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This dissertation considers the interaction between philosophy and satire in 
Greek literature of the Roman Empire through a detailed study of Lucian's 
Hermotimus. The argument is divided into three parts. Chapters 1, 2 and 3 show 
that recent studies of the dialogue value it according to two distinct ethic and 
aesthetic scholarly traditions (developmentalist and unitarian) which find 
themselves in opposition when defining the value of scepticism in Lucianic 
literature.  Chapters 4 and 5 address the form of the Hermotimus, and argue that 
despite its aporetic tendencies its main character, Lycinus, gives a moral 
message. Chapters 6 and 7 examine the ways in which the Hermotimus is a 
parody of protreptic literature and invites its readers not to live in any 
particular way, but to think about the rhetoric of other protrepic and aporetic 
philosophical texts of the second century AD. In the dissertation’s conclusion 
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Along with Tatian and Justin Martyr, Lucian is one of the few exponents of 
Syrian provincial literature written in Attic Greek during the ruling periods of 
the Antonine emperors.1 Lucian was born in Σαμόσατα (today’s Samsat),2 then 
a region of Commagene, and wrote in Greek during the reign of the Roman 
Emperors Antoninus Pius, Marcus Aurelius and Commodus. While Tatian and 
Justin Martyr used their expertise in Greek paideia to compose Apologies on 
behalf of their own understanding of Christianity, and to persuade others to 
become subscribers to their own doctrines at Rome, it is unclear as to how 
Lucian’s unstable identities interacted with his Syrian origin and his affiliations 
with Greece and Rome.3 As much as Lucian showed an interest in Greek 
education as a medium between Syrianess, hellenismos and latinitas, it is also 
within the contradictory endpoints and forms of expertise in paideia, rhetoric 
and philosophy, that he can be seen to situate his intellectual identity.  
Between the years 167 and 176 CE, Lucian wrote his longest dialogue, the 
Hermotimus or About the Philosophical Sects. The Hermotimus starts with a familiar 
Socratic-Platonic situation. Not in Athens, but in an unnamed Greek city, 
Hermotimus, a 60-year-old man who has been under the guidance of his Stoic 
teacher is on his way to class when he bumps into Lycinus who tells him that 
today’s lecture has been cancelled. Hermotimus’ teacher ate too much the night 
before, got drunk, started a fight with a rival Peripatetic philosopher, vomited 
on the way home, and is at present nursing a hangover. This unfortunate 
situation gives Lycinus some time to question Hermotimus about where he has 
gotten to in his studies, and what he hopes to achieve through the practice of 
Stoic philosophy. In the conversation that follows, Lycinus will try to persuade 
                                                          
1 Nasrallah (2005). 
2 Swain (1996), 19, and Swain (2007), 18-44. 
3 For more on the Syrian ethnic-identity in the Roman Empire and its relation to Greece and 
Greekness see Andrade (2013) part III p. 245-339. 
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Hermotimus to abandon his belief in Stoic philosophy and by the text’s end 
Hermotimus has promised to abandon his philosophical life for an ordinary 
one, and to avoid philosophers as though they were mad dogs. 
Throughout history, the Hermotimus has presented itself to readers and 
critics alike as a remarkably unstable text, for somen it is ‘rhetorical’ and 
‘playful’ and for others ‘philosophical’ and ‘serious’. The purpose of this thesis 
is to find new possible avenues of interpretation of the Hermotimus in order to 
solve some of the contradictions that emerge from previous readings of this 
text, and in such a way as to help integrate Lucian’s attitude to philosophy with 
his other unstable identities. 
 The scarce information about Lucian’s life, which has come down to us 
from his contemporaries, seems to show that philosophers who belonged to a 
philosophical sect found his humour abusive. The Cynic,4 the only dialogue in 
all the Lucianic oeuvre in which Lycinus (also the main character of the 
Hermotimus and one of Lucian’s favourite pseudonyms) loses the argumentative 
battle against his interlocutor, is a dialogue that might have been written as a 
defence of the Cynic school, as it takes the form of a controversy between a 
Cynic philosopher and Lycinus, who questions (φαυλίζεις) his opponent’s life 
chioces from the perspective of an unconverted man who sees wealth and 
reputation as the goal of life.5 Although contempt for non-philosophical goals is 
commonplace in Lucian, the way in which this criticism is directed at Lycinus 
leads to the suspicion that The Cynic was probably written by a member of the 
Cynic school, who attacked Lucian by turning one of his favourite personae 
against him, perhaps mirroring the literary technique that Lucian deploys when 
Cynic characters criticize their own school.  
 On the other hand, Lucian seems to have imitated philosophical 
discourses for the sake of protecting, not one philosophical doctrine over 
                                                          
4 For the authenticity of The Cynic see Dudley (1937), 144. 
5 Pseudo-Luc. Cyn. 5. 
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another, but philosophy as part of paideia. As is well known by Lucianists, 
according to Galen, Lucian made a book containing imitations of Heraclitus’ 
‚dark sayings.‛6 The book was given to someone else who took it to a well-
reputed philosopher who was in turn asked to do an exegesis. But the 
philosopher did not realize that he was being mocked, and offered 
sophisticated interpretations, thus embarrassing himself. Galen further informs 
us that Lucian also crafted some other meaningless phrases and sent them to 
some grammarians, who in the attempt of explaining them, ended up ridiculing 
themselves.7 
 Therefore, little can be drawn from the opinions of his contemporaries. 
Unsurprisingly, some Cynics seemed to have found Lucian’s humour offensive, 
and Galen’s account seems to confirm Lucian’s self-portrait as a μισαλάζων,8 
whose literature implies a reader sufficiently educated to be sceptical about the 
authenticity of classical texts, and capable of understanding a literary humour 
that plays with standard authorial conventions. But that is pretty much as far as 
we can go.  
 On the other hand, since Lucian’s death, his works seem to have been 
available without interruption.9 Scholars have perceived his influence in non-
Christian Greek literature, in the novels of Longus and Heliodorus, the Letters 
of Alciphron, and Julian’s Caesars. But none of these authors seems to shed 
much light onto the problem of Lucian’s local, moral, philosophical and 
religious stances or the aims of his humour.  
 Heinz-Günther Nesselrath has been one of the few scholars to take up 
                                                          
6 Escorialensis 804. Fol. 61v3-10; Parisinus R.C. 5749, Fol. 189v11-190r3 in Strohmaier (1976), 118. 
7 Strohmaier (1976) translates the Arabic as auf dem Wege der Anspielung; there is a textual 
problem in the last word in the original in Arabic. For a discussion of this passage see 
Shlapbach (2010), Hall (1981), 1-4; Jones (1986), 19; Clay (1992), 3402. For Heraclitus see Luc. Vit. 
Auct. 14, and with Luc. Mort. Dial. 8 (26) see Marcovich (1979). For the Grammarians see 
Wilhelm (1938).  
8 In a relevant article, MacLeod (1979) sympathized with the idea that the evidence that comes 
to us from the Arabic Galen matches Lucian’s own picture of himself in Piscator 20. See also Luc. 
Herm. 51.  
9 Tagliabue (2016). 
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the intellectual challenge of giving an interpretation of the Sceptical content of 
the Hermotimus in the light of Lucian’s proclivity towards literary Cynicism. In 
his view, the Hermotimus is a ‘Platonic’ dialogue written under the influence of 
Scepticism, in which Lycinus -one of Lucian’s masks but also a ‘new-Socrates’- 
debunks Hermotimus’ Stoicism and by extension any other form of dogmatic 
philosophy. For Nesselrath the Hermotimus shows not only that Lucian was not 
a superficial rhetorician and comedian, but that by putting in Lycinus’ 
argument the five modes of Agrippa, he was manifesting a clear approval of 
Scepticism.10 The presence of the modes of Agrippa upon which the dialogue is 
structured means that by the time Lucian wrote the Hermotimus he had already 
acquired a deeper knowledge of Scepticism (über das Niveau der Gemeinplätze).11 
In conclusion, and contrary to the majority of classicists studying this dialogue 
before him, Nesselrath suspects that Lucian might have written the Hermotimus 
in his later years (circa 176) and after he had abandoned a Menippean period 
(i.e. satiric, ironic, cynic literature), thereby justifying the use of Lucian’s 
pseudonym by supposing that he wanted his audiences to remember the great 
appreciation that he had for philosophy when he was in Athens.  
 Nevertheless, Nesselraths’ assumptions about the time of the 
composition of the Hermotimus and his high opinion of it are based on finding 
an alleged genuin ethischen Impetus in Lycinus’ recommended κοινὸς βίος and 
Hermotimus’ conversion to it. According to Nesselrath, the call to live like 
everyone else is similar to Sextus’ call for a βιωτικὴ τήρησις. As Nesselrath 
points out, even Peter von Möllendorff thinks there is some sort of ethical drive 
                                                          
10 In his (1998) and (2001) articles Nesselrath extended his conclusion, arguing that Lucian’s 
only two possible sources for the modes were either Agrippa or Favorinus. Without getting 
involved in the issue of Lucian’s opposing opinions about dogmatic philosophy and the 
Sceptical content of the Hermotimus, Bonazzi (2001) and Dechernaux (2010) have followed 
Nesselrath’s approach. Karavas’ (2009) opinion of Lucian’s recommendation in the Hermotimus 
to ‘stay sober and to distrust’ suggests that Lucian’s sceptic approach towards religion is 
substantial, and not just mere entertainment. 
11 Nesselrath (1992). 
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in the dialogue.12 For Nesselrath, the presence of this impetus means that not 
only was Lucian an unverbesserlich Komödiant and an uncompromised 
rhetorician, but even though Lucian never seriously held any philosophical 
doctrine, this does not mean that Lucian’s comedy is uncompromised regarding 
philosophy.  
 Nesselrath declares that his opinion about Lucian’s relationship to 
philosophy with regards to Lucian’s ethical impetus, is close to the opinions of 
the German right-wing scholar Rudolph Helm who was writing at the 
beginning of the 20th Century and of the Patriarch of Constantinople Photios, 
writing in the 9th Century:13 Lucian never seriously held any philosophical 
doctrine, even though at some point in his life he must have rejected all 
dogmatic philosophical schools, including the Cynic (although the attraction he 
had for it was moderate and not necesarilly doctrinal), though that does not 
imply that he did not distinguish false philosophers from true, and that among 
the true philosophers he liked some schools more than others. These 
contradictory sympathies depend on the separate intentions of each text 
devoted to them. But from the Hermotimus (Lucian’s longest and literarily and 
intellectually most challenging text)14 and the Parasite, one can gather that he 
had a positive opinion about the Sceptics. This allows Nesselrath to trace 
Lucian’s spiritual developement based on his knowledge of Scepticism. The 
greater degree of Sceptical arguments suggests that Lucian gained from 
Scepticism the spiritual freedom (geistige Freiheit) needed to acquire what he 
needed from the rest of the philosophical orientations for his own worldly un-
speculative inclinations. As a parallel example, Nesselrath points to the case of 
Cicero, who in a similar way took the teachings of the academic Sceptic Philo of 
Larissa to justify his own philosophical eclecticism. But Nesselrath argues that 
                                                          
12 Nesselrath (2001), 151 n. 33. citing Möllendorff (2000), 202 and S.E. P. I. 123. 
13 Nesselrath (1998). 
14 Nesselrath (2009) 131. 
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Lucian was never a radical Sceptic either and, even though in the Hermotimus he 
showed acceptance of Sceptic recommendations, he was, for most of his life, a 
temperate Cynic, like Demonax, who was not a fanatic of Cynicism, but 
somebody who advocated for the κοινὸς βίος, taking what was best from 
Socrates, Diogenes and Aristippus, and striving for a harmony between his 
deeds and words.15  
 This ethical drive present in Lucian’s Hermotimus not only gives purpose 
to Lucian’s anti-dogmatic comedy of philosophy, but also justifies the 
Hellenizing nature of his literature,16 since, according to Nesselrath, Lucian’s 
Syrian identity was that of an Eastern Roman, rather than a Syrian in the 
Roman Empire, who thought that Athens had as many moral flaws as Rome, 
and used his texts to promote himself as a Syrian able to aid these cities.17 
 Nevertheless, in the most recent commentary of the Hermotimus, Peter 
von Möllendorff offers an interpretation, which, if found true, could dismantle 
all or most of Nesselrath’s theory. Möllendorff acknowledges that there is some 
kind of ethical drive in the Hermotimus, but that Lucian does not give any 
constructive alternative plan (konstruktiven Gegenentwurf) for a reliable choice in 
lieu of that of a philosophic life. What looks like an alternative, the common life, 
is simply the exchange of the ascetic life for its exact opposite, a life of luxury,18 
but hidden under the guise of a κοινὸς βίος. The reader, who is aware of the 
dangers of perishing as part of the crowd, should admit that although the main 
character, Lycinus, has better arguments, he must dismiss the invitation to join 
the common life. Möllendorff thinks that at the end of the dialogue, 
Hermotimus, like Euthydemus in Xenophon’s Memorabilia,19 abandons the 
conversation unconvinced, knowing that he was unable to answer Socrates’ 
                                                          
15 Nesselrath (2001), 135-152. 
16 See Nesselrath (2009), 122-135 for a description of Lucian’s career, and see his essay about 
Lucian’s life in relation to the characteristics of his works and philosophy (2011), 11-28. 
17 Nesselrath (2009). 
18 Möllendorff (2000), 215. 
19 Xen. Mem. 4. 2, 39-40. 
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questions. In this sense, Hermotimus’ ‘conversion’ is for Möllendorff only a 
Zeichen von Geistes and an acceptance of the weakness of his character and 
arguments. The open ending of this dialogue is similar to Platonic aporetic 
dialogues. Lucian leaves the reader with no positive options, and invites his 
readers to analyse the situation from the outside, and to continue to 
philosophize about it after reading the text. 
 Möllendorff compares the effect that Hermotimus’ ‘conversion’ has on 
the reader to the effect that the battle of the logoi has on the spectator in 
Aristophanes’ Clouds,20 and concludes that, by involving Lycinus in a self-ironic 
game, in which he gives arguments on both sides like a sophist, Lucian is 
detaching himself from his character and at the same time promoting himself to 
an even better position as a pepaideumenos.  
 It should be noted that there is an on-going very similar discussion to the 
one that exists between Möllendorff and Nesselrath about the Hermotimus, 
between the latter and Serena Zweimüller’s interpretation of the Teacher of 
Rhetoric. For Zweimüller the narrator’s voice of the Teacher of Rhetoric is 
modelled on a deceiving kind of Socrates,21 and not only does she find it 
appropriate to talk about this text as one which could hint at the Nihilismus der 
Rhetorik by using the metaphor of the road, but she also thinks that it ends in an 
aporia.22 This interpretation leads Zweimüller to make long, albeit interesting 
and useful, reflections about the parallels between the Teacher of Rhetoric and 
Aristophanes’ Clouds, the pseudo-Platonic Alcibiades I and the Tabula of Cebes, 
and yet Nesselrath remains unconvinced that this is a text that talks about 
rhetoric in philosophical guise.23 
 So, which of the two interpretations should we take? Möllendorff and 
Nesselrath agree in the need to read the Hermotimus as a Platonic/Socratic 
                                                          
20 Aristoph. Cl. 880-1105. 
21 Zweimüller (2007), 35. 
22 Zweimüller (2007), 39 and 59-67. 
23 Nesselrath (2010). 
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dialogue, but they do so in different ways. Nesselrath interprets Hermotimus’ 
conversion at the ending of the dialogue as the successful result of Lycinus’ 
Socratic persuasion. For him the Hermotimus is a straightforward protreptic text, 
biographic even, because it seriously tries to convince the reader with Sceptical 
arguments that living the κοινὸς βίος is more ethical and reasonable than living 
a philosophical life based on dogma.  In contrast, for Möllendorff the whole 
point of the Hermotimus is to leave to the reader the maieutic task of discovering 
better reasons to study Stoic and dogmatic philosophy and to beware the perils 
of Scepticism. Those readers who were convinced by Lycinus’ Sceptical 
arguments have failed to recognize his Socratic-like irony and have wrongfully 
believed that Lucian was delivering his true and honest opinions in the voice of 
Lycinus. If so, the Hermotimus, Möllendorff believes, does not contain the 
Sceptical advice of living like everyone else, but is disturbingly cynic (bestürzend 
zynisch) and satiric, because the moral choices in it cancel each other out, and 
encourages the reader to think in general about the propositions given by the 
two characters.  
 Even though Möllendorff is not explicit about it, his interpretation of the 
ending of the Hermotimus could invite us to read the Hermotimus as though we 
were Academic Sceptics reading an aporetic Platonic text. Even if today not 
many interpreters believe that Plato did not give definitive proposals and 
opinions of his own in his dialogues,24 this was the view of some Middle 
Platonists, for whom Plato was really a Sceptic, and ‘whose message was that 
we should look for the truth without any expectation of finding anything better 
than the merely probable;’ and whose ‘chief or ultimate aim was to encourage 
us to do philosophy, and think things out for ourselves rather than supposing 
that we can get what we need from others, or from books.’25  In this sense, 
                                                          
24 MacCabe (2006), 40. 
25 Rowe (2006),13. For the Middle Platonists in general and in the age of Lucian see Dillon (1977) 
184-185.The Sceptical reading of Plato belongs to the second century BC. Even though in 
Lucian’s time Platonism was revived as a dogmatic sect (Plutarch, Apuleius, Albinus) there 
 15 
Möllendorff seems to suggest that the Hermotimus as a Platonic aporetic 
dialogue is designed to invite the reader to reason, to orientate and to persuade 
him about important subjects, even if it fails to produce absolute conclusions. If 
so, then the Hermotimus is a protreptic text, like one of Plato’s aporetic 
dialogues, because it is an exhortation to keep on philosophizing about life 
choices. In the end, both Nesselrath and Möllendorff agree that the Hermotimus 
is a philosophically interesting text, but they do so for different reasons.  
The purpose of Chapters 1-3 will be to trace the origins of our present 
paradigms and to make explicit the aesthetic and literary values implicit in 
these most recent opinions and value judgements about the humour of the 
Hermotimus. As I will try to show, their divergence, which clearly has to do with 
their assumptions as readers about the presence or the absence of an ethical 
stance in the text, is one that historically developed after Lucian’s works fell 
into the hands of early Christians, and ultimately led to two different methods 
in our times of approaching Lucian’s work. These I will label: developmentalist 
and unitarian, in comparison to the situation found in Platonic studies.26   
In order to solve some of the interpretative issues raised by this 
histocially-constructed divergence, Chapters 4-5 will look at what the 
Hermotimus is about and at its internal logic in order to try and understand what 
the consequences of Hermotimus’ conversion to the ordinary life and Lycinus’ 
propositions really are. In these two chapters I hope to prove that the form of 
the Hermotimus is that of an aporetic text, but which nevertheless contains the 
clear message of keeping away from one’s hopes and one’s desires.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
were, however, some exceptions, as is the case with Favorinus, who supported the old-school 
sceptic Academy, see Holford-Strevens (1988), 72-8. See also Trapp (2007), xi. 
26 In general terms, the developmentalist theory, which assumes that Plato changed his mind 
and his doctrine over time, was first established by K.F. Hermann (1839), and became the 
dominant view thereon after. For a typically developmentalist approach to Plato see Vlastos 
(1991). According to unitarians, Plato's works contain a unity of doctrine and more or less a 
single world-view, this trend is today represented by Shorey (1903) and Kahn (1996). Of course, 
the matter is much more complicated, see Long (2013), 131-2, Taylor (2002), Nails (1993), 
Thesleff (1982). 
 16 
 But it is not possible to read the Hermotimus simply as a narrartive that 
stays within its own fictional world. Chapter 6 will show that the Hermotimus is 
a parody constructed upon classical Platonic themes and clichéd situations of 
protreptic and aporetic philosophical discourses, which have the clear aim of 
attacking the philosophical aspect of utopia. Chapter 7 will show that the 
Hermotimus is not just a parody of the Tabula of Cebes, but that it is also dialogue, 
which through the blending of genres, illustrates how the rhetoric of a problem 
can be part of the problem itself. 
Lastly, the conclusions of this thesis offer general observations about the 
aischrologic potential of the Hermotimus and other concerns and horizons of 
expectation that potential readers of the Hermotimus might have, and have had, 




The Christianization of Lucian: 
From the First Readings of Lucian to Voltaire 
 
1. Setting the Framework. From Early Christianity to Byzantium 
 
The preoccupation with identifying Lucian’ serious works seems to have 
emerged two centuries after itr writing with the rise of Christendom. As we 
have seen, Lucian’s contemporaries do not seem to have found Lucian’s 
mischievous tricks philosophically challenging. Eunapius, writing in the fourth 
century, was Lucian’s last non-Christian reader and, in his introduction to his 
Lives of the Sophists, he seems to have been the first to divide Lucian’s works into 
the ‘seriously’ philosophical and the comic. While discussing the works of those 
who have written lives about philosophers, he compared Plutarch’s way of 
describing his teacher Ammonius in various of his works with Lucian’s who 
‘took seriously the task of producing laughter, wrote a life of his contemporary 
Demonax, and in that book and in a few others he was serious throughout.’1 
But, when the work of Lucian fell into the hands of the Christian fathers, that 
attention became focused on the serious content of Lucian’s work and its 
relationship to the purposes of his humour.  
 Early Christian intellectuals, who were still worried about paganism and 
the increasing diversity of Christian sects along with the presence of the pagan 
philosophical sects, debated extensively on what to do with pagan ‘classical’ 
culture that permeated all the layers of education in the Roman Empire.2 The 
need to believe in one true God encouraged the suspicion of believers not only 
of falsehoods, but also of nothingness. From this period onwards Lucian was 
identified either as a pagan attacking Christian values from a specific pagan 
philosophical doctrine, or as an opportunist mocking everything for his own 
                                                          
1 Vit.Soph. II 1,9 (454). 
2 On this point see Zappala (1990), 12. See also Hagendahl (1958), and Daniélou, (1973). 
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personal benefit and without any concern for moral principles. 
 Isidore of Pelusium, writing in the 5th century, for instance, was allergic 
to the idea of paganism being useful in any way to Christianity.3 In a letter 
dedicated to a sophist named Harpocras, reasoning in a way that recalls the 
argument from dispute (ek diaphonias), one of the Sceptic modes of Agrippa 
found in the Hermotimus and in Sextus Empiricus, Isidore concedes that Lucian 
might have noticed that one cannot trust the diversity of doctrines of paganism. 
According to Isidore, heresy and ambition are born from diversity of opinions 
about the truth, but one cannot argue that ambition causes disagreement among 
Christians as it did among the Greeks, because in the Gospels there is only one 
orthodox consensus about God. If Lucian criticized the multiplicity of creeds, 
Isidore argued, he did so because he must have belonged to the Cynic school, or 
in other words, because he was himself a pagan whose attacks ought to be 
understood only as part of a wider context in which pagans, unlike Christians, 
could not agree with each other about religion. 
 The interpretations of Isidore and others like him, in which they argued 
that Lucian ridiculed or shamed his targets in the knowledge of there being 
something truly and seriously respectable towards which he was trying to turn 
his readers, can be called dogmatic. The process of forcing Lucian to fit in, in 
one way or another, to Christian morality that began with the last polytheist 
intellectuals and the early Christian readers from the 3th to the 5th Century and 
finished with the production of the earliest manuscripts that we possess in 
Byzantium in the 9th Century, can be described as the ‘Christianization’ of 
Lucian.  
 However, the bipolar framework encouraged by Christian authors, also 
allows for the possibility that even if Lucian was ignorant of the truth about the 
Christian God, he knew that everything coming from the upholders of the 
pagan religion had to be rejected, because it was false, and that he was an 
                                                          
3 Isid. Pel. Ep. IV. 
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author constantly working to reach Truth. We can call this kind of 
interpretation of Lucian’s humour ‘positive sceptic’.  
 This was the opinion of the erudite advisor of Constantine, Lactantius, 
who also happened to be the first Christian author to comment on Lucian, and 
the first to have associated his humour with one that laughs at all the false 
creeds of the pagans.4 Lactantius’ point was that paganism is per se ridiculous 
and a marker of ignorance, not only from the perspective of those who know 
the Christian God, but also from the perspective of pagans themselves, as the 
Roman satirist Lucilius and Lucian, ‘who spared neither gods nor men’, 
demonstrate. In this way, Lactantius’ was not only pointing at Lucian’s parodic 
style and its criticism of the classical religious authorities, the Olympian gods 
and Greek philosophers;5 but he was also introducing the possibility of 
interpreting Lucian and other kinds of pagan literature as expressions of 
negative theology or positive scepticism. 
 Lactantius’s interpretation can be called positive sceptic, since he seems 
to have thought that if Lucian never embraced Christianity, this is simply 
because he was ignorant of it and because in all likelihood he was self-conscious 
about his own ignorance. Yet he knew that what was presented to him as the 
greatest truth (i.e. non-Christian religons) was false, even if he did not know 
whether there was a truth or not, or whether anyone had ever found it, and had 
laughed at the Greek-pagan cognitive universe in its totality. Therefore, Lucian 
had no interest in expressing any kind of truth in his works, or even in showing 
his own satiric, artistic, philosophical or religious stance, and would have 
limited the use of humour and scepticism against what is certainly false and 
wrong. Unlike the ‘dogmatic’ interpretation of Lucian’s humour, which is 
protreptic, the consequences of reading it as positive sceptic are only corrective 
or apotreptic. 
                                                          
4 Lactantius, Inst. 1.9.8.  
5 See Marsh (1998), 6-7. 
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 Both the ‘dogmatic’ and the ‘positive sceptic’ interpretations of Lucian’s 
humour imply that the kind of laughter that it encourages is not only 
‘aischrologic’ but also ‘consequential’.6 In either case, Lucian’s texts attack the 
opinions and behaviours that he would have thought are wrong. The only 
difference is that to explain Lucian’s humour as being dogmatic, one has to 
assume that the function of causing laughter is to encourage the reader to 
believe in a truth made explicit, but if one explains Lucian’s humour as being 
positive sceptic one has to assume that Lucian is causing offence but in the 
knowledge that truth is possible.  
 A text like the Hermotimus, which seems to contain a serious criticism of 
all dogmatic philosophy, can be read as expressing the ideas that Lucian had at 
a particular moment of his life in which he rejected dogmatic philosophy, and 
thereby, the consequences of humour can be not just corrective (proving that 
philosophy is wrong), but also moralizing and even ‘protreptic’ (that the 
common life is better).  
*** 
 
Besides the ‘dogmatic’ and the ‘positive scepitic’ ways of interpreting Lucian’s 
humour, Christian authors of the 9th Century began to argue that Lucian might 
                                                          
6 The term aischrology normally applies to deliberately shameful and offensive humour that is 
usually also obscene and that seeks to ‘change’ something (for example, the status of the 
reputation that an individual enjoys in a society). Aischrology is often associated with the 
scornful tones of iambus and of Old Comedy. Because aischrology is an operation of language 
performed with a deliberate social intention, which seeks for reprisals, we can say that it is 
‘consequential’, as opposed to a more playful, non-hostile and amiable kind of humour, which 
can be experienced outside the sphere of political and social life, and which seeks mostly to 
entertain without causing offence to anyone. Therefore, offensiveness is in many ways what 
allows one to distinguish between consequential and non-consequential humour. Although 
Lucian's humour seeks to make (some) things look ugly and shameful, it does not 
characteristically use obscene humour in order to do so. Perhaps this is the reason why there is 
a tendency to consider Lucian’s humour as non-consequential.  For aischrology and the 
consequentiality of laugher, see the entries in Halliwell’s (2008) book and its introduction 1-50; 
in particular, 33-41. For play as something different from the consequential business of political 
and social life see 115. 
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have been absolutely unconcerned with truth and falsehood, mocking that 
which is good and bad, and true and false, all the same. If so, Lucian’s own 
opinions were not to be found in his own texts and, if they were, then they too 
were the object of laughter, therefore making his own opinions as true and as 
false as everything else in the text.  
 Lucian became an incredibly popular author in Byzantium for schooling 
purposes.7 In this period the earliest manuscripts of Lucian we possess were 
produced,8 his works were catalogued, and titles were added to his dialogues.9 
His influence can be found in early Byzantium, for example, in the speeches of 
Chorikios of Gaza.10 But even if Lucian was perceived as a useful source from 
pagan antiquity, at least for linguistic and pedagogic purposes, and as 
paradigm of excellent Greek, he was also seen as some kind of atheist mocker, 
as glossators and intellectuals of the time attest.  
 This third way of interpreting Lucian’s humour, which I call ‘nihilisitic’, 
was established first by Photius of Constantinople, and the Arethas of Caesarea, 
who were the first to doubt that the content of Lucian’s comedy and Lucian’s 
message had any useful message of its own, either from the perspective of 
pagan philosophy and religion or from the perspective of Christianity.  
 Photius wrote various comments about Lucian in his Library, admired 
Lucian for his Attic language, and enjoyed finding out that the True Histories are 
a parody of Antonius Diogenes’ Wonders Beyond Tule and Iambulus. Yet, when 
it came to the content of Lucian’s work, he thought him to be a mocker of the 
pagans who lacked any ideas of his own:  
  
                                                          
7 Jenkins (1963), 44; Robinson (1979), 68-81; Zappala (1990) 23-25 and Baldwin in Macleod 
(1994), 1400-1404 for recent work on imitations of Lucian.  
8 An account of the manuscripts of Lucian can be found in Nilén (1906), Wittek (1952), Bolgar 
(1954), 480-481; McLeod (1980) and (1994), 1398-1399, 1404-1419; Nesselrath (1984) and (1990); 
Itzkowitz (1986); Bompaire (1993). 
9 See Ureña Bracero (1995), 23-37. 
10 Fitzgerald Johnson (2006), 109.  
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Read Lucian’s Phalaris, some Dialogues of the Dead and Dialogues 
of the Courtesans and other essays on various matters, in almost 
all of which he pours ridicule on Greek culture – their stupid 
and erroneous notions of the gods, their irresistible urge for 
immorality and license, the poet’s monstrous ideas and fictions, 
the resulting political mistakes, the irregular course of their 
lives in general with many vicissitudes, the boastful character of 
their philosophers who are full of hypocrisy and empty notions 
– in short, as we said, his purpose is to write satire in Greek 
prose. He himself seems to be one of those people who take 
nothing seriously; while satirising and ridiculing the beliefs of 
others, he does not state his own creed, unless one is to say that 
his creed is to believe in nothing. [...] The inscription on the 
volume allows us to infer that Lucian was a person of no 
beliefs. It runs: 
 
I Lucian, expert in ancient follies, wrote these works; 
What men deem wise is foolish, 
And there is no ideal among humanity; 
For what you admire is laughable in others.11 
 
Even though today scholars agree that this epigram is spurious, for many 
centuries it was taken as authentic. It will become clear that Photius’ opinion 
about Lucian is the exact opposite of Eunapius. For Photius, there is nothing 
serious in Lucian’s laughter; everything ‘serious’ is humoristic material. Thus, 
Lucian’s works are only valuable for their form, which offers rhetorical 
entertainment, and not for their content. 
 Arethas of Caesarea, who apparently was one of Photius’ students, 
anticipated the arguments against the possibility of finding in Lucian’s humour 
anything meaningful, even in his style. Indeed, Arethas is responsible for 
making the relationship between Lucian and the Christians much bitterer.12 He 
criticized Lucian for being irreverent towards the image of Jesus and for 
ridiculing his followers, for denying divine providence and, most of all, for his 
theological and philosophical relativism.  
                                                          
11 Phot. Bibl. 96a-b (trans Wilson).   
12 Russo (2001), 13-15. 
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 Arethas made a substantial comment on the Hermotimus, stating that if 
truth, as the Sceptics want it, is unattainable then there is also no reason to 
prefer the Sceptics to other schools,13 and implicitly Christians to pagans. As 
Epictetus was only too aware,14 it might have been difficult for a Sceptic to 
defend his own position, when he ought to be sceptical about his own 
Scepticism. Defending the idea that one has to believe something to be true in 
order to live, Arethas tried to defend Hermotimus’ attempt to show that it is 
possible to know which philosophy possesses truth, just as Pheidias could have 
guessed the whole from the part:  
 
He here takes up the ‘wrapped up argument’, which is 
sophistical, and bends it to no useful purpose.  Knowledge of 
the part, too, is credible in itself and true and has no need of the 
universal.  For example, two and four are parts of number, then 
next the number ten that encloses them, just as a hundred 
encloses ten, and a thousand a hundred, and ten thousand a 
thousand; but there is nothing to prevent the layman who does 
not understand ten, let alone the true nature of number, 
understanding directly at least that one and one are two and 
twice two is four.  So the man who misuses this sort of 
argument, to the effect that if someone doesn’t know the 
universal, he doesn’t know the particular either, is an utter 
scoundrel; because on the contrary the whole is inferred from 
the parts, and the assembling of the particulars is the basis for 
knowledge of the universal, since the so-called universal does 
not subsist as an entity in its own right.  This is what your wise 
Aristotle means when he calls universals ‘mere twittering’ 
somewhere in his work.  So there is nothing to prevent Phidias’ 
knowledge of the lion’s claw, the part, from suggesting to him 
by analogy the creature’s size, even if not its shape.  But if you 
are going to abolish analogy, what else will you be doing than 
condemning yourself to an irrational existence and a complete 
lack of awareness of everything that exists?  I don’t envy you 
this clever lunacy of yours, which will have you thrown to the 
                                                          
13 Perhaps adapting the argument found in Plat Tht. 161 C-E. 
14 Epict. Diss. I. 20. 4-5 
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wolves – Lycinus by name, Lycinus by nature.15 
 
In a similar vein Arethas criticized Lycinus for being a sophist and a 
Sceptic: 
 
You seem to speak the nonsense of the Sceptics, Lycinus. They 
too maintain that comprehension is unattainable and so 
absurdly claim that the truth cannot be determined, insofar as 
all men – because of the equipollence of arguments as well – 
need somebody to decide the issue, and they say that this is 
impossible for a human being, in as much as no-one on earth is 
immune from being diverted from a true judgement.  I will add 
this too on my own account: since you, who are spouting this 
nonsense, are a human being too, you too in your turn are 
undone by your own quibbling arguments, which sensible 
people have no time for, and are thus struck down with your 
own feathers.16 
 
Arethas is therefore the first to properly align Lucian with ἀμφίβολοι 
arguments and with a negative conception of sophistry as a form of extreme 
scepticism.17 For Arethas, if one denies that ‘analogic’ reasoning is a criterion of 
reality then one denies all reality, and is prone to live a life in disarray. 
Accordingly, he shows no interest in Lucian’s adherence to Cynicism or to any 
other philosophical school. Arethas defended inductive reasoning, and 
therefore felt entitled to defend the logic behind arithmetical operations against 
Lycinus’ scepticism about axiomatic truths. But by arguing in this way, he was 
also recognizing some philosophical weight in the arguments of the 
Hermotimus, and in Lucian more generally, even more so when he identified 
Lycinus as he who ‘speaks the nonsense of the Sceptics.’  
 By introducing the possibility that Lucian completely lacks of any moral 
                                                          
15 Schol. in Herm. 54. I am extremely grateful to M. Trapp for the translation of this difficult 
passage.  
16 Schol in Herm. 53 (trans. Trapp). 
17 Schol. in Herm. 70. 
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standpoint whatsoever, Photius’ and Arethas’ interpretations of the content of 
Lucian’s work completed the basis of the aesthetic and ethic framework started 
by Lactantius and Isidore, and it is from these that most of the judgements of 
value about the Hermotimus and other Lucianic works have been made ever 
since. Either for Lucian truth is impossible, or if it is possible he does not care 
for it. If it is the latter, then the only possible explanation for Lucian writing 
texts is that either his purpose was to entertain, or that because publishing was 
somehow beneficial for him. This other category for the interpretation, that 
which I have called nihilistic (as opposed to dogmatic), puts Lucian in closer 
relation to a radical scepticism (as opposed to positive scepticism) in which 
everything perceived and reasoned (including the own opinions of Lucianic 
main characters) is as true and as false as everything else, and to the sophists, 
who had the skill of arguing on both sides, regardless of what is true or false in 
reality. It is, therefore, in Byzantium when the two opposing images so familiar 
to us - Lucian the atheist, sceptic, selfish rhetorical entertainer and Lucian the 
satirist moralist philosopher - were fully formed.  
 
2. Adapting the Framework to the Reformation 
 
The three forms of interpreting Lucian’s humour (dogmatic, positive sceptic, 
and nihilistic) became the aesthetic basis for judging the appropriateness of his 
texts once they became part of the canonic literature for learning Greek during 
the Italian, and at a later stage, the northern Renaissance. But bringing texts 
from Byzantium to Italy also meant rethinking what the role of pagan religion 
and philosophy was with the Christian world.  
 The tensions between pagan philosophy and Christianity in Western 
Europe, in the wake of the arrival of Lucianic texts, are best exemplified in the 
discussions between Coluccio Salutati, a humanist acquainted with Lucian, 
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though probably not with the Hermotimus,18 and Giovanni Dominici of the 
Dominican order.19 Unlike Giovanni Dominici and others who believed that the 
works of antiquity were of no use to Christianity, Salutati and other early 
Humanists were convinced of the contrary. Salutati used his power as the 
chancellor of Florence to invite in 1396 Manuel Chrysoloras from Byzantium to 
teach Greek. Chrysoloras brought with him the codex now called Vaticanus 
Graecus 87, which contains the Hermotimus, and in this way the dialogue found 
its place among the Italian humanists.  
 Even though it is hard to attest to the influence of the Hermotimus in early 
Italian Renaissance authors, some of whom would have been aware of its 
existence before the printed editions of Lucian’s work, it is already possible to 
find a level of cautiousness towards his writings in the works of individuals 
such as Maffeo Vegio, who limited himself to imitating the form of Lucianic 
dialogues, but avoided Lucian’s scepticism and love for paradoxes.20  
 The first printed editions and translations of Lucian into Latin mark the 
end of the Christianization of the content of Lucian’s work and the beginning of 
the interpretations of Lucian in the early modern academies. The new interest in 
Lucian’s works prompted Giovanni Aurispa to buy, and take from 
Constantinople to Venice in 1493, another codex including Lucian’s complete 
works. This manuscript was probably the one used for Lucian’s editio princeps 
published in Florence in 1496 by Lorenzo Francesco de Alopa and edited by 
Janus Lascaris. The second printed edition of Lucian was made by Aldus 
Manutius in 1503,21 and later reprinted in 1522. Erasmus of Rotterdam (who 
certainly knew about Janus Lascaris) and Thomas More used either Lascaris’ or 
Manutius’ Greek editions for their Latin translations of Lucian published in 
                                                          
18 See Tomassi (2011), 103-104 and Mattioli (1980), 39 n. 2.  
19 Matton (1996) 255-260. 
20 Marsh (1998), 67-71. 
21 On the date see Thompson (1940). 
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1506 with the title Luciani complura opuscula ab Erasmo et Thoma Moro 
interpretibus optimis in Latinorum linguam traducta.  
 However, neither More nor Erasmus were the first to translate the 
Hermotimus. Conrad Wackers (Conradus Goclenius), the second professor of 
Latin at the Collegium Trilingue of the Catholic University of Louvain, founded 
in 1518, was inspired by the ideas of Erasmus and deserves the credit of being 
the first to render the Hermotimus into Latin. Erasmus had introduced Wackers 
to More in a letter sent on July 1521, praising his teaching and scholarship.22 In 
response, on October 29th 1522, Wackers sent Thomas More a letter,23 which 
served as a prologue to his translation of the Hermotimus. In this letter, Wackers 
is clear about his reasons for translating the Hermotimus, which in turn are 
symptomatic of the way in which the positive sceptic interpretation of Lucian 
could be used in light of the political situation of the day.   
 For Wackers, the Hermotimus is more than a document on a delightful 
theme (argumenti festivitate), it exposes those who pollute the name of 
philosophy by pretending to be philosophers, and is a way of stripping liars of 
their authority. False philosophers live just like the common crowd, and this is 
precisely the kind of lifestyle that Lucian disapproves of. Therefore, for 
Wackers, this text by Lucian was attempting to correct the wrong habits of 
those who under the guise of virtue were living a secret life in contradiction to 
their doctrines and their books. Lucian was acting like a Lysimachus, who 
according to Carystius in his Historical Notes had expelled all philosophers from 
his kingdom, just like the Athenians who expelled them from Attica, and the 
Romans, who banished all sophists from Rome.24 Therefore, for Wackers, 
Lucian was a positive sceptic, who in the Hermotimus imitated Plato’s style. But, 
unlike Lactantius, Wackers saw the Sceptical arguments of the Hermotimus, in 
                                                          
22 Erasmus. Ep. 1220 in Allen (1922). 
23 More’s reply can be found in Rogers, S. R. and Rogers E.F. (1949). 
24 Ath. 13.92. 
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the context of the rise of Protestantism, as a weapon against the multiplicity of 
opinions about Christianity, and not just against the multiplicity of opinions 
about truth of paganism.  
 In much the same way as Wackers, but from the Lutheran point of view, 
Vinzenz Heidecker (Vincentius Opsoboeus), viewed Lucian through positive 
eyes. A translator of Martin Luther into German, Heidecker published in 
November 1527 another translation of the Hermotimus in an anthology, which 
included Lucian’s Amores translated by Chiliano Mansueto, and Plutarch’s On 
the Education of Children by Johannes Mezler. Heidecker was at the time 
immersed in the study of Greek in Nuremberg and preparing to become the 
new director of a gymnasium in Ansbach, which he did some months later, and 
stayed there until his death in 1539. The anthology was dedicated to Christoph 
Gugel, jurist at Nuremberg, and a key figure for the implementation of the new 
Lutheran legal reforms after the Peasants’ War (1524-1525).  
 The tone of Heidecker’s praefatio to the Hermotimus shows how this 
translation of the Hermotimus, like that of Wackers’, intended to put Lucianic 
Sceptical arguments at the service of Lutheran Protestantism. Heidecker begins 
by reminding the reader that for Paul, empty philosophy had to be handled 
with care, otherwise men always detested philosophy because of its infinite 
number of sects obscuring and polluting truth with their contradictory theories. 
Just as a body has to be represented with harmony and proportion according to 
nature - as Horace wrote in the prologue of The Art of Poetry – in order for it not 
to be strange and to keep unity,25 in the same way a professional discipline or a 
way of living is not correct if there are too many discordant sects claiming to be 
able to teach it, hence leading people astray.  
 For Heidecker ever since Homer, pagan philosophers have given 
contradictory and irreconcilable theories about everything. The Hermotimus 
(Lucian’s advice against the counsel offered by philosophy) shows the 
                                                          
25 Hor. A. P. 1-37. 
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remarkable folly of philosophers, and explains to everyone that it is impossible 
to find an exact philosophy owing to the multiplicity of sects and their very 
different ways (vias diversissimas). When followed, philosophy causes people to 
spend the most beautiful part of their youth in trifles, rendering futile the 
administration of civil affairs.  
 Lucian’s attack against the discordes disciplinas of philosophical pagan 
sects reminded Heidecker of the ills currently besetting Christianity, torn apart 
by the discrepancy of religious sects and by the diversis vivendi modis, which 
defeated faith and extinguished true piety. One could have been carried away 
by the many contradictory pagan heresies, but there were also more digniores 
magistri to follow in antiquity, such as Plato Aristotle, Cratippus, Zeno, 
Epictetus, amongst many others. Heidecker believed that until the message of 
the Gospels was truly heard, and until our ignorance was taken away, the 
deceits of the Devil would keep on taking man by surprise. Heidecker bitterly 
complained that the Christian sects of his time are ‘the filthiest dregs of the 
most stupid sophists and those most impure frogs’ (spurcissimam illam fecem 
indoctissimorum sophistarum et imundissimas ranas).26  
 Heidecker’s translation of the Hermotimus is therefore a gift in gratitude 
to Christoph Gugel for having spoken against William of Ockham, Duns Scotus, 
and Thomas, and the plague born from them, Johann Eck, Jacob Lemp, people 
at Brussels and Oxford, Bartholomew Usingius, Petrus Tartaretus and John 
Versor, along with the magistros stupidissimos, modernists, realists and Thomists, 




Both Eramsus of Rotterdam and Marthin Luther valued differently Lucian’s 
humour as being unconcerned with regards to Truth. Of the two, Erasmus 
                                                          
26 Heidecker (1527), 8. 
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presents the most original interpretation, not only because he was one of the 
first in the early modern period to attempt to ‘Christianize’ Cynicism, by 
placing Socrates, Antisthenes, and Diogenes at almost the same level as Jesus 
and the apostles, but also because he made the attempt to align Lucianic 
scepticism with a true belief in God.   
 For Erasmus, as well as for Thomas More, Lucian was the ideal satirist, 
since his works suited the Horatian criteria of being enjoyable and useful at the 
same time.27 He saw Lucian’s comedy as somehow all-encompassing, for he 
believed the Syrian had been an elegant philosopher and sophist, and a satirist 
who attacked the unnecessary rationalism of philosophers ‘more in play than in 
slander and sparing not a single one of them’.28  
 Erasmus cleverly used Lucian’s sceptical arsenal in the Praise of Folly, 
published in 1509, to show what not to believe, but without encouraging 
disbelief in God: Folly attacks the Stoics for their contradictions between deeds 
and words, and their unviable rationalism, and praises Academic scepticism for 
quenching the thirst for knowledge. Happiness, states Folly, lies in opinion and 
not in knowledge, for nothing can be known and usually it is something against 
the enjoyment of life.  
 Yet, it is only after his contact with Wackers that we seem to find in the 
works of Erasmus some influence of the Hermotimus.29 This is perhaps most 
notorious in the controversy De Libero Arbitro Διατριβή published in 1524, in 
which Erasmus tried to prove to Martin Luther that, since it was impossible to 
find a safe criterion suitable to learn the mysteries of the Scriptures, one would 
do better to suspend judgment of the different opinions of theologians on the 
true meaning of the Scriptures, and submitt to the decrees of the Church. In this 
                                                          
27 Hor. A. P. 343. 
28 In Marsh (1998), 10, citing Botfield (1861), 70 and Bussi (1978), 13.  
29 First printed in 1531, besides the De Libero Arbitro Διατριβή a parody of the Hermotimus can 
also be found at the beginning of The Seraphic Funeral; see Thompson (1997), 996-999. 
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way, Erasmus cleverly used the Sceptic arguments of the Hermotimus to fit his 
own religious war-agenda. 
 In spite of Heidecker’s effort to portray Lucian’s comedy as useful 
positive scepticism in the service of Christianity and the Reformation, in 1529 
Luther bitterly said to Erasmus: ‘Christ will judge him as atheos and as a 
Lucianic Epicurus. He is a light-minded man, mocking all religions as his dear 
Lucian does, and serious about nothing but calumny and slander.’30 Later he 
added, ‘much worse than Lucian, mocking all things under the guise of 
holiness.’31 Luther’s opinion of Lucian’s humour deserves some attention.  
 As seen in the interpretations of Wackers and Heidecker, during the 
Reformation Lucian’s scepticism was also interpreted as positive, but the 
Byzantine dichotomy Monotheistic Christian truth- polytheistic Pagan 
falsehood, was replaced by the dichotomy True Christianity- multiplicity of 
creeds (pagan or Christian).  Luther reformulated under this ethical framework 
the old opinions of Arethas and Photius in a way which could counter the 
Lucianic humanism of Erasmus, hence Lucian’s comedy was seen as 
panaischrologic entertainment or mere entertainment with no concern for 
morality.32  
 This pre-nihilistic interpretation of Lucian also allowed people such as 
Luis Vives to argue that because Lucian was of Asiatic origin his language was 
too rhetorical to express any truth, although he did conceded at times to the 
beauty of Lucian’s style,33 which he remarked was, nevertheless, only a jeux de 
sprit and dangerous, vain rhetoric. Yet, Erasmus’ use of the sceptic arguments of 
                                                          
30 Luther, EE Viri  in Smith (1911), 211. 
31 Smith (1911), 212. Both references to Luther are cited in Duncan (1979), 79. 
32 See Marsh (1998), 170, who points to Erasmus’ remark that his critics might think that he is an 
imitator of Old Comedy and a certain Lucian. Relihan (1996), 279 notices the resemblance of the 
view from above of Folly in Praise of the Folly 48 with that of Menippus in the Icaromenippus, but 
then writes: ‘Despite his intimate acquaintance with Lucian, Erasmus does not animate the 
person of Menippus in his other works, though one of the Colloquies, the Peregrinatio Religionis 
Ergo, has a Menedemus as one of his characters; Menedemus and Menippus are confused in 
Diogenes Laertius 6. 102.'  
33 Vives Coll (1959), 45-53. See Duncan (1979), 80 for Vives’ contempt for rhetoric of wit. 
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the Hermotimus in the De Libero Arbitro Διατριβή might be closer to Luther’s 
interpretation than they seem. Erasmus finds Lucian’s scepticism and lack of 
ethical stance valuable as it serves the purpose of approaching God by stating 
all that is not God. For Luther too, Lucian’s comedy lacks an ethical impetus, 
but for him this is a matter of contempt, as unlike, Erasmus, he believed that a 
Christian had to be certain about the truth of God.34 
 
3. Lucian’s Religious Scepticism  
 
As the translations of Lucian, Julian, Dio, Stobaeus, the Cynic Letters, Diogenes 
Laertius, Galen, and Plutarch refreshed the insecurities of early Christian 
authors towards ancient Cynicism, the new translations of Sextus Empiricus 
became the founding stone of Modern Pyrrhonism and Scepticism.35 In the 17th 
Century, when Empirical scepticism about all religious faith began to be seen as 
positive, the hypothesis that Lucian had been a member of the Sceptics became 
more attractive.  
 Modern scepticism implied a change of perception about Lucian’s doubt. 
We have seen how Lucian’s sceptical humour could be perceived as targeting 
false religion and sectarianism, that is to say, falsehood. Even though Erasmus 
had already introduced the possibility of Lucian’s humour targeting dogmatic 
religiosity, with the rise of modern Scepticism it became possible to see Lucian 
as a writer who raised doubts not just about falsehood, but about the possibility 
of anyone or any institution knowing what Truth was.    
 The Hermotimus was not very much read in England. During the 
Elizabethan period, after Thomas More was beheaded in 1535 and after the 
death of Erasmus the year after, Lucianism became synonymous with 
                                                          
34 Popkin (1960) 6-7. 
35 See Floridi (2002); Popkin (1979). 
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disrespect, abuse and religious deviation, and a reminder of the Reformation.36 
In Stuart England the Hermotimus was not read because Johannes Benedictius 
omitted Heidecker’s translation of it under the pretext of poor quality. In 1634, 
Thomas Hickes published a Life of Lucian which serves as a prologue to the 
translations into English made by his father Francis. Here, the Hermotimus is 
mentioned in passing, but neither Francis Hickes’ nor Jasper Mayne’s later 
edition published in 1663 and 1644 include the Hermotimus.37 Again under the 
pretext of poor quality, the Hermotimus was also not included in the first real 
attempt, made in 1683 by Ferrand Spence, to translate all of Lucian into English, 
despite the fact that Spence considered Lucian to be not a renegade of true 
religion but a positive sceptic whose ‘wit is not this or that, but everything’.38 
Only in 1696, after the poet John Dryden wrote a life of Lucian to accompany a 
new edition of all of Lucian’s works translated by different hands and 
published in 1711, do we find again comments about the Hermotimus in 
England.  
 According to Dryden, Lucian in one half of his dialogues stands for 
Stoicism while in the other half he stands for Epicureanism, but he is ‘never 
constant to himself in any scheme of divinity, unless it be in despising his 
Gentile Gods’. However, this does not mean that Lucian was close to 
Christianity, or to any form of dogmatic religion, nor that he was ‘a steady 
atheist, or a Deist’. Dryden argues that Lucian was ‘a doubter, a Sceptic, as he 
plainly declares himself to be in the Dialogue, when he puts himself under the 
name of Hermotimus the Stoic, call’d the dialogue of the sects’.39 In the end, ‘he 
might as well believe in none, as in many gods.’40 
                                                          
36 See Duncan (1979), 90. 
37 Dudley (1919), 21-22. 
38 All of Spence’s passages can be found in Craig (1921), 144-147. 
39 Dryden (1711), 27. 
40 Dryden (1711), 23. 
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 This ambiguity forces Dryden to conjecture about the intended effect on 
the reader of Lucian’s works:  
 
I mean that he either form’d a body of philosophy for his own 
use, out of the opinions and dogmas of several heathen 
philosophers, disagreeing amongst themselves; or that he 
doubted of everything, weigh’d all opinions and adher’d to 
none of them; only us’d them, as they served his occasion for 
the present dialogue; and perhaps rejected them in the next. 
And indeed this last opinion is the more probable of the two, if 
we consider the genius of the man whose image we may clearly 
see in the glass, which he holds before us of his writings, which 
reflects him to our sight.41  
  
 This, for Dryden meant that Lucian laughed like Horace, but hurt like 
Juvenal,42 for which reason his humour was closest to the Aristophanic onomasti 
komodein, and was, in other words, offensive. His aim, however, was more ‘to 
disnest Heaven of so many immoral and debauch’d Deities’ and to expose false-
philosophers, than it was to prescribe morality.43 
 Unlike for Arethas, Photius, and Erasmus, who had already suggested 
that Lucian’s humour was anti-dogmatic and that it laughed at ‘everything’ 
without him expressing or taking any stand in his own works about the most 
important matters, Dryden was aware of the role of scepticism in choosing the 
right religious path without having to be certain about where Truth lay. Dryden 
turns doubt into Doubt, a matter of the most philosophical and religious 
importance. He even goes as far as to declare that the real characteristic of every 
great mind and the characteristic of the greatest periods in History is 
Scepticism, which leaves one wondering whether this emphasis on Doubt is the 
consequence of Dryden’s thoughts about his own conversion from the Church 
of England to the Church of Rome.  
                                                          
41 Dryden (1711), 25-26. 
42 Dryden (1711) 34. 
43 Dryden (1711), 43, 45. 
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One century after Dryden’s passing, we see a transformation in which 
Lucian’s begins to become philosophically valuable not onlyt because of his 
doubts within a religious context, but also because he was an Empiricist, and as 
such could be read as doubting all religious Truth. Evidence of this new way of 
understanding Lucian as a figure close to emerging modern forms of Sceptical 
philosophy can be found in an anonymous review to Thomas Franklin’s 
translation, published in 1780, in which the reasons why the Hermotimus is a 
dialogue so different from the rest of Lucian’s work are made very clear: 
 
The dialogue is not only an excellent ridicule of systematic 
philosophy but abounds with close argumentation. Indeed it 
proves strongly against all philosophy but what is founded on 
experiment, and might be applied equally to most modern 
systems of metaphysics, to the pre-established harmony of 
Leibnitz, the modified Platonism of Malebranche, the sceptical 
enquiries of Descartes, the immaterial world of Berkeley and 
the materialism of Hume.  
 
 Besides the comparison between Lucian’s comedy of the sects of 
philosophy with current trends in philosophy, the opinion of this anonymous 
critic is important as he introduced a new variable into the possibilities of 
Lucian’s Scepticism, now not only in reference to religion but also to the state. 
How is it then that Lucian -the anonymous critic asks- was not ‘afraid of the 
power of the civil magistrate, when he so severely stigmatized the religion of 
his ancestors, and of the country and times in which he lived’? The critic’s 
answer is that at the time pagans after Christ no longer believed in their gods 
and that by applying his wit to ‘the absurdities of pagan mythology’ Lucian 
only helped to deliver the coup de grace.  
 Among the negative aspects mentioned by the reviewer of Franklin’s 
translation about Lucian is that his style can be verbose and that Lucian like 
‘Voltaire among the moderns, could not resist the temptation of saying a good 
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thing when it came in his way, let what would be the consequence.’44 The 
association of Voltaire with Lucian had an enormous impact on the valuation he 
subsequently received from his critics in the emergence of modern philology. 
 As a fluent reader of Latin, Voltaire was acquainted with Perrot 
d’Ablancourt’s translation of Lucian.45 Usually his Lucianic pieces are seen as 
related to Lucian’s shorter dialogues,46 but it is worth thinking about the ways 
in which Lucian’s scepticism and even the Hermotimus might have influenced 
his most famous and scandalous work Candide ou l’Optimiste and the anti-
sectarian content of the Galimatias dramatique. In this way Voltaire’s wit and 
fiction agitated all who read him, and this was particularlyh true of the most 
conservative spirits inside the German academies who began to associate him 
with Lucian, to the point at which Lucian became known as the Voltaire of 
antiquity.  
 In the wake of the modern state and of modern philology as a discipline 
of the university, early German philologists thought of Voltaire as an 
opportunistic atheist, who followed no ideals and no morals regarding God and 
the State. Voltaire was a deist who rejected more radical views like that of 
Spinoza, and praised the moderate scepticism of Descartes, even though he 
preferred the empiricism of Locke and Newton as a more effective method to 
attaining truth. But Voltaire was also famous for his anti-clericalism, and for 
that reason radical believers thought of him as an atheist, while his deistic 
position left nonbelievers unsatisfied.  
 Philologists and classical scholars associated Christoph Martin Wieland 
with Voltaire, and Voltaire with Lucian. Wieland, who translated the 
Hermotimus and the rest of Lucian’s works from the first modern edition of his 
works into a Latin translation by Johan Friederick Reitz and Tiberius 
                                                          
44 Anonymous (1781), 92. 
45 For an overview of this period see Bury (2007), 145-174.  
46 For example the Dialogue entre Marc-Aurèle et un recollect and Conversation de Lucien Erasme et 
Rabelais dans les Champs Elysées. See Robinson (1979), 156-167. 
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Hemsterhuis published in 1743, not only thought of him as a great writer and 
an example of literary elegance and erudition, but also as an ally of the 
Enlightenment, and a moralist fighting against superstition. The Hermotimus 
was Lucian at his best, a product of his maturity as a writer, and a dialogue of 
great utility to fight against religious sectarianism.47 In contrast, Wieland 
believed that the Nigrinus was a panegyric on Athens against the excesses of 
Rome written by a young Lucian, after which he had begun to write Platonic 
dialogues.48 Soon, the opinions of Wieland on the Hermotimus and the Nigrinus 
were followed by Schoell in his History of Greek Literature.49 Wieland’s opinion of 
the Hermotimus is of fundamental importance, because although he had a loose 
interest in looking at Lucian historically, his opinion was not very different 
from Gibbon’s, who thought it unlikely for a true philosopher to accept pagan 
religion, and who saw Lucianic satire as a powerful weapon against it.50  
 However, after Winckelmann, German scholarship worked with a 
theoretical framework that centred the ‘classical’ almost exclusively in imperial 
Athens. In this notion of ‘the classical’, Lucian’s literature and all the 
production of the second sophistic is seen as a pale reflection of the ideal, 
imperialistic past of classical Athens.51 In addition, the association of Lucian 
with Voltaire was not forgotten,52 and the charge of Lucian as a frivolous writer 
with no ideals allowed, inte wake of and unfolding of the German Nation State, 
for the interpretation that he was not in fact a Sceptic, but a nihilist. 
                                                          
47 Wieland (1830), I, 10. 
48 Wieland (1830) I. 8, 18. 
49 Schoell (1830) II. 476, 482 
50 Gibbon (1813), 49. Contrary to Winckelmann, for Gibbon the Second Century AD was the 
happiest period in history. 
51 For a theory of the classical see Porter (2006) 1-65, and the different contributions in that same 
book. 
52 See Deitz (2007), 175-190. 
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Chapter 2 
Lucian in the Modern Academy 
 
If everything can be anything, we are left with nothing at all. 
H.-G. Nesselrath1 
 
So far, we have seen how early Christians set up an aesthetic framework in 
which Lucian’s comedy was deemed more or less valuable depending on its 
distance from Christian values. Lucian could be seen as a potential friend if he 
was seen to be attacking false religion, which was represented first by non-
Christian religions and later by heresies. Scholars of Byzantium warned that 
Lucian may have not stood for Christianity, for philosophy or religion, or 
indeed for anything at all, owing to the fact that he was not one taking sides, 
and that he sought to entertain with literature. Most people saw entertaining 
with literature as a vain activity that lacked of religiosity and moral 
indoctrination and was therefore not a very good one. It was also possible that a 
literature believing in nothing offended religion itself, or that, although Lucian 
was certain about the existence of Truth, he remained sceptical about those who 
claimed to possess it. This interpretation of Lucian began to be considered of 
religious importance for Christianity by people like John Dryden. But once 
Lucian was thought as the Voltaire of antiquity it became possible too that his 
literature was seen as an attack against religion from the perspective of an 
extreme sceptic, an atheist, and an empiricist, 2 of dubious morality. Just like 
Voltaire, Lucian could be seen as the epitome of the ancient immoral writer 
lacking in ideals and working only for his own interests, ready to challenge the 
very foundations of not only Christianity, but also of all religious and political 
                                                          
1 Nesselrath (2010), 396. 
2 For example, Rabasté (1888) considered that Lucian was at the same level as Voltaire, Locke 
and Condillac. 
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organisation, including the state.3 Others, however, used Lucian to attack that 
which Voltaire represented,4 and therefore in the modern academy, this  
distancing of Lucian, as far away as possible from Voltaire, became the best 
strategy by which to defend Lucian. 
In this chapter I hope to contribute to the study of Lucian by establishing 
two categories which refer to two distinctive tendencies in Lucianic studies that 
emerged as soon as philology became a profession in the modern academy. 
These two categories, which I have borrowed from Platonic studies, are the 
developmentalist and the unitarian account of Lucian.5 It should, however, be 
noted that while in the case of Platonic studies scholars take clear positions 
regarding the unity or the progress of Plato’s works, I have created these two 
categories in order encapsulate the opinions of scholars who in their studies of 
Lucian do not call themselves unitarians or developmentalists.  
 
                                                          
3 For a complete bibliography of Lucianic studies in Germany from 1700 to 1878 see Engelmann 
and Preuss (1880), 485-497. See also Betz (1961), Nesselrath (1992), Holzberg (1998) and 
Baumbach (2002), which provide by far the best account of Lucian in Germany, and also his 
article (2011). 
4 Jacob (1832) argued that Hermotimus, Demonax and Nigrinus were sincere dialogues against 
false religion, in which he showed himself indifferent to the terrible sophistic ‘‘art’’, which the 
eighteenth century had called philosophy, and whose chief leader was Voltaire. Bernays (1879), 
42 considered Lucian to be the Voltaire of antiquity, and he disliked both. For Croiset (1882) 
Lucian might be seen to fighting against the excess of reason and credulity, but he was not like 
Voltaire, who contributed to Newtonian theory or empiricism. 
 The debate of whether to compare Lucian or not to Voltaire continued into the 20th 
century. For Bompaire (1958), 499 contrary to Voltaire, who was always a fighter for freedom of 
speech on the subject of God, Lucian is capable of praising the piety of Panthea, lover of the 
Emperor, and in another to condemn light-heartedly the death sentence of atheists. Overall, 
Bompaire, 491-499, does not find Lucian’s anti-religious strife particularly interesting and 
deems it largely provocative. 
 Baldwin (1973), 103 reached the conclusion that the comparison between Lucian and 
Voltaire only stands up if one demotes the latter, since ‘Lucian was not a deep thinker, and did 
not pretend to be one. It is a mystery why Arethas would have treated him like an anti-Christ. 
On his own evaluation, he was primarily an entertainer. That is merit enough in any age.’  
 For Branham (1989), 129, if one focuses on Lucian’s parodic techniques and how his 
dialogues as literary inventions are ‘wedged between ancient materials and a contemporary 
audience’, rather than on what Lucian actually believed, this enables us to see Lucian as a very 
different kind of author to Voltaire or Swift. 
5 See p. 15, n. 24. 
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1. Adapting the Aesthetic Framework to Romantic Aesthetics 
 
It was in one of the first modern essays to discuss the role of play and satire in 
the development of history and of human morals, On Naive and Sentimental 
Comedy,6 that Friederich Schiller substituted a Christian aesthetic framework, 
which had at one extreme false religion, and true religion at the other, for an 
aesthetic framework that had nothingness at one extreme and the right ideal at 
the other.  
 In his essay, Schiller classified all poets according to their relationship 
with nature; in so far as he thought that once man saw ‘nature as something 
other than himself he became free of nature as a universally determining source 
or model but at the same time lost his feelings for nature as home’.7 Like 
Winckelman, and Rousseau before him, Schiller believed that a happy primitive 
culture could be found in the past, but only decay could be found in the 
present. Besides natural objects, Schiller argued that the Greeks, the childhood 
of man, also inspired a certain nostalgia. But reason had forced a gradual 
separation of man from nature, transforming the latter into an object, an idea. 
The world had reached a perfect harmony between reason and nature in 
Ancient Greece and had become disharmonious in Revolutionary France. 
 According to Schiller, therefore, poets should be divided into two 
categories: the naive poet who continues nature, and the sentimental poet who 
only has nostalgia for the naïve in nature. The poet who is not part of nature, 
the poet who is not naïve, has only the sentiment of nature as an ideal, and can 
only express feelings about nature through art. Sentimental poets are further 
classified as satirical or elegiac. The poet is satirical if he aims to point towards 
the alienation (Entfernung) of man from nature, and speaks the truth about the 
                                                          
6 Schiller (1966). Schiller published this essay in three parts between 1795 and 1795 in a literary 
journal run by him called Die Horen. For Schiller and the origin of the comic as a literary quality 
see McFadden (1982), 10-21. 
7 McFadden (1982), 12. 
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contradictions between nature and the ideas man has of it. Punishing or 
pathetic satire is a genre only suitable for sublime souls and is exerted in earnest 
and with passion according to will (im Gebiete des Willens). However, if poetry is 
done by a beautiful heart (schönen Herzen), one that entertains by enhancing 
understanding, then it is called playful satire (scherzhafte Satire).  
 In either case, Schiller believed, all poetry should always keep a balance 
between being punishing and entertaining, as it was otherwise likely to become 
frivolous or to lack playfulness, something that it should always have. In spite 
of their mischievous mockery of Socrates, a sincere and serious intellect (eine 
ernste Vernunft) on the side of truth and against the sophists and fighting for an 
ideal can be found in Aristophanes and Lucian, who vindicated this character 
against all doubt in his Diogenes and Demonax.  
 So it is that despite their decadent moment in history, Schiller thought 
that modern satiric authors could also find this balance between reason and 
play: Cervantes in Don Quixote, Fielding in Tom Jones and Sophonisba, 
Shakespeare in his Yorick in Hamlet, and most importantly Christoph Martin 
Wieland. Wieland and Lucian were for Schiller different from Voltaire, who 
even though he managed to incline readers to the naïve in his Ingénu and 
Candide, lacked idealism and passion in the rest of his works and was only an 
artificial writer. As is evident, here Schiller tried to detach Wieland – Lucian’s 
translator into German - from Voltaire.  
 
2. The Developmentalist Reading of Lucian. 
 
The historicist-rationalist impulse of German philologists demanded higher 
standards of proof which extended beyond Lucian’s work to his biography and 
his historical context.8 But to understand Lucian in his own historical context, 
                                                          
88 Perhaps the best place to find all the issues connected to historicism, including racism, radical 
liberalism, eurocentrism and germanophilia is Meinecke (1943). Strong criticisms against 
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scholars based their investigations on earlier biographies, which had 
incorporated the question of Lucian’s philosophical and religious journey in 
introductions to his works so thatr it might fit true Christianity. The Sambucus-
Cousan Greek and Latin edition, which included a life of Lucian as told in the 
Suda, Cousin’s Luciani Elogium as a prologue and Jakob Zwinger’s De Vita et 
Scriptis Narratio, is a great example of the debate surrounding Lucian’s 
historical context through narrative of his spiritual development. 
 Cousin, who in his youth had been a student and copyist of Erasmus, 
and was the first to write a biography of Lucian, defended him in his Elogium 
on similar grounds to those provided by his master. Lucian’s dialogues, Cousin 
argued, were not only an example of suavitas, elegantia and varietas, but also 
useful entertainment as they laughed seriously at the pagan gods and wrong 
beliefs in general. Contrary to that what is stated in the Suda, Cousin thought 
that because of his commitment to truth, Lucian had been undeservedly 
labelled an atheist. Accordingly, in this biography, Lucian becomes 
progressively more sceptical about his pagan context, without ever becoming a 
Christian; starting off his career as a sophist, before becoming an imitator of 
Pyrrho, who as a Sceptic affirms nothing, but leaves everything unresolved by 
arguing on both sides. In Cousin’s view, Lucian had written the Hermotimus at 
the age of 40 when he had already begun his philosophical studies. As a result, 
the work could be counted not only as the most useful example of ancient 
sceptical literature, but could be considered better than his previous works 
which had no ethical maturity. 
 Lucian, however, was much less appealing to the doctor and philosopher 
Jakob Zwinger, for whom the Hermotimus and the Twice Indicted are 
philosophical texts in which Lucian attacks the philosophical sects of his time. 
Lucian is a famous sophist and philosopher praised and imitated by many 
                                                                                                                                                                          
historicism can be found in Popper (1957), and much more systematically in Foucault (1994) 
and (1982). For a general overiview of historicism see Hamilton (1996). 
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theologians. But, in agreement with the Suda, when it comes to metaphysics he 
is the most impious, laughing at God, Christianity and men, and capable of 
abandoning the quest for truth in his transgressions of moderate censure. 
 Cousin’s interpretation was continued in Jean Bourdelot’s Luciani 
Samosatensis Philosophi Opera Omnia, which included Heidecker’s translation of 
the Hermotimus together with the rest of the translations in the edition of 
Cognatus-Sambucus. For Bourdelot, Lucian was a negative theologian, who 
after abandoning sophistry and philosophy, remained in search of a true 
Theology that might allow him to live the most perfect or ideal life.9 
 This way of debating the relationship between Lucian’s texts and his life 
is, I suggest, that which among Lucianists is understood when they use the term 
developmentalist. The developmentalist reading of Lucian consists of situating 
Lucian’s works in a progressive biography marked by philosophical, spiritual 
and religious development in order to measure just how close or how far he 
was from Christian truth.  
 However, the developmentalist theory could not be explained without 
the substitution of true ideals for Christian truth. In their Entwicklungsgeschichte 
seiner geistigen Thätigkeit geschehen, to use the terminology of the time,10 German 
philologists of the early 19th Century made this substitution, by conceding that 
Christianity might not have been the same as true religion for Lucian, and that 
perhaps it was more likely that he sought to find Truth in the schools of 
philosophy, which represented the different contradictory religious and 
philosophical ideals reached by Antiquity before Christianity. In this way, the 
reason for applying developmentalist theories to Lucian’s time became a way to 
measure how evolved he was as ot considered the limitations of his own era, in 
which clearly Christianity was the best outcome available to him or anyone else 
of that period in history. 
                                                          
9 Zappalla (1990), 134-136. 
10 Hermann (1828). 
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 Scholars, however, were not able to agree precisely what it was that 
Lucian stood for. Some proposed that Lucian was writing to defend Greek 
paideia,11 others true philosophy.12 Some others went further and argued that 
Lucian’s aim surpassed the sphere of professionalism and that he must have 
been a defender of Virtue put into practice,13 an indiviual taken over by a 
religionis puris desiderium.14 Inspired by the Enlightenment, a few other scholars 
began to think of Lucian as a guardian of empirical truth and science against 
religious superstition.15 Lucian’s true philosophical affiliation also became a 
matter of debate among scholars, for he was seen as an Epicurean,16 whilst for 
others he embodied an eclectic similar to Demonax, which was only partially 
acquainted with Epicureanism.17  
 The political dimension of Lucian’s texts and his opinions of Greek and 
Roman societies was also unclear. Unlike the intellectuals of Byzantium and the 
Renaissance, for scholars who worked whithin the mind-set of the new nation it 
was possible to believe that Lucian was not sceptical about religion and faith 
but a state idealist trying to set straight the institutions of Rome.18 Of all of 
Lucian’s texts, the Nigrinus was most suited to the simultaneous study Lucian’s 
philosophical and political affiliations, because if read as a non-satiric text it 
seemed to contain Lucian’s conversion to Platonism and a criticism of the vices 
                                                          
11 Ranke (1831). 
12 Jacob (1832). 
13 Sommerbrodt (1888); Hirzel (1895), 271-331. 
14 Frietzsche (1869), 2.2. 1-44. 
15 Léon Dewaule, a professor of philosophy at the Lycée Impérial de Périgueux, published the 
essay Etude sur Lucien ou un sceptique au 2ème siècle de notre ère, sa vie et son époque, which I have 
not been able to consult. It seems that Dewaule might have seen Lucian’s Hermotimus and 
scepticism in general as positive, since he was a supporter of Condillac and of the emerging 
empiricism of his times. Rabasté (1888) thought that Lucian was a defender of truth and 
freedom of speech, fighting against superstition, and therefore he welcomed the mixture of 
comic traditions in Lucian’s work as a sign of encyclopaedic erudition. He also acknowledged 
the importance of Menippus in Lucian, but pointed to the borrowing of sources of Old Comedy. 
16 Sommerbrodt (1888). 
17  Dindorf (1858), VII; Zeller (1877), 3.1 851-854. 
18 Jacob (1832).  
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of Rome and a praise of Athens.19 Therefore, it was even possible to speculate 
about Lucian’s life based on an alleged conversion from barbarism to 
Hellenism, and more specifically to Atticism, as Hirzel himself did.20 Lucian’s 
political motivations to produce literature also became ambiguous: was he a 
social revolutionary opposing the Empire21 and defending the people?22 Or was 
he someone close to the ‘vera razza romana’ and with those who had completed 
their cursus honorum?23 It was to be many years before academics stopped 
searching for Lucian’s ideals. Even in the 1960s, Vincenzo Longo still argued 
that Lucian had a ‘’credo’’ morale which was not atarassia, but rather a turbamento 
morale, which though vague and repressed, was born from a spiritual tension 
that eventually surfaced in his work.24  
 However, we should not dismiss developmentalist approaches as simply 
naïve and idealistic attempts to understand Lucian. Developmentalist theories 
discussed many questions that are basic to our understanding of the 
Hermotimus and of Lucian in general. When was the Hermotimus written? Before 
or after the Fisherman, where Parrhesiades ends up siding with pagan 
philosophy?25 Should it be separated from the more Cynic-like works of 
Lucian?26 Does this dialogue belong to a period in which Lucian began to be 
                                                          
19 Rohde (1876), 320 believed that Nigrinus was ‘eines des wichtigsten Dokumente antirömischer 
Opposition der zweiten Sophistik betrachtet’, an opinion also shared by Boldermann (1893), who 
following Mees (1841), 47 believed that the Nigrinus was satiric, but added that in it Lucian was 
praising Athens and the citizens of the rest of Greek cities as if they were the Athenians who 
defended the country from the Persians. If this were the case, then Nigrinus was a completely 
fictional character, just as Mycillus or Adeimantus, and Brun’s (1888) proposal was that this was 
a text that showed that Lucian’s conversion to Platonism would be false. This text could 
therefore have been written as a hidden satire to prevent people from suddenly converting to 
philosophy, as argued by Chlebus (1838), 27. 
20 Hirzel (1895), 271, citing Luc. Herm. 13. 
21Peretti (1947).  
22 Settembrini (1861), 14. 
23 Fumarola (1951). Gallavotti (1932), Venchi (1934), Quacquarelli (1956), and Longo (1964). Litt 
(1909) argued that Lucian was trying to persuade people to become statesmen rather than 
philosophers. 
24 Longo (1964), 21. 
25 Remacly (1854/1855). 
26 Fritzsche (1869), 2. 26; Croiset, (1882); Schmid (1891), 308. 
 46 
interested in philosophy?27 Was it written before or after his ‘Menippean 
phase?’28 Before he became a Cynic?29 Or does the Hermotimus belong to a 
period later than the Twice Indicted?30 Did Lucian write it when he was old?31 
Should the modes of Agrippa, depending on whether he took them from 
Agrippa himself, from the Sceptic Aenesidemus,32 or from Menippus’, tell us 
anything about the date of composition?33 
 To the question: are his characters real or fiction? Dryden suggested that 
Hermotimus might have been Lucian, but it is easier to think that Lycinus is 
Lucian’s spokesperson.34 Does the Hermotimus contain a reference to Lucian’s 
previous temporary conversion to philosophy or is that just part of its fiction?35 
The old man in Hermotimus 24 does seem to resemble Nigrinus,36 the Platonic 
philosopher, or some other of Lucian’s characters.37  Clearly Lycinus is 
modelled on the Platonic Socrates, but this does not mean that this is an 
expression of an agnostic period in Lucian’s life when he had adopted a form of 
practical Scepticism.38 Is it possible to identify Lucian behind his masks?39 After 
all, the Hermotimus could have been a fiction which did not contribue anything 
to the writing of a life of Lucian.40 It might just have been a very long joke about 
philosophers that might not have offended anyobody.41 And in any case, what 
                                                          
27 Sommerbrodt (1888). 
28 Boldermann (1893). 
29 Litt (1909). 
30 Ranke (1831);  Van Eyken (1859), 25. I only have the information of this text from Nesselrath 
(1992), 3454; Schwarz (1877). 
31 Rohde (1876) 191 n.1.  
32 Praechter (1898). 
33 Wassmandorff (1874), Frietzsche (1869) 2. 34-35. 
34 Remacly (1851). 
35 Luc. Herm. 24; Schmid (1891), 308, n. 11. 
36 Wetzlar (1834); Croiset, (1882); Rhode (1876) 191 n.1; Gallavotti (1932), 175-176 n. 2; 
37 For Bruns (1888), 92 the teacher in the Hermotimus is not Nigrinus, but the same man who is 
hidden in the character of the Thesmopolis in On Salaried Posts, and Timocles in the Zeus Rants. 
38 Schwarz, A. (1863), 7; Frietzsche (1869) II.2, 27; Litt (1909); Caster (1937), 62-63. See Tackaberry 
(1930), 51, for whom Lucian is a sceptic. 
39 Rohde (1869), 32. 
40 Schmid (1891), 308, n. 11; Hirzel (1895) 290-291. 
41 Schmid (1891), 305. 
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is the merit of this dialogue? Should we praise it for not being the usual 
Lucianic comedy about philosophers, but a serious and sincere dialogue 
proving the ways in which philosophical leaders and religion can be morally 
misleading?42 But even if we were to read it this way, what should we think of 
the quality of its humour? It is unclear whether Hermotimus was a historical 
figure43 or a fiction.44 Considering what we take the model of the Hermotimus to 
be, whether Old Comedy,45 whether Aristophanes and Horace,46 or Middle 
Comedy, 47 or Cynicism,48 would it have been seen to insult philosophers, 
philosophical dogmatism, and in particular Stoicism, or even religiosity itself?  
 All these are not merely obvious, fundamental questions about the 
Hermotimus and Lucian in general but they also lead to us the generation of 
objective historical propositions about Lucian’s knowledge of Cynic 
philosophy, his disillusionment with all philosophy in the Hermotimus, and the 
beginning of his comic dialogues,49 all of which extend our understanding of 
Lucian as a historical figure.  
 Let us return now to what was said in the Introduction about Heinz 
Gunther Nesselrath: that he is almost the only scholar of recent times to take up 
the intellectual challenge of giving an interpretation of the Sceptic content of the 
Hermotimus in the light of Lucian’s proclivity towards literary Cynicism; and 
                                                          
42 The Hermotimus continued to be read by Croiset (1882) and Bompaire (1958), 305 as some kind 
of philosophical dialogue comparable to Plato’s Gorgias or Phaedo.  
43 Schmid, W. (1891); Litt (1909), 48. 
44 Remacly (1854/1855). 
45 Ranke (1831). 
46 Jacob (1832). 
47 Kock (1888). 
48 Boldermann (1893). 
49 For instance, Bernays (1879) placed at the centre of his study Lucian’s relationship with 
Cynicism. Hermann (1828) divided Lucian’s works into a Normalepoche, in which Lucian wrote 
the best of his works, and a period after the Hermotimus, identifiable for his more scientific and 
serious works, and which was also the decisive point in his writing career, after which, 
becoming ealderly, his creativity ceased. Rohde (1869) later followed Bernays, but argued that 
although a Cynic for most of his life, Lucian was first a Platonist (Nigrinus), then a Sceptic 
(Hermotimus), and then an Epicurean (Alexander, Historiae Verae). Boldermann (1893), on the 
contrary, prioritized the role of comedy and satire in Lucian’s autobiography over his alleged 
conversion to philosophy. See also Hirzel (1895), 291-294 and Caster (1935). 
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that he reads the Hermotimus as a work of maturity representing Lucian’s 
greater knowledge of Scepticism, written with the ethical impetus of turning the 
readers towards the κοινὸς βίος. Clearly, by bringing back the literature of the 
19th century without inquiring into problems of methodologies, Nesselrath has 
produced yet another developmentalist interpretation of the Hermotimus which 
tends to interpret the ‘common life’ as the aim towards which Lucian trys to 
turn us, and therefore claims its positive scepticism as evidence of it being one 
of Lucian’s greatest dialogues. 
 
3. The Unitarian Reading of Lucian 
 
There is, however, a big challenge to the developmentalist approaches to 
Lucian’s work. Schiller’s idealist approach to Lucian in the early 19th century 
rapidly found itself strong opposition in the work of the theologian Heinrich 
Gottlieb Tzschirner, who believed Lucian was not only attacking the new 
religion (in this regard being close to Arethas and Isidore,) but all religious 
feeling, thereby creating a spiritual vacuum between Paganism and 
Christianity. For Tzschirner, the purpose of Lucian was not to restore, but to 
destroy, as was Wieland’s and the Enlightenment’s. He claimed that Lucian did 
not have any moral position of his own, but attacked all moral positions, 
including Christianity, for his own pecuniary and individual benefit.  
 This hunch, that Lucian never had in mind any other purpose other than 
to produce entertaining literature, co-existed throughout the 19th century with 
developmentalist theories about his life and work. Croiset, for instance, argued 
that the merit of Lucian’s work was only literary, and not moral.50 Sommerbrodt 
and Frietzsche argued that Lucian was not a reformist of religion and politics, 
but that his work was at most a mirror through which his society and, and by 
extension contemporary societies, could look at their own false beliefs. For 
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Hirzel, the study of rhetoric might have ‘hellenized the barbarian of the East’,51 
but Lucian’s literary quest never transcended the search for the best literary 
form; if Lucian had anything to do with Cynic literature, he argued, this was 
only because he was using a Cynic text to criticize asceticism and because as a 
rhetorician he never stopped preaching a non-dogmatic philosophy of common 
sense in support of the common life.52 
 Schillerean values forced a work of literature to be aesthetically original 
and committed to ideals, which made comic literature written for the sake of 
literary beauty liable to be read as superficial and rhetorical entertainment, 
owing to its lack of real philosophical deepness of thought and ideals. Jacob 
Bernays contributed with the influential opinion that Lucian was not a Cynic, or 
an idealist philosopher of any kind, but a sophist living in a mechanistic 
civilization, whose works reflected a nihilistic wasteland (nihilistische Öde).53  
 Renowned philologists writing at the beginning of the 20th Century took 
Bernays opinion of Lucian to be true, but in a context of increasing racism and 
idealistic nationalism in Germany, Lucian ended up being expelling altogether 
from the canon of classical authors. Norden, who like Bernays was of Jewish 
decent, argued that Lucian’s linguistic skills and lack of ideals of his own were 
due to the impurity of his race.54 Hermann had already argued that it was 
possible that the lack of idealism was not only Lucian’s problem, but the 
problem of all the Greeks of his time.55 But it was Houston Stewart Chamberlain 
who went one step further in explaining Lucian’s lack of idealism in racial 
terms. Born in Southsea, Wagner’s son-in-law, and a forerunner of National 
Socialism, Chamberlain was a sophisticated propagandist. In 1899 he published 
                                                          
51 Hirzel (1895), 269. 
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For Hirzel, 325-326 supporting the common crowd is not in contradiction with Cynicism see his 
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53 Bernays (1879), 42. 
54 See Norden (1898) I. 394. See Holzberg (1988). 
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the book Die Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, in which he sought to 
explain that the basis of European civilization consisted of Greek and Roman 
pasts, Christianity, the negative influence of the Jews, and the ‘regenerative 
power’ of the Germans.56 For Chamberlain, the Syrian was nothing more than 
‘an example of the fact that even a highly gifted mind cannot create anything 
truly magnificent or lasting in a state of chaos void of all nationality or race,’57 
and ‘even if all philologists of the world were to maintain that Lucian’s 
comments on religion and philosophy were profound, that he was a courageous 
fighter against superstition, and so on, I would never believe them. Lucian was 
altogether incapable of knowing what religion is’.58 Suspiciously, Ulrich von 
Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, perhaps the most famous philologist of the time, 
repeated many of Chamberlain’s ideas, adding that, at most, Lucian’s work was 
valuable as journalism, emphasising Bernays’ opinion that Lucian’s nihilism 
was a sign of the weakness of his thought.59 
 Racism stripped Lucian, at this time, of the possibility of contributing 
any original ideas of his within his own literature. But even then, one could still 
argue that even if he lacked ideals and principles, he was a good and 
entertaining writer. The problem was that Lucian’s originality was much closer 
to the mimicking of original classical authors than to creating a new literature, 
and literary-aesthetic values demanded that in order to be good a work of art 
had to be original. Ultimately, it was one of Wilamowitz-Möllendorff’s star 
students, Rudolph Helm, who managed to end the eighteen centuries that 
Lucian had enjoyed as a classical author. By arguing that Lucian had been 
incapable of having serious ideas of his own, and had never been an original 
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57 Trans Holzberg (1988), 207. 
58 Baumbach’s translation (2007), 206. 
59 Wilamowitz (1905). 
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writer, Helm thus fulfilled the desires of the Inquisition, Luther, and a handful 
of other conservative readers to silence Lucian once and for all.60 
 In his Lukian und Menipp, Helm argued that Lucian could not have been a 
good writer because he was an imitator of Menippus, whose works could even 
be reconstructed thanks to Lucian’s brazen plagiarism. However, Helm’s whole 
point rested on the idea that Lucian was a nihilist sophist whose original source 
also lacked morality and ideals, and that he was also a plagiarist. This line of 
argument meant that although it was impossible to talk about Lucian’s spiritual 
development, one could still attempt to make a chronology of Lucian’s works 
based on their indebtedness to Cynicism and in particular to Menippus. Helm’s 
point can be best perceived in his discussion about Lucian’s sources for the 
Hermotimus. Before Helm, scholars had proposed that Lucian had imitated Old 
Comedy61 and Middle Comedy.62 But this discussion was soon replaced by the 
fact that there must have been a common source between him and Sextus 
Empiricus for the Modes of Agrippa. Helm dismissed Praechter’s insightful 
proposal that Lucian could have borrowed the modes of Agrippa from Agrippa 
himself or from the Sceptic Aenesidemus,63 and followed Frietzsche, who 
argued that the Hermotimus was an imitation of Menippus’ On Sects. 
Interestingly, when Helm found himself unable to prove that the Hermotimus 
was an imitation of Menippus, he then went on to argue that Lucian had also 
imitated Plato, in particular the Euthydemus.64  
 Helm’s preference for Menippus over other sources becomes clearer 
when we learn what he believed philosophy to be. Helm contrasted real 
philosophy, whose defining characteristic was to have an Ideal, with three 
                                                          
60 The effects of Helm’s study on Lucian’s status as a classic author can be perceived in the 
opinions of Capelle (1914), who tried to argue that sixth formers should not be forced to read 
Lucian as there were enough Greek literary treasures and that there was neither time nor 
affection for ‘the spiritual nihilist’.  
61 Ranke (1831). 
62 Kock (1888). 
63 Praechter (1898). 
64 Helm (1906) 131. 
 52 
forms of nihilism, which match Lucian’s sources: sceptical nihilism, rhetorical 
or sophistic nihilism and the nihilism deriving from Old Comedy and 
Menippean Cynicism. The Cynics and the Sceptics had in common the rejection 
of the investigation of nature and theological speculation, in a way that was 
similar to Christian apologetics and to Old Comedy. Unlike Christian 
apologetics, and lacking the political incisiveness of Old Comedy, the works of 
Menippus of Gadara were not only the product of plagiarism themselves,65 but 
also meaningless entertainment without content.66 The grinning and biting 
Menippus, as he is presented in Lucian,67 meant that his comedy contained a 
κωμῳδῶν καὶ γελοτοποιῶν type of humour, but that the reader could not 
escape the superficial even if he tried to playfully pretend that it had a deeper 
philosophical aim. This was the reason why Strabo thought Menippus to be a 
satirist as a buffoon simply cannot be counted as a philosopher.68  
 According to Helm, Menippus’ Cynicism was in stark contrast with the 
moralising philosophy of Crates and Diogenes, but he was unsure whether its 
lack of philosophical content was intentional or unintentional, as in Menippus 
Cynic nihilism had found a witty proponent, whose skill was reflected in taking 
the motives of comedy, and making parodies of epic, and tragedy, on the one 
hand, and using the thoughts of the older Cynics in special situations and 
scenes adapting Platonic dialogue to comedy on the other.69 Following Reich, 
Helm conceded that one can find Socratic irony, traces of the burlesque and 
mime in Plato,70 but it was the products of mime and fantastic scenes that gave 
Menippus the uniqueness of his literary form, imitated and praised by Lucian 
and later authors. Menippus was neither a philosopher nor a Cynic, but a 
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sophist, an opportunist plagiarist writer, trying desperately to win over his 
audience. Menippus had manipulated previous writings unknown to us, from 
which he acquired his inclination for satire, freedom of spirit as well as hatred 
for real philosophy.71  
 It is for this reason, therefore, that Menippus On Sects seemed to be a 
more probable source for Lucian, as it was thanks to another imitator that his 
works were destined to transcend. Lucian, like Menippus lacked any Ideal, and 
like any real sophist snatched any opportunity for success and fame, regardless 
of how he might achieve this goal.72 It was this same attitude of Lucian’s 
towards literature that he had towards Rome.73 The only explanation for this 
attitude is that Lucian was as much a self-motivated freethinker as he was 
devoted and pious, and therefore his relationship with the Romans was friendly 
or hostile depending on the specific circumstances of interaction.74 
 Helm’s study was well received in Germany, where in the midst of 
WWII, still influenced by Norden, Helm, Hirzel and Wilamowitz, Eberhard 
Neef continued to condemn Lucian’s relationship with the philosophical 
schools as the mere result of mimesis. The success of Helm’s argument in many 
ways lays in allowing a unitarian reading of Lucian as opposed to a 
developmentalist one. Contrary to the unitarian reading of Plato, in which the 
various dialogues are assumed to have been composed from a single 
philosophically elevated to a point of view, in the unitarian reading of Lucian 
all dialogues tend to be read as produced as part of the same literary aim: to 
entertain with words without pursuing anything more serious than 
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entertainment and remaining disenfranchised from any real philosophical and 
moral discussions.  
 
4. Lucian, a Writer of Entertaining Fiction.  
 
In contrast with 19th century idealism, studies after Helm are characterised by 
their textualism.75 But Helm’s version of the unitarian reading of Lucian 
compromised the quality of his works within two aspects. The first was formal: 
imitative literature can be seen as less valuable than original literature. The 
second was moral: literature, which treats serious religious and philosophical 
material superficially merely to entertain, is not very good. After Helm, scholars 
came to the rescue of Lucian, but in a way that will strengthened the unitarian 
interpretation of his comedy. As we will see in the following section, in arguing 
against developmentalist theories, scholars reduced Lucian’s philosophical 
content to an imitative kind of literary wit, whose value had nothing to do with 
sincerity or autobiography, and everything with a sophistic literary game about 
stereotypes of philosophy. The conclusion that followed from this trend of 
thought was that rather than disdaining Lucian as a sophist, we should think of 
him as being similar to a modern writer of fiction.76   
 After Helm, Marcel Caster dealt a second blow against 
developmentalist theories, by arguing that these were based on the subjective 
values of scholars,77 and that Nigrinus was a work of complex rhetorical irony, 
which could not be taken at face-value as Lucian’s conversion to Platonism.78 
For Caster, Lucian was never a philosopher but only acreator of literary games 
made up of stereotypes of philosophical conversions in a way that was similar 
                                                          
75 For this change in literary studies in general see Rorty (1982), 139-159.  
76 For example, Borges (1955) in his prologue to the Spanish edition of Bradbury’s The Martian 
Chronocles suggests that science fiction begins with Lucian’s True Histories. This is also argued in 
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77 Caster (1935), in Caster (1937), 376-380. 
78 Caster (1937), 117. 
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to the games of the sophists.79 But this did not necesarilly meant that Lucian 
was an unworthy author, as it could be argued that Lucian’s take on Cynicism 
and philosophy was a literary way of criticizing corruption and useless 
complications and advocating for a simpler life, which allowed for the practice 
of vraie culture; Lucian’s real ideal. 
 After Caster, it became possible not only to deny Lucian’s conversion to 
philosophy, but to argue that confessional passages in Lucian’s work were 
simply an amusing re-elaboration of commonplaces employed to contrast the 
true philosopher and the false philosopher for the sake of entertainment. If 
anything, Lucian’s confessions were merely self-praise of having discovered a 
new form of sophistic display.80 As a sophist, Lucian borrows from 
Epicureanism, Cynicism and Scepticism alike without committing to any 
school.81 Lucian is no longer an imitator of Menippus82 and his references to the 
Cynic are simply ways of recognizing his debt to the school,83 for which reasons 
it is also pointless to seek Menippeanism everywhere in Lucian’s work.84 But 
equally one cannot deduce from this that Lucian converted to Cynicism, or to 
any other sect. In the presence of philosophy Lucian adopts the attitude of an 
ἰδιώτης, whose only certainty lies in paideia and in using literary and 
philosophical traditions to talk about that which surrounds him and his world, 
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but without pretending to transmit the truth, or giving any conclusive message, 
or promising anything to his reader.85 Sometimes the term "eclecticism" is used 
to describe this particular phenomenon.86 It is also convenient to argue that 
Lucian might have been trained in sophistry,87 but that he never converted to 
philosophy.88 In any case, Cynicism, his favourite school, was not a philosophy 
in the true sense and therefore Lucian was not a true philosopher,89 or a generis 
humani paedagogus worried with the ‘recta vivendi ratio’, for ‘he was first and 
foremost a sophist (with an interest in philosophy), and this is how we should 
understand him.’90 
 Lucian continued to appear as an educated man who sided with the 
common man in the confrontation with philosophy.91 One did not need to be a 
member of any school to have some knowledge of philosophy,92 since the 
educated had to have some knowledge of all the philosophical systems, and yet 
one did not need to belong to a particular school in order to adopt the views of 
that school.  Therefore, if Lucian never converted to philosophy, then his 
treatment of the schools of philosophy had more to do with rhetoric and literary 
re-creation. Although he might not have been a philosopher, he might have 
always been an artista,93 an écrivain whose true faith lays in a paideia consisting 
of classicism and mimesis.94 Now we can speak of Lucian as a pepaideumenos 
with a certaine éthique humaniste,95 whose notion of literary knowledge as the 
criterion of the absolute value of man, his definition of philosophy as the 
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knowledge and set of practical morals at the service of Athens, and the idea that 
to be Hellenic was not a matter of race but a quality of the spirit, echo the ideas 
of Isocrates.96 If some sort of evolution can be traced in Lucian’s work this must 
be literary and not spiritual.97  
 The reconsideration of the literary value of mimesis and the Second 
Sophistic, as well as of sophistry in general, was a third major blow against the 
idealism implicit in developmentalist readings of Lucian. Augusta M. Campbell 
Davidson, who should be credited with the first attempt in the 20th Century to 
make the Hermotimus available to every reader in English,98 and the north-
American feminist, classicist and educator Emily James Putnam, who was the 
first  to value Lucian’s comedy owing to its closeness to rhetoric and to the 
Second Sophistic,99 sparked this change in attitude.  
 Jacques Bompaire went one step further. He broke with Schillerian 
aesthetics, thereby giving an entirely new role to imitation in literary art, and 
appealed to the virtues of literature of the Second Sophistic in such a way as to 
recover Lucian’s position as a classic.100 Contrary to Schiller, Bompaire argued 
that the most faithful interpretation of the spirit of the ancients was the study of 
art and imitation. Bompaire emphasised the fact that the Greeks and the 
Romans were also preoccupied with the aesthetic choice between nature and 
techne, and that the common opinion of the ancients was that the poet had to be 
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able to meticulously apply the rules of poetry, thereby privileging skill, 
education and theory over inspiration. Bompaire also noted that some of the 
ancients would even openly argue in favour of the superiority of art, and in 
particular of the superiority of imitation.101 But even if the ancients argued 
about the dilemma between nature and art, they also knew this to be a false 
one, and that the two opposing forces complemented one another.102 The 
preference for one over the other could come from a divided and incomplete 
nature, or from an art completely detached from nature. Bompaire argued that 
the trilogy φύσις, τέχνη (μάθησις, ἐπιστήμη, γνῶσις), ἄσκησις (μελέτη, 
ἐπιμέλεια, ἐμπειρία) - art that was formed by the latter two – was suggested 
first by Protagoras, before being established by Plato, Aristotle and Isocrates as 
the φιλόσοφος ὆ητορικὴ.103 Later, the rhetorical tradition added mimesis to the 
concept of art. It was for this the reason that in some cases the notion of art was 
reduced to imitation, its role being to find an appropriate style that lead to the 
harmony and balance of nature. Perfection in nature, on the other hand, can be 
taken as mere good luck. It is absurd for us to choose one over the other when 
even the ancients argued that ‘nature’ includes art. If such a binary issue still 
prevails, this is only because the moderns have failed to understand art, and the 
doctrine of mimesis, even when the ‘sublime’ lies in the imitation of the 
ancients. 
Following Perry, it seemed to Bompaire’s student, B.P. Reardon, that 
post-Hellenistic man had lost his identity as a πολίτης, and that therefore his 
era was characterized by a certain Romanticism, in which the individual had 
become ‘a spiritual wanderer who seldom knew where to go or what to do, 
with the result that he went almost everywhere in mind and body and thought 
all kinds of thoughts.’ Whenever the intellectual was not in search of the 
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unknown, he ‘retreated into the ivory tower and lulled his soul to peace by 
devoting himself to learning, or to art for art’s sake.’104 ‘Reading the bulk of 
second century literature, that is to say such writings as reflect general 
tendencies, one is not transported into a real world, but into a sham one, in a 
museum of fossils.’105 From the point of view of paideia, literary expression in 
the strictest sense follows a doctrine of mimesis. Therefore, it is the product of a 
literary culture that is forever referential to its literary patrimony and in that 
there is some kind of elevated game; an art for the sake of art.  
Bompaire’s characterization of Lucian as écrivain meant that Lucian’s 
comedy was now solely entertainment,106 and it no longer made much sense to 
think too much about Lucian’s ideals, to try and situate Lucian’s pensée 
philosophique,107 or to worry about the critical potential of its scepticism or 
consequentiality of its laughter. If anything, Lucian’s apparently abusive 
humour could only be explained as the defence of paideia against 
sectarianism.108 In their research, the developmentalist readings of Lucian had 
found that his literature could be read as being particularly critical of 
hierarchies, of gods and men, of rulers and the ruled. It was possibñe that 
Lucian’s humour might have been shameful and abusive that gave to his work 
philosophical value. By contrast, the unitarian reading of Lucian allowed his 
work to be that of a sophist whose almost single life-interest was to produce 
escapist literature for a reading elite through the amusing recreations of 
classical themes. These may, at times, perhaps, have been written for his own 
economic benefit, but his work did not aim to forward any particular 
philosophical theory. Neither did it promote his personal views on morality, 
religion and politics or seek to offend anyone. 
                                                          
104 Perry (1955), 295-298. 
105 Van Groningen (1965), 52; Reardon (1971), 5. 
106 Hall (1981) 192-193 
107 Reardon (1971), 175. 




In my opinion, current disagreements between Nesselarth and Möllendorff can 
be best explained as two trends in Lucianic studies which developed from the 
moment in history in which Lucian’s work fell into the hands of Christians.  In 
many ways, the unitarian account of Lucian is the result of the secularization of 
classical studies. Unlike the developmentalist theory, one key characteristic of 
the unitarian account of Lucian is to divide his works not by a progression, but 
into larger sections (for instance; fiction and historical works),109 or even to treat 
them as a fictional universe whose parts can be compared against each other, 
whithout any problem, for the purposes of interpretation. But this is only made 
possible as the unitarian account is not particularly interested in discovering 
what the author’s personal beliefs about the world that surrounded him, and 
tends to read Lucian’s texts as mere sophistic entertainment, which lacks 
offensiveness and does not attempt to make an impact in real life. 
Developmentalists, by contrast, tend to arrange Lucian’s texts by a progression 
depending on the sect or belief that scholars imagine Lucian closest to. For this 
reason, their account is also more prone to reading Lucian’s humour as one that 
trys to defend truth by attacking the reputation of his enemies. Therefore, we 
might say that the presence or absence of aischrologic humour is that which 
divides the developmentalist theory from the unitarian.  
Literary historians realized that aischrology had to play a major role in the 
interpretation of Lucian’s comedy, as practices of patronage were at the core of 
the economy and the politics of literature and philosophy. It was simply too 
problematic to reduce all literature of the Second Sophistic to mere 
entertainment.110 Lucian’s writings were part of the ‘institutional life’ of the 
                                                          
109 Anderson (1976), 177; (2009), 3. 
110 Bowersock 1969, for Lucian p. 115 
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second century,111 and of its aging rhetorical culture, engaged with the political 
and social controversies of his time only in the variations of formulae.112 What 
was perceived looking at as entertaining literature was in many ways a central 
aspect of the lives of powerful individuals who were also sophists and 
philosophers, and members of an elite of created by the Antonines, who (re)-
created the figure of the sophist, and formed a new kind of intellectual which 
would go on to fight against ψευδοπαιδεία.113 Furthermore, Lucian’s use of 
themes and variations of the past do not invalidate the possibility of satire.114 
Similarly, class and provincial identities are not only fundamental to our own 
comprehension of the ideologies of the higher class, but also to our 
understanding of philosophers and intellectuals who were close to the elite and 
whoi were were not politically neutral.115 ‘The prominence of philosophy in 
Lucian’s work is due not only to his reading or to the demands of his audiences 
but also to the fact that society and the culture of the day swarmed with 
philosophers as much as with sophists’.116 Lucian was ‘not an otherworldly 
‘’artist,’’ still less a ‘’journalist,’’ but a man in touch with his time’.117 Ultimately, 
it is hard to believe that Lucian’s literature could have been entirely 
uncompromised, and this suggests that his take on philosophy had to respond, 
at least partially, to the internal politics of the economy of paideia. In spite of 
this, literary historians writing after Bompaire concluded that although Lucian 
might have reflected on the gap between wealth and poverty, his literature did 
not support any agenda for social change. Siding with ordinary citizens against 
philosophy as it appeared in the Hermotimus, suggested that for Lucian the life 
                                                          
111 Anderson (1994), 1425. 
112 Anderson (1993), 1444-1445. 
113 Bompaire (1958), 118- 119; Norden (1898) 1. 374. For ψευδοπαιδεία see Boulanger (1923) 438. 
114 Baldwin (1973), 74. Baldwin introduced Marxism to Lucianic studies. Marx had also read 
Lucian, and looked at his atheism as a positive form of progress, see Marx (1975), 184 with van 
Leeuwen (1972), 149. See also Marx, (1977), 134. Baldwin is openly negative about Bompaire’s 
approach, which (needless to say), implies that art can be done for the sake of art, 106-107.  
115 Baldwin (1973), 88. 
116 Jones (1986) 32 
117 Jones (1986), 23. 
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of the common man was the best, and it was for that reason he attacked 
asceticism as an extravagance of philosophical and religious minds, who 
appeared almost desperate for a holy or divine man to germinate.118 At least in 
this sense, Lucian’s comedy had to have some critical consequences.119 But, even 
if Lucian ‘displays sympathy for the lot of the common man,’ ‘he would have 
hated to have been thought one’.120 In the end, Lucian’s literature seems to have 
been for the most part non-offensive and largley entertaining.121  
Even though the unitarian reading of Lucian rescued his popularity after 
WWII, seeing in Lucian only an entertaining writer of fiction did not favour a 
text like the Hermotimus which was no longer read as a philosophical dialogue 
and was now seen as boring and mechanical in the development of its ideas.122 
As Nesselrath notes, this dialogue did not capture the attention of most scholars 
in the 20th century,123 and this is why, apart from Möllendorff’s commentary, 







                                                          
118 Anderson (1994) 4-16. 
119 Jones (1986) 39 refering to the Zeus Tragic.  
120 Baldwin (1973), 116-117. 
121 Baldwin (1973), 103. For Alexiou too the intention of joking about serious matters of Lucianic 
comedy can count as the best kind of humour (Cic. De. Or. 2. 250.) of an entertaining sophist 
Alexiou (1990), 4. 
122 Reardon (1971), 174; Robinson (1979), 31; Hall (1981), 155. 
123 Nesselrath (1992), 3451-3452. 
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Chapter 3 
Rescuing the Philosophical  
Content of Lucian’s Comedy 
 
The unitarian reading of Lucian brought with it an aesthetic revaluation of the 
imitative and parodic form of literature from the Second Sophistic. But it did so 
by defending the value of literature written for literature’s sake and literature 
written for the sake of entertaining. Confining all possible critical consequences 
of its humour to the realm of the textual and the literary meant that Lucian’s 
texts as diminished in their philosophical value, which had depended largely 
on their aischrologic and sceptical potential to go beyond the textual. In the 
following chapter I will show that in recent scholarship there ha been a 
tendencys had to rescue the philosophical content of Lucian by replacing a 
framework that finds more interesting a nihilist absurd comedy that debunks 
all ideals with the Romantic aesthetic literary framework, which has idealism as 
its core value.  
It seems that the idea that Lucian might have been a provincial author 
whose humour criticised concrete hierarchies (religious figures and institutions, 
or powerful polititians) is no longer philosophically appealing. Scholars are no 
longer so much interested in reading Lucian as an author who tells us what 
really happened in his life. Instead they prefer to see in his literature evidence 
of an undermining of authority, which holds the structure of any given text: the 
authority of the text’s author. Seeing in Lucian a forerunner of nihilism appears 
to have been the last turn towards textualism in Lucianic studies.  
Bracht Branham was the first to introduce this trend thart is now the 
basis of a more recent aesthetic framework used to value Lucian’s work. 
Branham sought to prove that Lucian’s comedy ought to be considered as 
valuable owing to its lack of straightforward moral, political and philosophical 
stances, and, because of its all-encompassing kind of humour, which appeaered 
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to him to have been the work of a forerunner of nihilism. By way of illustrating, 
Branham had to introduce another aesthetic framework, which I suspect was 
based on Nietzschean values of the comic, which were, willingly or not, 
introduced via the work of Mikhail Bakhtin.  
 I find the matter interesting enough to warrant an analysis of how this 
reversal of opinions about Lucian’s nihilism could have happened in the first 
place.  
 
1. Subverting Romantic Aesthetics: F. Nietzsche’s Values of the Comic 
 
We do not know the extent of Nietzsche’s influence in the work of Mikhail 
Bakhtin and in his theory of the novel,1 but there seems to have existed a 
somewhat fraught relationship between the two.2 Is it possible Bernays refered 
to Lucian’s works as a nihilistische Öde with the purpose of attacking Friederich 
Nietzsche? Perhaps Nietzsche’s use in the Birth of Tragedy of Bernays’ ground-
breaking interpretation of the Aristotelian concept of catharsis as a medical 
term particularly riled him?3 One can hardly overestimate the importance of the 
philosophy of Friederich Nietzsche in the most recent interpretations of 
Lucian’s comedy, precisely because Nietzsche allows a literature that presents 
an all-encompassing laughter aimed at the absurdity of the world to be 
                                                          
1See Clark and Holquist (1984), 26 and Curtis, J. (1986) 339-344 who highlight the importance of 
Nietzsche in Bakhtin. The relationship of influence between these two intellectuals has to be 
analysed more deeply through an analysis of Rohde’s Der griechische Roman und seine Vorläufer, 
which was highly praised by Bakhtin who used it to theorize about the prehistory of  novelistic 
discourse, see Bakhtin (1981), 4, 64, 372.  For Nietzsche, Bakhtin and Plato’s Symposium and the 
novel. See Corrigan and Glazov-Corrigan (2005), especially 32, 44.  
2 Rabelais and His World was first published in 1968. For a concise and clear introduction to 
Bakhtin see Schmitz (2007), 63-75. See also Dentith’s (1995) excellent book. For Bakhtin, the 
classics, and Lucian see in particular the articles of Emerson, Edwards, Nagy in Branham (2002). 
See Branham (2005) for an analysis of the poetics of Menippean satire.    
3 As it is well known Bernays’ most important contribution was his (1867) Grundzüge der 
verlorenen Abhandlung des Aristoteles über Wirkung der Tragödie, which argued that the term 
catharsis in Aristotle was a borrowing from medicine. Prof. Vöhler at the Freie Universität 
Berlin is currently working on a project called The Pathologizing of Catharsis in the 19th Century: 
Bernays, Freud, Nietzsche. 
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philosophically interesting. Besides, Nietzsche’s own writing is Lucianic in 
some ways, as I am about to show.    
 Nietzsche’s references to Lucian are scarce,4 although it is quite likely 
that he remained a reader of Lucian throughout his life,5 and thereby, almost 
certainly, owes at least some stylistic elements to Lucian.6 For instance, it is not 
too bold to read Thus spoke Zarathustra as Nietzsche’s most Lucianic piece. This 
is a work about a holy man, Zarathustra, who happens to be also an anti-
idealist, nihilist and mistrustful sage, and who leads the way to the creation of 
the superman or Übermensch. This is a concept that is undoubtedly, although 
not solely, based on Lucian’s term ὑπεράνθρωπος.7 Perhaps one can also see 
some similarities between Hermotimus and the Wanderer and his Shadow,  which 
was published as part of the second volume of Human, all too Human. Many of 
Nietzsche’s previous ideas about the relationship between laughter and truth 
and the aesthetics of comedy and satire were consolidated in this later work. 
                                                          
4 Babich perhaps is right in finding similarities between the beginning of On Truth and Lie in an 
Extra Moral Sense, published just one year after The Birth of Tragedy, and Lucian’s True Story, 
Babich (2014), 247-248. Babich has also argued that in Twilight of the Idols 2, in the section called 
What I owe to the Ancients, Nietzsche praised Lucian: Babich (2013), 14 n. 2. 
5 Although after 1878 and up to the publication of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche seems to 
have lost interest in the Dionysian, his interest in the role of laughter in philosophy, Menippus 
and the seriocomic can be found before and after his ‘Dionysian period’. In his early years 
Nietzsche’s incessant philological production was focused mostly on Greek literature. Soon 
after he went to teach at the Gymnasium in Basel, where he gave courses on Lucian and every 
other major author of antiquity, he exchanged bibliographic gossip about Erwin Rhode’s 
upcoming Lucian’s Schrift: Loukios ê ónos published in 1869 and was in competition with 
Knauth's De Luciano libelli qui inscribitur Lucius sive asinus auctore published in 1869 (KGWB 1. 2. 
383). Out of 22 essays published before he turned 23 (See Latacz (2014), 11., it is) the one essay 
on Latin literature, Über die Varronischen Satiren und den Cyniker Menippus published on the 6th of 
November, 1868, which stands out. In a letter sent to Erwin Rhode three days later, Nietzsche 
tells of his excitement of delivering the first lecture of the semester on the same topic. Nietzsche 
had not obtained his doctorate, but was hoping to get a dispensation owing to the impressive 
number of essays he had published. Getting a dispensation would feel like ‘being a bridegroom, 
joy and vexation mingled, humour, γένος σπουδογέλοιον, Menippus!’ At the end of the letter, 
Nietzsche proposed that Rohde write a Beiträge zur griechischen Litteratureschichte in which he 
would include essays about the writings of Democritus, the Certamen of Homer and Hesiod, 
and Menippus (KGWB 1. 2. 599). 
6 Burnham and Jesinghausen (2010), 32-33 fail to see the relevance of Lucian among the different 
traditions of satirists influencing Nietzsche. 
7 Luc. Cat. 16. 
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Here, we find a short dialogue between an old man and Pyrrho,8 who is 
questioned about the possibility of educating men on how to mistrust and 
disbelieve everything. What is interesting about this piece is that it certainly 
resembles not only Fontenelle and Lucian’s Dialogues of the Dead, as the latter is 
Fontenell’s model,9 but also the Hermotimus. Without underestimating 
Nietzsche’s unusual originality, the topic of the quest for education; the 
metaphor of the road and the gate; the hint at Hesiod’s two roads; the 
somewhat honest old man admits that he should not be listened to as a carrier 
of truth but as a teacher of mistrust of truth (which paradoxically is the only 
way to truth) and finally the notion of laughter and staying silent (which is, of 
course, part of the Sceptics’ aphasia) as constituting a better philosophy;  
inevitably make us think of the Hermotimus, and Lycinus’ advice to stay sober 
and remember to distrust.  
 Besides his own possible Lucianism, the reason why Nietzsche is so 
relevant to the interpretation of Lucian is because his take on comedy allows a 
work of comic art to be deemed as better as it does not depend on the 
righteousness of his satiric stance, but on the extent of its potential to debunk all 
claims to truth by laughing at existence.10 A comedy that laughs at everything 
rejects faith with its idea that God is truth and that truth is divine,11 and it 
                                                          
8 See Bett (2000), 67 for the problems and advantages of reading Pyrrho as a historical figure. 
9 Sommer (2006), 260. 
10 According to Nietzsche the essence of humanity and its most invincible instinct is to preserve 
the species, but we are still in an era of morality and religions. However, whatever one does, 
good or evil, and regardless of whether one is mocked or praised for it, it is done for the sake of 
human existence. In history there had been several ‘teachers of the purpose of existence’ who 
try to bring meaning to our lives, but they deceive us by inventing higher purposes or 
imagining a greater existence. These teachers do not know that it is the whole of existence that 
is laughable. Thus, all reason, purpose and trust in life are nothing more than the object of 
laughter. In spite of the corrective power of laughter, teachers of the purpose of existence keep 
on emerging. In order to stop this cycle, an individual will have to ‘laugh at oneself as one 
would have to laugh in order to laugh from the whole truth’. If one were able to laugh at all 
existence and all truth and falsehood, laughter would acquire tragic undertones, Nietzsche 
(2002), 27-29, Fr 1. 
11 Nietzsche (2002), 200-201. Fr. 344. 
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rejects ascetic ‘persons of faith’ including philosophers,12 scientist and scientists 
alike, precisely because the latter is also based on a ‘faith of truth’, which is 
based on perception.13  
 All this does not mean that Nietzsche denies the possibility of truth, but 
that one is left with a new infinity that consists of infinite interpretations.14 But 
it does mean that in the end, all serious talk is meaningless.15 The comedy of 
existence strikes us with the realization that the choice is not between reason 
and the senses, scepticism and belief, truth and falsehood, but between 
falsehood and despair, laughter and absurdity. Before we can even 
understand,we can only laugh, lament, and curse,16 but if gay science prevails 
laughter will be paired to wisdom.17  
 In this way, Nietzsche elevated the epistemological potential of laughter 
to wisdom, but only as long as it preserved a high degree of pessimism and 
scepticism. The seriocomic and laughing at the absurdity of life is for Nietzsche 
a matter of unveiling that which is serious, depending on the artificial 
hierarchies that have been constructed by truth. In this way, Nietzsche states 
that just as it is assumed that gods also philosophise, he has no ‘doubt that they 
thereby also know how to laugh in a superhuman and new way – and at the 
expense of all serious things!’18 A true philosopher is measured according to the 
importance of his laughter.19 The more a philosopher is capable of laughing at 
all idealism and everything that gives meaning to existence, the better a 
philosopher he is. 
 Valuing a comedy of existence implied rephrasing Schiller’s notion of 
nostalgia for nature and the naïve in art, but it also gave Lucianic satire a 
                                                          
12 Nietzsche (2002), 210. Fr. 352; Nietzsche (2002), 217. Fr. 357. 
13 Nietzsche (2002), 200. Fr. 344. 
14 Nietzsche (2002), 239-240. Fr 374. 
15 Nietzsche (2002), 182-183. Fr. 327. 
16 Nietzsche (2002), 185-186. Fr. 333. 
17 Nietzsche (2002), 28. Fr. 1. 
18 Nietzsche (2001), 152. Fr. 257. 
19 Nietzsche (2001), 174-175. Fr. 294. 
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privileged place in the chronology of the life of myths and religion,20 and in the 
history of the novel.21 Like Schiller, Nietzsche welcomed the abusiveness of 
laughter, although he differed from the Romantic writer in that which he saw as 
the value of Lucianic satire in the attacks against those who moralized in the 
need of a fading God.22 While for Schiller satire and scepticism have an aesthetic 
value because they are construed, in and are at the service of, an intrinsic or 
previously conceived set of moral values, for Nietzsche, on the contrary, 
Lucianic satire is valuable because it highlights the crisis of morality and 
rational and divine truths, and because in so far as it does this it also sides, 
through laughter, with the Dionysian.  
 Further differences between Schiller and Nietzsche are perceived in the 
opinions of the latter of Voltaire,23 who is praised for his grace, for his faun-like 
free spirit, and whose virtues lie precisely in his lack of moralizing and his 
relativity about truth,24 and of Wieland, whose translations of Cicero and 
                                                          
20 Nietzsche (1999), 54 
21 In Birth of Tragedy out of The Spirit of Music Nietzsche argues that Platonic dialogue, like 
tragedy before it, mixed all the available artistic styles, comic and tragic, and arrived half way 
‘between narrative, lyric, and drama, between prose and poetry, thus breaking the strict older 
law about the unity of linguistic form.’ Plato’s dialogues then became the model of the novel, 
‘which can be defined as an infinitely intensified Aesopian fable where poetry has the same 
rank in relation to dialectic philosophy as, for centuries, philosophy had in relation to theology, 
namely that of ancilla.’ Only in this way could Plato manage to tame what was daemonic in 
Socrates, and later art became excessively philosophical and dependent on dialectics and logics. 
At a later period, the Cynic writers went further than Plato in terms of the form of the dialogue 
and mixed prose with metrical forms, arguing in favour of the irrational through the figure of 
‘the mad Socrates’, and they performed their lives according the life-style of Diogenes. 
Nietzsche (1999), 69. However, after tragedy was co-opted by Socrates and the old religion of 
the Greeks had faded away, the beauty of their myths collapsed and ‘soon the mocking Lucians 
of the ancient world chase after the discoloured, ravaged flowers scattered by all the winds that 
blow.’ Nietzsche (1999), 54. Thus, in this early work of Nietzsche, Lucian’s satire already has the 
potential of being a remedy to Platonic rationalism and to Cynicism as a development of 
Platonism. 
22 McFadden (1982), 175-176. 
23 Nietzsche (1997), 46. See Schacht’s introduction (1996) ix to Human all Too Human. While 
gradually Nietzsche departed from Romantic aesthetics, he never abandoned his appreciation 
for Voltaire, to whom he dedicated the first edition of his second book, Human, all too Human. 
For a direct and vivid account of Nietzsche’s later relationship with romanticism see Nietzsche 
(2001), 234-236. Fr. 370. See also Nietzsche (1996), 26. Fr. 25. 
24 Nietzsche (2001), 35. Fr. 35. See also Nietzsche (2001), 101. Fr. 216. 
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Lucian are the best example of German prose,25 but who in the end is 
condemned for his proclivity to moralize.26 
 
2. Bakhtinean Values of the Comic 
 
Throughout his life Nietzsche reinterpreted Cynic values, and even, from The 
Gay Science onwards, began to portray himself as seriocomic philosopher with 
Cynic and Menippean traits.27 Similarities between Nietzsche’s absurdist, 
nihilist laughter and that which we know about Cynic laughter are not hard to 
find, perhaps as it is possible to find some sort of existential comedy in old 
Cynic humour. 
 Diogenes, who like Socrates claimed to be ignorant of most things,28 
rejected social conventions, common religious beliefs, and traditional forms of 
paideia, which he deemed to be distractions from virtue.29 Accordingly, he 
fiercely defended his own creed and opinions by mocking important citizens, 
but also Homer, Plato and Isocrates,30 and by making parodies of the syllogisms 
                                                          
25 Nietzsche (1996), 333. Fr. 90. 
26 Nietzsche (1996), 336 Fr. 107  
27 In the latter book, Nietzsche brought Cynic parrhesia to talk about the physiological reactions 
to Wagner in much less positive tones than he had done so in The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche 
(2002), 232-233. Fr. 368; As it is attested in one of his late notes of 1886 he even toyed with the 
idea of writing a Dionysos philosophos: A Satura Menippea (KGWB 8.1. 228.), a project that might 
have had resonated with Thus Spoke Zarathustra; see Gillespie (1996), 229. KGWB 8. 3. 404. In 
one of his later notes written between September and October 1888, Nietzsche feels free to link 
Jacques Offenbach with Heinrich Heine and Petronius with Menippean Satire, See Nietzsche’s 
positive remarks about Petronius (KGWB 6. 2. 43, 41-42). In The Case of Wagner Nietzsche even 
made a parody of Horace’s dictum ridendo dicere verum quid vetat for ridendo dicere severum (Hor. 
Serm. 1.24) and in his autobiographic Ecce Homo (written in 1888 but not published until 1908) 
he even claimed that the highest thing that could be attained on Earth was Cynicism.  
28 D.L. 6.24, 6.26, 6.58, 6.64 
29 D.L. 6. 63. 
30 D.L. 6.54. 
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of intellectuals,31 thereby pointing at the distraction represented by rationalism 
when virtue lies in those deeds that have a basis in theory.32  
 In this sense, one aspect of Cynic humour is aischrologic and parodic and 
is therefore closer to our notion of satire. Diogenes’ keenness for parody, and 
verbal puns that pointed at the tyranny of reason was later incorporated into 
Cynic satirical literature by his later epigones Hipparchia, Crates, Metrocles, 
Monimus, Menippus, Bion of Borysthenes, Teles and Cercidas. All these 
authors are credited with using the iambus and elegy and with parodying 
tragedy, hexameters, epistolary literature, dialogues and diatribes to convey 
their doctrinal message.  Nevertheless, Diogenes and other Cynics also 
insisted on falling back on nature in order to live a good life, and accepted 
courageousluy every caprice of Tychê, who behaved as the theatre directress of 
human comedy. 33 Cynics practiced another kind of humour closer to our 
comedy of existence, because for them tychê exceeded the possibilities of logos, 
and all attempts to find absolute moral values, as long as they came from nomos, 
were meaningless. Their humour sought to provoke laughter by reviewing the 
incongruence and absurdity of all attempts to find meaning in human affairs 
that did not correspond to nature, such as conventions and reason.  
 What classicists should not forget is that Mikhail Bakhtin made the 
category ‘Menippean Satire’ a useful tool, which could be used to explain the 
origins of that which he called the polyphonic novel.34 Bakhtin believed that 
totalizing seriocomic tones had been a response that came from the ‘unofficial’ 
world, which found the order of the ‘official’ world absurd and solipsistic. This 
                                                          
31 D.L. 6.37, 68 Branham 93-94. 
32 The deeds of Diogenes are documented in the chreia. However, the idea that virtue lies mostly 
in deeds and not in words seems to have come from Antisthenes. D.L. 6.11, see Branham (1996), 
83. 
33 Teles in Stob. Fl. 108.82. 
34 The mixture of prose and verse has worked for the definition of this genre, cf. Bakhtin (1984), 
113. But see also Relihan, (1984), 228-229, proving that modern criticism has filled a gap in 
ancient literary nomenclature by naming a genre ‚Menippean satire‛. Fields (2008) for a full 
discussion of parrhesia in Roman Greece. See also Visa-Ondarçuhu (2006), Foucault (2004) and 
Martín García and Macías Villalobos (2008),15-86 and 960-1027. 
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kind of all-encompassing humour can be perceived in ‘Menippean satire’ and in 
the rest of the several branches of European seriocomic traditions, which find 
their roots in the primeval poetics of ancient carnival festivals such as the 
Saturnalia, and that gave birth to the polyphonic novel.35  
 According to Bakhtin the carnival was a performance, but one that made 
no distinction between audience and performers, and which through laughter 
created a ‘misalliance,’ or a dialogue between ‘the sacred and the profane, the 
low and the high, the great with the insignificant, the wise with the stupid.’36 
During the carnival a king is crowned and then subsequently de-crowned, a 
symbol of death and rebirth, but once the festival was finished, the "popular-
festive forms", "the folk," "the unofficial world," "popular-festive culture" was 
replaced again by the official monologic world, and life returned to normality. 
The purpose of these carnivals was not only to momentarily change the order of 
things in order to allow them to continue, but also to establish a link between 
the past, the present and the future and for the individual to dissolve into the 
social. 
                                                          
35 Erasmus and More’s translations of Lucian transformed the genre of the dialogue and of 
literature in general in the Renaissance, Gómez (2000) 90-102; Gallo Gruss (2003) 131-156. 
Lucian’s texts, along with Erasmian literature, are sometimes today read as if they belonged to 
the literary genre Menippean Satire. However, the term in a generic form was not used until 
1581 by Justus Lipsius, and only in reference to writers in Latin (Varro, Apuleius, Seneca and 
Petronius). Lucian’s texts were labelled ‘Menippean Satire’ later than this in a pamphlet that 
defended the idea of a Catholic France independent of the Spanish Crown, entitled Abrrégé et 
l’Ame des Etats convoquez an l’an 1593. See Satyre Ménippée de la vertu du catholicon d'Espagne et de 
la tenue des estatz de Paris (1882). See the discussion in De Smet (1996) 44, and 43-45. In the 
justification of the new title for the second edition of this pamphlet which circled Europe 
widely, the author, who in all likelihood was the philologist Jean Passerat, argues that satire is 
not just malicious gossip reprehending public or individual vices, as carried out by satirists 
Lucilius, Horace, Juvenal and Persius, but all kinds of writings that mix prose and verse, and 
make use of many different arguments, see Marcilly (1882), 331. The adjective Menippean thus 
refers to prose containing bitter puns and mockeries like that of Menippus’, which can cause 
laughter, and that challenges and corrects the vices of mankind. Menippus is the creator of this 
satire, and Varro, Lucian, Petronius and Apuleius were his later imitators. Therefore, unlike 
Bakhtin’s theory of Menippean satire, in its origins the term seemed to refer to an all-
encompassing kind of moral satire. 
36 Bakhtin (1984), 123.  
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  ‘Carnivalized literature’ resulted from the influence of the carnival in 
literature. It was born in an epoch in which national legends and ethical norms 
‘that constituted the ancient ‘’seemliness’’ (‘’beauty’’, ‘’nobility’’)’ were in 
decay. Before the advent of Christianity, there was a competition between 
heterogeneous religious and philosophical schools and movements and 
‘’ultimate questions’’ of worldview were on everyone’s lips. Prophets and 
wonder-makers were encountered in public spaces with even more frequency 
than monks of the Middle Ages during the flourishing of monastic sects.  
 Seriocomic genres were able to conceal all the serious monologic genres, 
and the contradictory ideas and opinions of the outside in an ‘inner logic.’37  By 
absorbing the serious genres and monologic discourses, Menippean satire not 
only established both an external and internal ‘dialogicality’ of approach to 
human life and thought between the serious genres.38 
  One characteristic of Menippean satire is that it is in close relationship 
with Socratic dialogue, and is characterized by the syncretic juxtaposition of 
various points of view, which display the technique of provoking one’s 
interlocutor to speak. Bakhtin calls this practice anacrisis, and identifies Socrates 
as its best practitioner. In Socratic dialogue, however, all the interlocutors are 
ideologists, which means that when an idea is being tested, the character 
embodying the idea is also under scrutiny, for which reason Bakhtin speaks of 
the ‘image of an idea’.39 Bakhtin’s point is that by means of syncrisis, the utopias 
of the wise man collide with the world’s evil, depravity, baseness, and 
vulgarity.40  
 Menippus is the creator of the classical form of Menippean satire, but 
Bakhtin argued that the genre had arisen earlier, from Socratic dialogue, 
perhaps with Antisthenes. The fragments of Menippus, Heraclides Ponticus, 
                                                          
37 Bakhtin (1984), 119. 
38 Bakhtin (1984), 120. 
39 Bakhtin (1984), 111-112. 
40 Bakhtin (1984), 115. 
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Bion of Borysthenes, and Varro (Bakhtin believed incorrectly that Varro used 
the term Menippean Satire to refer to a generic form41), the pseudo-Hippocratic 
Letters, and the Apocolocyntosis, are according to Bakhtin some of the few 
remaining examples of Menippean satire.  
 Lucian’s dialogues have similarities with Menippean satire, his texts 
‘taken as a group, are an entire encyclopaedia of his time: they are full of overt 
and hidden polemics with various philosophical, religious, ideological and 
scientific schools, and’ ‘they challenge the ‘masters of thought’ in all spheres of 
societal and ideological life.’42  
 However, as in the case in the works of Roman satirists Lucilius and 
Horace, Lucianic dialogues borrow elements of Menippean satire and are 
according to Bakhtin not Menippean satire proper, even if it is through such 
elements, in modern times, that Menippean satire has exerted its influence.43 It 
is very important to mention that Bakhtin is explicit about the differences 
between Rabelais’ carnivalized literature in the full sense of the word and 
Lucian’s: 
 
Lucian’s laughter is always abstract, ironical, devoid of true 
gaiety. Scarcely anything remains of the ambivalence of the 
saturnalian symbols. The traditional images are bloodless and 
made to serve the abstract moral philosophies of Stoicism 
(moreover, degenerate and distorted by late Cynicism). His 
kings are slapped ‘in the face, as the least of slaves.’ But these 
are commonplace punishments of the regime of slavery, 
transferred to Hades. They are but a dim survival of the 
saturnalian ambivalent king-slave images. They are mere blows 
devoid of all generating force; they do not contribute to birth 
and renewal. Lucian’s banquet presents the same 
                                                          
41 Relihan (1984) has proved that the term did not acquire a generic form until the late 16th 
century, and concluded that ‘modern criticism has filled in a gap in ancient literary 
nomenclature by naming a genre Menippean Satire’. See his book (1993) on ancient Menippean 
Satire. See also De Smet (1996), 13-56 and Weinbrot (2005), 6-19. 
42 Bakhtin (1984), 110. 
43 Bakhtin (1984), 137. 
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commonplace, superficial aspect; the inmates of Lucian’s 
underworld also eat, but eating has nothing in common with 
Rabelaisian feasting. Former kings may not enjoy it, but neither 
can the former slaves and beggars. Everybody eats but nobody 
feasts, not even the philosophers, who only laugh ironically, 
mocking the uncrowned kings and the wealthy. This is what 
matters most. Lucian’s material bodily principle merely serves 
to debase the higher images, to render them commonplace, 
with almost no ambivalence. It does not renew or regenerate.44 
 
Thus, the work of Rabelais, unlike Lucian, can be considered proper carnivalized 
literature, because the author’s voice, opinions and intentions join the ‘joyful 
relativity of everything.’45 When Lucian gave a definitive form to Menippean 
Satire, and established its modern form, his authorial presence was final and 
conclusive, and controlled the hostility of carnivalesque laughter towards the 
official, and inclined the genre towards the centripetal, the unifying, the 
monologic, the moralizing, the archaizising, canonical and hierarchical.  
 All of these are necessary characteristics for any given literary genre to 
survive. Perhaps one could argue that Bakhtin was reluctant to classify Lucian’s 
comedy as carnivalesque literature in the same way that he related the 
seriocomic to Menippus and not to Aristophanes and Old Comedy.46 Lucian 
might exhibit some of the stylistic features of the grotesque,47 but in spite of the 
Menippean presences in his work, as in the case of Aristophanes and Old 
Comedy, he deviates from the popular because he is suspected of being 
politically conservative and of trying to convey ideas that belong to the official 
world.  
 
                                                          
44 Bakhtin (1984b), 387-388. 
45 Bakhtin (1984), 126. 
46 Edwards (2001) published in Branaham (2002), 27-55. 
47 The influence of Nietzsche on Bakhtin's Aesthetics of Grotesque Realism is studied by 
Mazour-Matusevich (2009). However, more attention is needed on the influence Nietzsche 
might have had on social class, and the relativeness of bad taste and good taste in literature 
incorporating the aesthetic taste of what Nietzsche calls Southern humanity. Nietzsche (2001), 
78. See also fr. 76 and Fr. 218. 
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3. Adapting the Framework to New Values of the Comic  
 
Bracht Branham was the first to appreciate Lucianic nihilistic laughter through 
the Nitzschean-Bakhtinean values of the comic as positive,48 and in doing so he 
replaced the Romantic aesthetic literary framework with a nihilist absurdist 
one.  His appreciation of the ‘anarchically comic’ aspect of Lucian’s literature, 
which not only attacks idealism, but is lacking in any ideal,49 is an evident 
criticism of moralist valuations of satire which believe that the task of good 
satire is to rebuke vice.50 Instead, Branham proposed that Lucian’s seriocomic 
literature did not seek ‘to persuade us of the truth of one of two opposed 
dogmas but to generate comically disorienting contrasts between traditional 
"truths," and thereby to reveal both the kind of validity that inhabits a tradition 
and why that validity is merely partial.’51 But careful attention must be paid to 
the role of  aischrology in Branham’s approach, because today the less offensive 
and the less of a moralist Lusian is found to be, the more he is perceived as a 
philosophical a thinker.  
 Branham concedes that Lucian would have appreciated humour that 
denounces false-seriousness and that stands for true-seriousness,52 but his 
purpose was to show the ambiguous seriousness of the self-contradictory truths 
given by an apparently congruent literary tradition that started with Homer, 
                                                          
48 Branham only mentions Gilman’s Nietzschean Parody and does not make any direct reference 
to Nietzsche, but the aesthetic values that he used to rescue the philosophical importance of 
Lucian clearly come from his reinterpretation of Bakhtin’s notion of the seriocomic in Lucian’s 
literature, see Branham (1989), 26-28. 
49 Branham (1989), 5-6, 13, and 225: ‘the discrepancy between the ideal and the actual is in fact a 
central preoccupation in Lucian, but he often uses the contrast to call the ideal itself into 
question.’ 
50 Van Rooy (1965), 90-92. While agreeing with Hendrickson (1927), 52,47, 49-51 on the 
importance of γέλως and κατάγελως in satirical authors, Van Rooy argued that the humour of 
Menippus and Lucian lacks  the τὸ σπουδαῖον completely because it does not follow any ἀρχή. 
Their works are therefore pseudo-satire because of their sham seriousness, and because they 
wrote chiefly for entertainment, which is merely negative and completely nihilistic. Only one 
serious thing remains and that is –to raise a laugh. Van Rooy (1965), Chpt. 3. 
51 Branham (1989), 102. 
52 Branham (1989), 63. 
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thereby ‘making foreign, fanciful, and subversive points of view accessible.’53 
Humour in Lucian only offers a ‘source of insight’ that allows us to think about 
an object from two or more perspectives at once.54 Although Lucian might have 
sometimes led some attacks against his enemies, such as Alexander, he did so 
as a conservative.55 But Lucian is at his best when he is truly a seriocomic 
author, and demands that his humour stays within the boundaries of the text 
and is used as a mere instrument for causing laughter at the incongruous.56  
 Therefore, Branham concludes, Lucian’s work is mostly parodic and not 
satiric.57 It is a literature that is utile et dulce only in so far as it reveals through 
parody literary procedures, and the condition of mankind58 through its 
characters,59 who desire ‘to get out in order to look in,"60 and who share with the 
reader their privileged perspective in which it is impossible to distinguish 
between the boundaries of the serious and the comic. More often than not 
Lucian’s criticisms fall into being mere expressions of "wit for its own sake,"61 as 
they appeal to his tendency to fulful the role of a playful and entertaining 
intellectual. Lucian used his wit for ‘critical purposes’, which meant inserting 
serious material in ironic contexts and systematically provoking the reader to 
consider serious material from humorously divergent perspectives. This is a 
comic ambivalence, in which ‘the reader is often made uncertain as to how 
seriously any given point of view is being advocated by the author.’62 Authorial 
distance is a necessary part of this kind of entertainment and is as important as 
the distance between audience and tradition, precisely because distance invites 
the reader to enter Lucianic literature as a kind of game, and to avoid its 
                                                          
53 Branham (1989), 22, 82. 
54 Branham (1989), 91. 
55 Branham (1989), 264 n. 68. 
56 Branham (1989), 57; 133-134 and 240. 
57 Branham (1989), 130. 
58 Branham (1989), 23-24. Cf. Luc. Men. 16. 
59 Branham (1989), 62. 
60 Branham (1989), 61. Cf. Duncan (1979), 16. 
61 Branham (1989), 88, 61. 
62 Branham, (1984), 162-3. 
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illusion. Therefore, even if it is itself a game, this literature has its own kind of 




In Bakhtin, Menippean satire in the true sense of the word was, among other 
things, aesthetically relevant, because its taste for the grotesque and its all-
encompassing humour implied criticizing and even offending ‘the official’. But 
the path taken by recent scholars when thinking about ‘Menippean Satire’ 
emphasises it as a heuristically valid historical category and has led to a an 
interpretation of Lucian whose interest is to challenge the authority of the 
author itself, but whose literature is not aischrologic.  
 Branham was not terribly interested in why Lucian’s literature was not, 
according to Bakhtin, carnivalized literature proper,64 and he considered that 
Menippean seriocomic humour ‘works by revealing to the audience as 
problematic the approriateness of laughter or seriousness in a given context.’65 
Along with  
Petronius, Erasmus, Rabelais, Voltaire and others, Lucian is today considered to 
be an exponent of parrhesia and a cultivator of the genre of the spoudaiogeloion, 
both fundamental aspects of Menippean Satire and Cynic humour.  But 
criticisms of the Bakhtinian definition of seriocomic literature as hostile 
literature of the carnivalesque have been made based on the fact that the context 
of a ritual promoted by the state itself, gave room to aischrologic or hostile 
speech and happened under a license that granted state-sponsored democratic 
                                                          
63 Branham (1989), 20-21. 
64 For Branham, the purpose of Menippean Satire is to produce a dramatic change of 
perspective, but not to challenge the official. He contrast this with the humour of Aristophanes 
that creates laughter by reversing binary oppositions, for example, war for peace, Branham 
(1989), 17. 
65 Branham (1989), 56. 
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freedom of speech (parrhesia).66 It has therefore been argued that what seems to 
be ‘popular’, ‘subversive’ and ‘offensive’ in seriocomic literature might have 
only challenged the ‘official’ in a very narrow sense, but never its basic 
structures.67 
 On the other hand, the hunch that within the work of Lucian, along with 
that of Menippus and his near contemporary Oenomaus (all of whom were 
natives of the Anatolian peninsula), one could find some sort of nihilistic Cynic 
humour already existed.68 Today, scholars seem to have reached an agreement 
that Lucian was closer to literary Cynicism than he was to doctrinal Cynicism, 
or Scepticism and Epicureanism.69 Even though Lucian’s work might have been 
supported by a fairly consistent set of principles related to contemporary 
polemics, it is believed that his comedy remains only loosely connected to real 
philosophical disputes. This means that Lucian’s preferred literary forms are 
chosen to entertain only and mostly without causing offence. This would have 
allowed Lucian to criticise uneducated and vociferous Cynics like Peregrinus 
while at the same time praising Socratic figures like Demonax and Demetrius,70 
but without offending philosophers or other Cynic readers and always 
remaining distant from preaching like a sectarian philosopher while at the same 
                                                          
66 See Halliwell’s (2008),vii-viii. 333 n. 3, 462 n. 53 lucid reflections on Bakhtin. 
67 Goldhill (1991), 176-88.  
68 Dudley (1937), 170. 
69 Jones (1986), 90-92; Goulet-Cazé’s and Branham (1996), 389–413 do not consider Lucian a 
formal Cynic, but acknowledge the influence of the school in his work. On the contrary, 
Desmond (2008), 60–67, counts Lucian among the Second Century Cynics. Niehues-Pröbsting 
(1988) 239-261, Nesselrath (1998) and Bosman 2012, all believe that Lucian was not an ascetic 
philosopher, but that he was somehow a literary Cynic. Halliwell analyzes a narration that 
contains a close relationship with ‘real events’ like the Peregrinus, and talks about a ‘matching 
pair of narrator- audience relationships’, Halliwell (2008), 465. Cynic loidoria is directed back 
against Peregrinus, but the narrator also disapproves of the Cynic idea of ‘escaping from the 
absurdity of life.’ Halliwell (2008), 467. According to Halliwell, the combination of these two 
aspects allows the reader to know that the narrator is not a member of the Cynic movement, 
and that he is not correcting Cynicism or creating a panegyric worshipping of the Cynic 
affiliations of Peregrinus. 
70 Demetrius the Cynic or Demetrius of Sunium, cf. Luc. Tox. 27, and Branham (1996), 393. See 
also Alexiou (1990) ), 125-126. 
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appearing as an admirer of philosophy.71 
 A final distancing of Lucian’s comedy from aischrology has been made by 
Stephen Halliwell, who is not interested in reading Lucian as Menippean 
satire,72 and proposed that in Lucian’s sophisticated, hybrid and ultimately 
elusive comedy he is much closer to the existentialist comedy of the ‘absurd’ 
(one in which abusively laughing at one truth is (not) as abusive as laughing at 
some other truth) than he is to Old Comedy.73 
  In his own analysis of the freedom of Aristophanic comedy to point out 
grotesque shamelessness and to translate this shame into theatrical artifice, 
Stephen Halliwell concludes that aischrology kept some sort of ambiguity at the 
level of socio-political function. After all, aischrology ‘may always have an 
inbuilt tendency in virtue of its shame-breaking/causing excesses, to outrun the 
possibility of stable communal action or institutionalized judgment.’74 
According to Halliwell, this means that Aristophanes cannot count as a fully 
absurdist comedian, precisely because he is aischrologic, and because we can 
read to some extent the stance from which he launches his criticisms.75 But 
unlike Aristophanic comedy, Lucian’s self- subversive and self-delusive 
strategies have an aim: they qualify the hostility of the criticism by exposing 
and including the author of the criticism in his own critique. If Cynicism or any 
other philosophical endeavour is taken to break through the limits of human 
existence, they become ridiculous, but if they serve as a useful standpoint from 
which to show the follies of mankind, then they are praised.76 Therefore, the 
narrator and his audience are complicit in revealing falsehood and delusion and 
laugh at those who have the project of transcending. 
                                                          
71 Alexiou (1990), 67, 87. See also 98-99 for her criticism to Anderson. 
72 Halliwell (2008) points at the different kinds of non Menippean seriocomic tones in Homer, 
80-85; at symposiums, 139-144; of Socrates, 140-141 and 148-151; in religious contexts, 212-213; 
in Menander, 390, and in Lucian, 432-436. 
73 Halliwell (2008), 435 and 461-462. 
74 Halliwell (2008), 262. 
75 Halliwell (2008), Ch. 7 and 341. 
76 Halliwell (2008), 468-469. 
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 After Branham, who was explicitly against the reducing of Lucian to a 
figure of mere historicist interest,77 Lucian’s literature progressively began to be 
read as playful literature of philosophical relevance,78 as he seemed to be similar 
to a critical philosopher who was interested in proposing ethical, religious, 
literary and philosophical problems but without ever moralizing them. 
  
4. Lucian, the Critical Philosopher 
  
Bearing in mind Bakhtin’s theory of Menippean satire and Genette’s distinction 
between hypertext (parodying text) and hypotext (parodied text),79 as well as 
the meta-textual relationship that exists between the two, Alberto Camerotto 
has proposed that Lucian would have had two publics in mind; the extended 
readership or the ἰδιώται, which would include anyyone who knew Greek and 
could read, and the pepaideumenoi, or the privileged reader. In both cases, 
according to Camerotto, Lucianic parody requires a process of mathesis about 
paideia. Lucianic texts offer guides to the reader so that it might be possible to 
understand the parody, and in this way the reader acquires an independent and 
autonomous view about the hypotext with intellectual pleasure.80  
 The satirical hero is the embodiment of a satiric virtue, which consists of, 
among other things, Socratic and Cynic values, such as the knowledge of not-
knowing, parrhesia about the polis’ ignorance, and a Socratic elenchos in search of 
truth. But Camerotto argues that these values are presented in a way in which 
otherwise they would appear as non-virtuous, and this provocative quality is 
                                                          
77 Branham (1989), 2. This is a very important feature of Branham’s study that should not be 
taken lightly. In some ways, this consciously non-historical approach is similar to the one 
proposed by Heiddegger to Greek philosophy. On this point see Most’s (2002) fantastic article. 
78 Alexiou (1990), 156-157. 
79 Camerotto (1998), 15. For the different uses of intratextuality in Greek and Roman literature 
see the collection of essays in Sharrock and Morales (2001). 
80 Camerotto (1998), 261-302. 
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what approximates Lucianic literature to social satire.81 However, the satiric-
Lucianic hero is not a dogmatic philosopher. He is partly superior to 
philosophers, although also an outcast when viewed in comparison to the rest 
of the members of the polis. This distance allows the satiric hero to invert roles 
and to criticize philosophical arrogance from the point of view of the crowd.82 
On the other hand, he is a man of the crowd who has to also distance himself 
from it, as though he was a creature of the carnival who needs to be crowned 
and reaccepted into society before the carnival-time has passed. This distance 
gives the Lucianic hero appropriate space to point out and laugh at all of 
society’s contradictions. Laughter is the distinctive mark of the satirical hero, 
and at the same time a philosophical and ethical instrument by which he can 
laugh at the world.83  
 Contrary to what happens in a Platonic dialogue, according to Camerotto 
in Menippean satire the ideology that the satiric hero stands for remains 
unchanged during the process in which all social roles are inverted. The 
contrast of role reversal, therefore, becomes more evident, but so that at the 
same time both worlds, that of the carnival and that of ordinary life, are 
laughed at. Above all, the satiric hero is happy to laugh at himself, as long as 
the laughter that this creates is useful to everyone and is directed 
sympathetically at all who make up the public. In this way, for Camerotto as for 
Branham, the consequences of Lucianic laughter may have the intellectual 
provocation of a literary critic, but it is neither moralizing nor subversive.  
 Later scholars have gone farther than Camerotto in appreciating Lucian’s 
literature for its disconcerting instability. Unlike Camerotto and Möllendorff 
who think that Lucian assumed an ‘educated reader’ who would understand 
his sophisticated comedy, Tim Whitmarsh is clearly interested in Lucian’s texts 
                                                          
81 Camerotto (2014), 112. 
82 Camerotto (2014), 50. 
83 Camerotto (2014), 290. 
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as always questioning the reader’s own comfort in considering himself as 
educated, and in questioning what being educated means.84 For Whitmarsh, 
Lucian is ‘the most irrepressibly brilliant of writers,’85 precisely because in his 
works we not only find a bewildering number of ambiguous personae, but also 
because any search for authoritative, ‘true’ utterances’ ends in failure: ‘this is a 
comedy of nihilism: as Lucian famously (and Socratically) put it at the 
beginning of the True Stories, the only truth is that all is lies.’86 Lucian’s own 
authorial voice, along with all other ‘sophic’ authorities, is a matter of 
appearance rather than substance.87 Scholars think that Lucian had a genuine 
interest in philosophy, perhaps that of analyzing the philosopher as a creator of 
logoi, and more specifically on the impact that the talk of philosophers can have 
on others.88 His ‘artistic and playful re-casting of Platonic works’ is ‘more than 
just erudite fun,’89 precisely because reading Lucian can not only teach us other 
ways to read Plato, but can also show us ways in which some readers of 
antiquity might have done the same.90 Causing absurdity in the reader is one of 
Lucian’s aims as well as Plato’s,91 and this absurdity is created by making a 
‘fiction of himself’,92 which explores his cultural identity in relation to the 
Roman Empire.93 But in the case of Lucian this exploration is a part of a 
                                                          
84 Whitmarsh (2003). 
85 Whitmarsh (2001), 248. 
86 Whitmarsh, (2001), 252.  
87 Whitmarsh (2001), 265. Simon Goldhill too claims that Lucian’s literature challenges the 
authority of the author itself by introducing to the reader a form of self-presentation that is also 
self-subversive, for which reason all autobiographic moments in Lucian’s oeuvre are self-
parodic and a fiction of the author’s intentions, to the point of undermining any form of 
straightforward confession, Goldhill (2002), 63-67. 
88 Shlapbach (2010), 250-277. 
89 Ní Mheallaigh (2005), 96. 
90 Ní Mheallaigh (2005),101. 
91 Ní Mheallaigh (2005), 95 compares Plato’s metaleptic strategy in Plat- Phaed. 59b, which 
causes ‘unsettling absurdity’ in the reader, with Lucian’s own identity games. For metalepsis 
see Genette (1980), 236. 
92 On this point see Dubel (1994). 
93 Goldhill (2002), 66. 
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‘comedy of nihilism’ with no true, certain or stable affirmations.94 In Lucian’s 
works the reader finds a contractual significance both to real events and to 
truth, since in reading Lucian and what seems to be a ‘serious’ dialogue, ‘the 
reader assumes that the text relates truthfully to an extra-textual referent (the 
<<real>> world), and that the author guarantees the veracity of his 
information’.95 But, through the playful exchange of names, Lucian complicates 
this ‘autobiographical contract’ established between the narrator, author and 
reader,96 and ‘challenges us to think about physical, psychological and 
epistemological dimensions of our own reading experience, about why we read 
fiction, and about the strange journey we make from one world to another 
every time we pick up a book.’97  
 This direction that the latest studies of Lucian have taken seems to me to 
implicitly support what I call the unitarian reading of Lucian. We saw how 
scholars in the later half of the 20th century agreed that there was no need to 
discuss Lucian’s spiritual development, because as a sophist and a creative 
writer, his works were made mainly for the purpose of entertainment. But the 
introduction of Nietzschean values of the comic and the reaction to Bakhtin’s 
interpretation of Menippean satire allows a reading of Lucian as an author 
capable of criticising and undermining all voices of authority to the extent that 
we can consider him to have been close to nihilism, and more similar to a 




                                                          
94 Whitmarsh (2001), 256. 
95 Ní Mheallaigh (2006), 123. 
96 Genette (1997), 37-34. In her most recent book she argues that if ‘onymity can affect 
particularly readerly expectations, then the citation of another author’s name – a feature that I 
will call metonymity – can be used to elicit different types of responses from the reader as well.’ 
Ní Mheallaigh (2014), 171. 
97 Ní Mheallaigh (2014), 97. 
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4. Conclusions to Chapters 1, 2 and 3. 
 
My reader will now remember Möllendorff’s interpretation of the Hermotimus 
in which he argued that the κοινὸς βίος does not represent any reliable 
alternative to a philosophic life, but instead is simply the exchange of the ascetic 
life for its exact opposite, a life of luxury, hidden under the guise of a ‘common 
life’. Möllendorff seems to be trying to rescue the philosophical content of the 
Hermotimus by pointing at the key elements of a good Lucianic work according 
to that which I have called the unitarian reading of Lucian: it is a satiric 
dialogue, because it has nuanced self-subversive elements, but it is not 
aischrologic, because it is inconclusive and morally unsettling.  
 The reason why I have decided to analyze with such detail and at such 
length the background of the discussion between Nesselrath and Möllendorff in 
the last three chapters, is because I think that both interpretations (the first more 
developmentalist, the latter more unitarian) are the result of a much longer 
process which led readers in one direction as soon as Christians began to 
interpret Lucian with their own aesthetic and ethic framework. But, in spite of 
their common origin, today each of these two tendencies to read Lucian has 
their own aesthetic framework with which to value Lucian’s works.  
Of the two, the developmentalist approach to Lucian is keener to commit 
itself to discover the author’s personal beliefs about the world that surrounded 
him. It is a tendency much more inclined to historicize Lucian’s texts in the 
form of biographies, with the aim of discovering the truth behind them. 
Lucian’s texts are arranged in a progression which depends on that which 
Lucian is found to be standing for or on whichever doctrine he is closer to, 
doubting mostly about what he thought was wrong and false and laughing 
aischrologicaly at it to the point in which the defence of his own views could 
have offended others, as a positive sceptic or even as a dogmatist. We can 
consider Nesselrath’s proposal that the Hermotimus is an attack against 
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philosophy and a proptreptic dialogue encouraging us to live like everyone else 
as developmentalist. 
 The unitarian reading of Lucian has little concern for the ‘real’ historical 
content of Lucian’s works and diminishes the importance of distinguishing 
between truth and falsehood, or indeed fact and fiction. Instead it focuses on 
Lucian’s ability to make us doubt what truth is and doubt how we might 
discover who holds it. It is a tendency that is characterized by its textualism and 
argues that the aim of Lucian’s works is to make his readers laugh at everything 
and at everyone, including himself, and which can go as far as to subvert the 
authority that the author has over his own texts. Therefore, a text must not be 
too offensive, as it would mean that it acts in accordance with the author’s 
moral convictions and seeks to persuade in one direction or another. But in the 
unitarian reading of Lucian, the more a text de-centralizes and subverts the 
‘author’ the better it is philosophically speaking. We can consider Möllendorff’s 
proposal that both the common life and the philosophical life are fraudulent 
proposals and that the dialogue ends in aporia as a unitarian reading of the 
Hermotimus. 
 In order to consider the pertinence of these two proposal, Chapter 4 will 
consider the Hermotimus as a closed diegetic world, with the aim of proving that 
Hermotimus’ conversion is ironic and that structuraly the dialogue has the form 
of an aporetic dialogue. Chapter 5 offers a continuation of this formal analysis 
and aims to prove that Lucian had in mind the delivery of a very clear moral 
message.    
 Chapter 6 and 7 will be dedicated to proving that the Hermotimus is 
evidently a parodic text attacking the utopian potential and the asceticism of 
dogmatic philosophy. Finally, in the conclusions I will try to explore the 
possibility of Lucian’s Hermotimus as a text deemed to be offensive by his 
contemporaries. To do so I will look at a quarrel, which took place between 
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The Aporetic Form of the Hermotimus 
 
Towards the end of the dialogue Hermotimus, once Lycinus has proved to his 
interlocutor that pursuing eudaimonia through Stoic philosophy is impossible,1 
and after he has roundly exposed the true nature of philosophers,2 Hermotimus 
is on the verge of tears as he contemplates the possibility that he may have 
wasted a lifetime. To console him Lycinus tells him one of Aesop’s fables, in 
which a fox encounters a man who is made angry because he cannot count the 
waves: ‘Why, noble sir, do you get angry because of those gone by, you’ll do 
better if you don’t care for them and you start counting again from where you 
left off.’3 Lycinus then advises Hermotimus to behave like that man:  
 
The same for you, because you consider it so, in the future you 
will do better if you decided to live the life that is common to 
all of us (βίον τε κοινὸν ἅπασι βιοῦν ἀξιῶν) and if you 
become a fellow-citizen with the majority, and if you do not 
have hopes for anything bizarre and conceited, and you will 
not be ashamed, if you are sensible, to learn new things even if 
you are an old man and to change of direction for the better.  
 
As a parting shot Lycinus confesses that during the dialogue he aimed 
specifically at the Stoics as they were Hermotimus’ preferred school, but that he 
could have used any philosophical sect to make his argument. The concluding 
section of Lucian’s longest dialogue seems to show that Hermotimus is 
determinded to follow Lycinus’ advice: 
 
Well said! Yes, I'll be off with just that purpose in mind, to 
change even my very appearance. At least you will see me 
                                                          
1 Luc. Herm. 13-70. 
2 Luc. Herm. 71-85. 
3 Perry, 492.  The attempt to count waves is often seen as futile in Greek literature (Anacreont. 
13.3; Ael. V.H. 13, 15; Theoc. 16, 60; Dio Chrys. 20.12; Luc. Amor. 2). For more references on the 
meaning of the moral of this fable see Gow (1950), 317. 
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without this long beard that is now woolly and thick and 
without this self-punishing lifestyle, but completely relaxed 
and free. I will immediately change my clothing to the purple 
robe, to show everyone that I no longer have anything to do 
with imbeciles. How I wish I could vomit everything that I 
heard from them, and it would also be good, and I would not 
even hesitate to do it, to drink hellebore for the opposite reason 
than Chrysippus, not to remember a single thing of what they 
said. I have to thank you, Lycinus, because you stood over me 
and hauled me up when I was being carried along by a rough 
and turbid torrent and had given myself up and was floating 
downstream with the current; like in a tragedy, you appeared 
like a god from the machine. I think that I could also not 
irrationally shave my head, like those that are free after being 
saved from shipwreck, as a thank-offering for salvation, so 
much mist has been shaken off from my eyes. And if I ever by 
any chance while I am walking happen to encounter a 
philosopher, I will turn aside and avoid him as one does to a 
dog with rabies.4    
 
Much of the weight of the interpretation of this dialogue lies in the way in 
which this epilogue is interpreted. This passage prompts the reader to consider 
the sincerity of both characters. Does Lycinus really think that the lives of 
laymen (ἰδιώται) are an alternative to the philosophical life, or is he just playing 
with Hermotimus’ own idea of philosophy? Is Hermotimus really intending to 
abandon 20 years of philosophical education and to shun all philosophers in the 
future or is he being sarcastic?  
 A first clue to interpreting Lycinus proposal to live like everyone else lies 
in the moral of Aesop’s fable, which seen from different perspectives shows the 
intonation with which Hermotimus ends the conversation. On the one hand, the 
moral stresses the importance of persistence regardless of that which has 
occured and now cannot be changed. But on the other hand, if the reader 
focuses his attention on the role of the fox, the fable also shows that, even 
                                                          
4  Luc. Herm. 85-86. For the Deus ex Machina see Plat. Clitophon 407a. 
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though she attempts to make the man feel better, at the same time she is wrong 
to encourage him to continue with such a futile task. Lycinus seems to be telling 
Hermotimus to abandon the useless study of philosophy, but the degree to 
which the alternative choice, found in the life of laymen, is sound, remains 
ambiguous. Just as in the case of the fable, the interpretation of this last 
exchange of words in the Hermotimus partially depends on the perspective that 
the reader chooses to adopt.  
 In this chapter I want to prove through an analisis of its structure, that 
the Hermotimus has the appearance of an ‘aporetic’ dialogue, owing to the fact 
that Lycinus’ proposed κοινὸς βίος is ironic and does not represent any 
alternative to the philosophical life.5  His proposition is instead a demonstration 
of his mastery at turning the rhetoric and arguments of philosophers against 
themselves. To do so, I will first look at Hermotimus’ hopes in Stoicism and at 
Lycinus’ argument in detail. 
 
1. Hermotimus’ Hopes in Stoic Philosophy 
 
When we firt meet Hermotimus he has been attending lectures on Stoicism for 
20 years in the belief that ‘one can either be wretched, going to perdition among 
the rabble of ordinary people or achieve happiness through the practice of 
philosophy’.6 Hermotimus has the religious belief that philosophy as if through 
a kind of fire, is supposed to be able to reveal those things that others wrongly 
admire for what they really are.7 He believes that philosophy provides the 
criterion by which to distinguishing the true happy life from the false.  
                                                          
5 There exist three analyses of the form of the Hermotimus, those of Schwarz (1877), Nesselrath 
(1992) and Von Möllendorff (2000). In spite of their differences, these analyses have in common 
the way in which they organize the form of the Hermotimus and all three put at their centre the 
main argument against the attainability of philosophical happiness. 
6 Luc. Herm. 1. 
7
 Luc. Herm. 7.  
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 Philosophers are said to possess the right theory (λόγος) which is the 
necessary tool for living a happy life without making unhappy mistakes. The 
Stoics considered philosophy a τέχνη directed towards the cultivation of an 
ideal disposition of the soul (διάθησις τῆς ψυχῆς). Based on what truth is,8 as 
an expert in philosophy, Hermotimus’ teacher ought to be a wise man capable 
of transmitting the practice (ἄσκησις) of the art of living (τέχνη περὶ τὸν βίον) 
and, whose end (τέλος) is that of a virtuous life (τὸν ἐν τῇ ἀρετῇ βίος).9 
Hermotimus and the other students learn, from books and lectures, the rhetoric 
of philosophy about Virtue, but in the end, according to Lycinus, all this 
philosophical rhetoric is a distraction from that which is more important: 
practice.10  
 The reward that Hermotimus wishes to gain from Stoic practice is not only 
excellence (ἀρετή) and happiness (εὐδαιμονία), but also wisdom (σοφία). 
Therefore in order to become virtuous the Stoic has to have coherence in his 
way of living (βίος), and this implies that his rational principles and theory 
(λόγοι) guide his actions (ἔργα). The perfect philosopher must never ruin his 
ascetic routine as a result of having been dragged down by human passions: 
 
He must be completely happy (συνόλως εὐδαίμονος) and that 
must be the canon and measure of the life spent according to 
virtue (τὸν κανόνα εἶναι καὶ γνώμονα τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν 
βίου), for he who lacks the slightest thing is imperfect, even if 
he has more of everything and if it is not like that, he is not yet 
happy (οὐδέπω εὐδαίμων).11  
 
As a result of this congruency, which is said to bring a life of calm and total 
happiness (γαληνόν τινα καὶ πανευδαίμονα βίον βιοῦσιν), the philosopher 
who has perfected human virtue is no longer subject to human passions and 
                                                          
8 Luc. Herm. 17; Luc. Herm. 51. 
9 Cf. Luc. Herm.7. 
10 Luc. Herm. 1, 79, 82. 
11 Luc. Herm. 76. 
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despises the common standards of honour, high-birth, riches and glory.12 He is 
‘the only king, the only rich man, the only wise man, and the only one of 
everything’ and will look down on the rest of people as if they were slaves.13   
 For the Stoics, philosophy was able to purify the soul from the body by 
separating that which was manly from that which was feminine, and that which 
was mortal from that which was immortal. As much as it was a bodily and 
mundane exercise, the philosophical ἀσκήσις was also a spiritual preparation 
for the afterlife (ἐς ἄλλον βίον προγυμνάζεις ἑαυτὸν).14 Some Stoics like 
Chrysippus claimed never to have seen a perfectly virtuous man. In this sense, 
Hermotimus believes that there are two kinds of virtue, the mundane virtue or 
the virtue ‚practiced‛, and the divine Virtue or the virtue ‚perfected‛.15 
However, like any Stoic he also believes that there is some remote possibility of 
living the ideal and virtuous life and just a moment of philosophical happiness 
would be worth the sacrifice he is making by living an ascetic life.16 Indeed, he 
believes that those who manage to become virtuous live a truly happy and 
wonderful life thereafter (εὐδαιμονοῦσιν θαυμάσιόν τινα βίον τὸν λοιπὸν 
βιοῦντες).17  
 But in Stoicism the best philosophy, the true philosophy,18 is also the 
more virtuous because the Stoics’ ideal of transcending from the condition of 
the lover of wisdom, or the φιλόσοφος to the sage, or σοφός was deemed 
impossible. The Stoics would have thought that virtue, following the example 
of Socrates as it appears in Xenophon’s Memorabilia,19 lays more in deeds than in 
                                                          
12 πανευδαίμονος, Luc. Herm. 2 and perfected virtue Luc. Herm. 8; πάθος Luc. Herm. 9, 76. 
13 Luc. Herm. 16, 81. These are familiar and well-known Stoics paradoxes, see Cic. Lucullus. 136. 
For another satire of them see Hor. Sat. 1. 3. 96-98. 
14 Luc. Herm. 76. 
15 Luc. Herm. 2,4, 22. 
16 It is worth noting that in the Letter to Menoeceus 122, Epicurus also claims that it was never too 
late to do philosophy. 
17 Cf. Herm 5. 
18 Luc. Herm. 16. 
19 See the discussions around this topic in Xen. Mem. 1. 2.59; 1. 3. 15; 1. 5. 6; 2. 3.8; 2. 6.14; 2. 10. 6 
and more importantly 3. 11. 10.  
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words. Therefore, if perhaps not a wise man, the philosopher in contrast to the 
ἰδιώται is someone who has taken up the training (ἀσκήσις) required to 
progress (προκοπή) towards the happiness enjoyed by the sage.20  
 From the perspective of the Stoics, anybody who was not a sage was a 
φαῦλος a worthless man, or an ἄφρων, and to be saved the Stoic teacher 
offered an ἀσκήσις that had two aspects; the words of the teacher, his classes 
and the philosophical discussions in symposia,21 and the imitated actions of his 
students.22 The sage was not allowed to make any mistakes,23 and the pupil 
similarly had to put all his efforts into not making any. The practice of 
Hermotimus’ teacher aims at the perfection of the soul in its earthly prison, the 
body.24 This implies that the student must work hard (πόνος), and make a 
serious effort (σπουδή), which consists of restless intellectual study and the self-
restraint of bodily passions.25   
 Hermotimus is one of those progressing (οἱ προκόπτονες) in virtue, a 
ἡμίσοφον26 on the way to meet his teacher who he believes embodies the ideal 
sage, and the συρφετός, or the common men like Lycinus. He has trusted his 
teacher of Stoic philosophy (τῷ διδασκάλῳ πιστεύω λεγόντι),27 who like other 
                                                          
20 See Sellars (2003) 54-85. The best analysis of Lucian’s concept and criticism of philosophy as 
τέχνη is that of Nesselrath (1985), 141, but see p. 56-58 for discussions on happiness and and p. 
12, 124, 126, 153-155, 168, etc. for the relationship between Stoics and rhetoric. For Stoic imagery 
in the Hermotimus see Edwards (1993) and Tackaberry (1930), 15-20. 
21 Luc. Herm. 1, 2, 11, 79, 81. 
22 Luc. Herm. 80-83. 
23 Cf. D.L. 7. 87, Cic. Fin. 3, 31; 4, 14-15; 3, 15. 
24 In the Icaromenippus, tired of philosophical discussion Menippus uses one wing of an eagle 
and another of a vulture to go to the moon and from there to the palace of the gods. Once there, 
the Moon asks Zeus to punish philosophers for their great ignorance and their pretentiousness. 
His flight is indeed the flight of the soul and this dialogue is extremely likened to demonology 
just as as in Plutarch’s On the other side of the moon. The comparison is an  interesting one, since 
there is the possibility that the Icaromenippus, like the Hermotimus, has an open ending, as we do 
not know whether Menippus in actuality makes the trip, or whether he is just a madman who 
talks nonsense like a stranger and should therefore not be trusted.  
25 Luc. Herm. 8. That this effort is intellectual is obvious from the start of the dialogue, cf. the 
expression τῇ τοῦ βαδίσματος σπουδῇ in Herm 1. 
26 Luc. Herm. 15 
27 Luc. Herm. 7. 
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philosophers appears to be quite trustworthy (μάλα τις ἀξιόπιστος).28 
Hermotimus’ hope (ἐλπίς) is like that of all those who practice philosophy will 
know what happiness is,29 and become πανευδαίμων, an individual who has 
perfected virtue.  
 
2. Lycinus’ λόγος 
 
The driving force which allows this friendly exchange to take place and which 
gives the dialogue a vertical narration is the argument that Lycinus holds 
against the attainability of philosophy. This logical and philosophical level of 
Lycinus’ logos could be called argumentative.  
 In view of the contradiction between the actions and words of 
Hermotimus’ teacher,30 adopting the role of a layman who claims to know 
nothing about philosophy, Lycinus throws an argument (λόγος) at 
Hermotimus, which, in order to keep his reputation, he will be forced to 
withstand.31 The challenge is to prove whether there is such a thing as 
philosophical happiness, and why it is that he is so sure of studying Stoicism 
under the guidance of his teacher, especially when there are so many other 
teachers of Stoicism and schools of philosophy to choose from.32  
 The basic tenets of Lycinus’ argument are based on the fact that 
Hermotimus believes: 1) life is short, and that the art of philosophy requires a 
great deal of time.33 As Hesiod puts it, the road to virtue is steep, slippery, and 
long, and requires a great deal of sweat and effort;34 2) only one philosophy can 
                                                          
28 Luc. Herm. 26. 
29 ἅπαντες μὲν οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ζητοῦσιν ὁποῖόν τί ἐστι Luc. Herm. 66. 
The word ἐλπἰς occurs  first in Herm. 4. But, the feeling is also expressed in the use of the 
optative in 5 and 6. 
30 Luc Herm. 9-13. 
31 Luc. Herm. 52; 66. 
32 Luc. Herm. 7, 15. 
33Following Hippocr. Aph. 1.1 Cf. Luc. Herm. 1, 4, 6, 46, 75, 77. 
34 Luc. Herm. 1, Hes. WD. 289. 
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be in possession of the truth, which means that it would be absurd and 
ridiculous (γελοιότατον) to trust all philosophical hairesis, or indeed to 
disbelieve them.35 Surely, most people would give up.36  
 One part of the discussion is centred on the possibility of being certain 
that the Stoics are the correct philosophy judging from the senses and through 
the use of perception.37 But from a Stoic point of view the ‘impression’ 
(φαντασία) of respectability, which has impinged upon Hermotimus and his 
reputation, may be the wrong one. Regardless, Hermotimus is not yet prepared 
to accept this truth and so it is that Lycinus, taking for granted that if one wants 
to make the life-choice of becoming a sage, one must choose carefully a 
philosophical guide, leaves the matter behind and proceeds to prove logically 
that it is impossible to know which of the schools might truly be the right one.38   
 As it has been well documented chiefly by A. Schwarz, Praechter, B. 
Schwarz, Tackaberry, and Nesselrath, one main characteristic of the argument 
of the Hermotimus is the presence of the five modes of Agrippa. The modes of 
Agrippa are types of arguments and are also preserved in Diogenes Laertius’ 
Life of Pyrrho and in Sextus Empiricus. They can be defined as abstract argument 
patterns by whose application a Sceptic can render dubious any positive 
statement.39 Sextus tells us that the more recent Sceptics offer the following five 
modes of suspension of judgement: 1) the mode deriving from dispute; 2) the 
mode throwing one back ad infinitum; 3) the mode deriving from relativity; 4) 
the hypothetical mode; 5) the reciprocal mode.40 These modes are a supplement 
                                                          
35 Luc. Herm. 25-49. See also 14, 64-70. 
36 Luc. Herm. 5. 
37 For the different kinds of impressions according to the Stoics see DL. 7. 49-51. For logic 
understood by the Stoics as a criterion of truth see DL. 41-4. For the Stoics, the wise man has to 
be an expert in dialectics and logic. DL. 7.83. For Stoic logic in general see Long and Sedley 
(1987), 188-190. 
38 Luc. Herm. 49. 
39 Annas and Barnes (1985), 22. 
40 S. E. P.  164. 
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to a general objection against the dogmatic ethicists and are specifically directed 
against the Stoic belief in the art of living (ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη) and its goal.  
 Lucian uses these modes in the Hermotimus in the following ways: 
 
 The first mode or mode of dispute demonstrates that due to the vast 
diversity of contradictory philosophical sects, one cannot choose the 
right philosopher unless one finds the right criterion.41 Hermotimus 
assents to the proposition (P1) that the Stoics are the only one and true 
philosophy thereby leading to true virtue and happiness. But he also 
admits that (P2) besides the Stoics there are other schools of philosophy 
in existence, each one of them prescribing different dogmas and 
definitions of virtue and happiness, and all of which are mutually 
incompatible. There has been an undecided quarrel (ἀνεπίκριτος 
στάσις) between the philosophical schools about what true happiness is, 
and therefore one cannot choose or reject any of them unless one finds a 
criterion by which to make a judgement over their relative excellences. 
Therefore, until a criterion is found Hermotimus and Lycinus should fall 
back on suspension of judgement (εἰς ἐποχήν).42  
 
 After deeming Hermotimus’ sensory impressions to be wrong, Lycinus 
will proceed to dash his hopes, by showing him that his rational 
impression (λογικὴ φαντασία) is also wrong. In order to do this Lycinus 
implements the Second Mode of Regress to Infinity. Because 
philosophical happiness is desirable, the only thing Hermotimus and 
Lycinus can do is to find a criterion that allows them to distinguish the 
true philosopher from the false.43 In the case of philosophical happiness, 
                                                          
41 Luc. Herm. 14. 
42 See Sextus P. 1. 165. 
43 Luc. Herm. 51-53. 
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one cannot infer which philosophy has found truth by testing just one 
part of it, as desired by Hermotimus, precisely because one has to make 
sure that every part of each philosophy is correct. Furthermore the goal 
of each sect is different.44 Thus, apart from testing all the schools, the 
only thing left to do is to remain highly critical.45 Yet, regardless of how 
critical one is, it is also possible that none of the schools haves ever found 
true philosophical happiness.46 Therefore the only thing Hermotimus 
and Lycinus can do is to find an expert who might teach them the 
criterion by which to distinguish truth from falsehood.47  But how might 
they know for sure whether this teacher is speaking truthfully? To know 
they would need another criterion and somebody capable of teaching it, 
and so on ad infinitum.48 Thus, it is not possible to rationally know who is 
an expert in philosophy or which happiness offered by the different 
schools is the correct one. 
 
 The third mode or Mode of Relativity, or of Comparison with Other 
Things is according to Sextus ‘that whereby the object has such or such 
an appearance in relation to the subject judging and to the concomitant 
precepts, but as to its real nature we suspend judgement’.49 As a Stoic, 
Hermotimus is supposed to be able to distinguish between cataleptic and 
non-cataleptic impressions. These two forms of impression differ from 
one another; cataleptic impressions accurately correspond to an object, 
and therefore they are a criterion by which one can discern truth from 
falsehood. Lycinus uses the mode of relativity against the emphasis 
placed by the Stoics on conceptions, or notions (ἡ ἔννοια), which like 
                                                          
44 Luc. Herm. 54-62. 
45 Luc. Herm. 63-65. 
46 Luc. Herm. 66-68. 
47 Luc. Herm. 69. 
48 Luc. Herm. 70. 
49 S.E. P. 1. 167.  
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any other kind of impression are a ‘printing on the soul’, and ‘stored 
thoughts, and memories’.50 Hermotimus could not have proved that that 
majority had taken the Stoic path, as he did not make a census, therefore 
the observation that many people have joined the Stoics is not a 
convincinmg criterion.  Hermotimus could not have chosen the Stoics 
based on what those ignorant of philosophy said about them, nor could 
he have trusted the Stoics themselves who would have praised Stoicism, 
or indeed members of other schools who would have inveighed against 
it. Choosing the Stoics according to their appearance (ἀπὸ τῶν 
σχημάτων) is not a criterion either, because as Lycinus has already 
mentioned, although unaware of it, Hermotimus’ teacher behaves in a 
manner that is contrary to that which he preaches.51 Furthermore, using 
the example of Momus, who reproached the gods for not leaving a hole 
in the chests of man through which to read their minds, Lycinus argues 
that the only way to know a person’s real hidden attributes (γνώρισμα) 
is through long conversations and relationships.52 Thus, Lycinus 
concludes that external attributes do not reveal what people really think, 
and that in relation to the appearance of philosophers, one must suspend 
judgment.53  
 
 The fourth mode or Hypothetical Mode debunks Hermotimus’ belief in 
axiomatic truth. Hermotimus believes that it is as logically easy to know 
that Stoicism is the true philosophy as it is to know that two 2+2=4.54 
Lycinus argues that theories, which are structured ἐπὶ σαθροῖς τοῖς 
θεμελίοις/ ‘upon rotten foundations’, reach nonsensical conclusions. 
                                                          
50 Cf. Plut. On Common Conceptions 7.242-256 (SVF 2.65); cf. See Aug. Civ Dei  8.7 (SVF 2.106). 
51 Just at the moment in which Lycinus is about to expose his teacher, Hermotimus admits to 
never having seen a Stoic who is completely virtuous cf. Luc. Herm. 9-12, 76 and 80-83. 
52 λόγοις καὶ συνουσίαις ἀναδεικνύμενα καὶ ἔργοις τοῖς ὁμοίοις ὀψὲ μόλις, Luc. Herm. 20-21. 
53 Cf. Herm. 16-20. 
54 Luc. Herm. 35. 
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Sextus Empiricus uses the same proverbial expression in reference to 
geometry, which is based upon basic tenets or propositions, which are 
posited as evident and the means by which other things can be 
established.55 For example, an over-daring poet creates a Geryon-like 
monster,56 who appears to be like a human multiplied by three. Thus, the 
monster has six eyes, six ears, three voices which escape from three 
mouths, etc... If one supposes that the monster will go to war then he will 
need three shields, an axe, a spear and a sword, all details which are 
consistent with the same outline. However, such a monster cannot exist, 
we can only imagine it by thinking that there is a human being 
multiplied by three. In the same way, Lycinus argues, geometry follows 
axioms,  which if changed one can easily say that 5 + 5 is 7, or that (5 + 5) 
x 2 = 14. Surely something can be consistent and at the same time false 
(οὐκ ἐννοοῦντες εἴ τι γένοιτο ἂν ἀκόλουθόν τι αὑτῷ καὶ ψεῦδος ὄν·).57 
 
 The fifth mode or The Reciprocal Mode or of Circular reasoning, is ‘the 
form used when the proof itself which ought to establish the matter of 
inquiry requires confirmation derived from the matter’.58 This mode 
takes place every time Lycinus insists on the fallacy that there must be a 
true philosophy, because even though there appears to be a criterion by 
which to choose a school of philosophy, circular proof is in fact no proof 
at all.59  
 
                                                          
55 Compare S.E. M. III. 10, 185 with Luc. Herm. 74. 
56 Famously Eurystheus ordered Heracles to bring him the cattle of the monster Geryon, a three-
headed shepherd with six hands (Luc. Tox. 62 and Luc. Herac. 2). A similar argument to the one 
of the Hermotimus is found in Plat. Leg. 795c: ‘if someboody were born a Geryon or a Briareus, 
then with a hundred hands he should also able to throw a hundred darts.’  
57 Luc. Herm. 74. 
58 S.E. P. I. 169. 
59 Cf. Herm, 64, 68, 69. 
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The conclusion of Lycinus’ argument is that the philosophical goal is both 
impossible and unattainable.60 Hermotimus’ idea of philosophy is nothing but a 
lie and an empty happiness (τὴν κενὴν μακαρίαν).  Therefore, Hermotimus 
should, on principle, discover whether it is empirically possible to inspect all 
philosophical theories and investigate carefully (ἐπισκέψασθαι ἀκριβῶς) what 
each one says before making a decision. Meanwhile he will remain sober and 
distrustful61 and will never be lured by consistency in argumentation.62 The only 
thing he can do is to have ‘a critical and investigating preparation, a sharp mind 
and an intelligence precise and incontestable’ *...+ that will allow him to ‘judge 
in such matters’.63  
 The consequence of being deceived by philosophers is that both students 
and philosophers miss the practice of virtue, and never act according to that 
which they preach.64 Virtue lies mainly in deeds, in being ‘just, wise and brave’, 
and not in the composition of ‘wretched speeches, syllogisms and unsolvable 
problems’ (ποιεῖν ὆ημάτια δύστηνα μελετᾶτε καὶ συλλογισμοὺς καὶ 
ἀπορίας), which only throw people to an impasse (ἐς ἀπορίαν) because they 
know how ‘to question and quibble and cheat and snare them in insoluble 
conundrums’.65 People trust philosophers irrationally, following their desire for 
an impossible happiness, as well as their passions. Paradoxically, only those 
few brave men, who turn away from philosophy should be called philosophers: 
 
You’ll come across very few who due to their bravery admit 
that they were deceived, and that dissuade (ἀποτρέπειν) 
others from making a similar attempt. If you do meet one, you 
can call him a lover of truth (φιλαλήθη) and honest and just, 
and, if you like, a philosopher. For to him alone I wouldn’t 
                                                          
60 ἀδύνατον εἶναι φιλοσοφῆσαι καὶ ἀνέφικτον ἀνθρώπῳ γε ὄντι, Luc. Herm. 67. 
61 Luc. Herm. 47. 
62 Luc. Herm. 74. 
63 Luc. Herm. 64.  
64 Luc. Herm. 9-12, 80-83. 
65 Luc. Herm. 79. 
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grudge the name. The rest of them either know nothing of the 
truth, though they think they do, or they know it but conceal it 
through cowardice and shame and the desire to be highly 
honoured.66  
 
This passage is very close to being a declaration of self-praise on the part of 
Lycinus, because as it dismisses the accusation of hating philosophers; a 
criticism aimed at him by Hermotimus. Like Socrates, he does not know what 
truth is, and argues that philosophers are better suited to answer that question. 
Nevertheless, it is harder to listen to truth, due to its parrhesiastic nature, than to 
falsehood, which is always more enjoyable.67 Lycinus’ recommendation is that 
Hermotimus’ life will be better in the future if he decides to live like the rest of 
the ἰδιώται and accepts a ‘life that is common to all of us, as a fellow-citizen 
with the majority’.  
 More importantly Hermotimus will lose his ‘hopes for anything bizarre 
and conceited, and will not be ashamed to learn new things’, and ‘change of 
direction for the best’.68 Although Hermotimus’ philosophical happiness may be 
impossible to achieve, another life seems to be available to him in which he 
might live ‘completely relaxed and free’ (ἄνετα πάντα καὶ ἐλεύθερα). 
 
3. Lycinus’ Proposed Κοινὸς βίος 
 
It is crucial at this point to reconsider both the role of Lycinus in his 
conversation with Hermotimus, as well as the outcome of his argument in 
which he puts forward the recommendation to live like everyone else. As 
aforementioned, much of the weight of the interpretation of this dialogue lies in 
the way in which the epilogue is read.  
                                                          
66 Luc. Herm. 75. 
67 Luc. Herm. 51. 
68 Luc. Herm. 84. 
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 If one accepts that Lycinus is being completely sincere, owing to the fact 
that he appears to be seriously persuading Hermotimus to live like everyone 
else, that his arguments are very similar to the five Modes of Agrippa, and that 
often in Sextus Empiricus’ Scepticism we see the Sceptics joining forces with 
laymen against the dogmatic philosophers, we might therefore conclude that in 
this dialogue Lucian rejects philosophy, and that he either advises us to live an 
ordinary life, or is perhaps even trying to convert us to a form of Scepticism. 
This reading would support Nesselrath’s interpretation 
 But, is Hermotimus really willing to abandon 20 years of Stoic 
philosophy after just one conversation? Is Lycinus seriously proposing to 
Hermotimus that he should live like everyone else? Is this the opinion of the 
character or is it that of Lucian? As it will be demonstrated, the binary situation 
of the Hermotimus does not allow for such an interpretation. Lycinus’ argument 
is subsumed by the alternatives offered Hermotimus, which are ‘either to be 
wretched, going to perdition among the rabble of ordinary people or to achieve 
happiness through the practice of philosophy’.69 At the end of the dialogue this 
situation is reversed, and Hermotimus believes that practicing philosophy is a 
wretched activity, whilst living like everyone else gives him both relief and 
comfort. However, it is not possible to take Lycinus’ proposal to live like 
everyone else seriously and a look at what Lycinus means by ‘living a life that is 
common to all of us’, and to be one of the idiôtai, will prove that such a proposal 
is ironic.70 
 Within the context of the epilogue in §86, which contains Hermotimus’ 
conversion as well as throughout the whole of the Hermotimus, those who do 
not have membership to the exclusive club of philosophers are known as 
ἰδιώται.71 As expected, the word is always used in reference to somebody 
                                                          
69 Luc. Herm. 1 
70 See Schwarz, A. (1886) p. 11 So tritt uns Lykinos von Anfang bis zu Ende als Satiriker und feiner 
Spötter entgegen, der jedoch im Stande ist, einen ernsten Ton anzuschlagen. 
71 Luc. Herm. 1, 17, 52, 67, 83. 
 102 
outside of the professional group of philosophers, or outside of the circle of 
those active in public life. Therefore, even if we think that the common life is 
that of laymen, there is still a challenge in knowing to whom this term refers.  
 Like the idiôtês, the life that is common to all of us is also defined in contrast 
to the city of virtue that is imagined by Lycinus in sections 22-4. This city is the 
destination to which philosophers (in their own view of things) exhort everyone 
to hasten. Here people dwell calmly and live a life of total happiness 
(πανευδαίμονα βίον βιοῦσιν) with excellent laws, equality, freedom, and every 
other good. From the perspective of philosophers, all that occurs in the non-
philosophical cities, in the remaining cities (ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν), among 
‘us’ (οἷα δὲ πολλὰ γίγνεται παρ’ ἡμῖν), is robbery, violence, cheating, and 
other base activities. Therefore, even if we believe that Lycinus is promoting the 
ordinary life we must think that, from what we are told, that the cities in which 
we all live are not ideal places of habitation especially when compared to the 
utopian city of philosophy. Besides that, laymen are also subject to other forces 
that are just as harmful as philosophy. As already mentioned, Hermotimus 
hopes for philosophy are no different from the hopes and empty happiness of 
unreflective and ordinary people. The entire point of the Hermotimus is that 
philosophers behave like everyone else.  
 Perhaps one could argue that Lycinus is referring to a life lived in any 
city without succumbing to the vices of ordinary people. In support of this, one 
could point to Lycinus’ definition of virtue that lies in behaving justly, wisely and 
bravely, and in deeds but not in words.72 Lycinus is indeed urging Hermotimus to 
wake up from his dream and to do useful things for the common life, and yet he 
is never told what these ‚useful‛ things might be. Moral values are formulated 
in the course of the dialogue, and even encouraged, but always in the context of 
an attack on the failings of philosophers rather than as positive targets in their 
own right.  
                                                          
72 Luc. Herm. 79. 
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 The alleged values of justice, wisdom and bravery are exactly the 
opposite of what Stoic philosophers preach and do. That this is the case 
becomes clear in Lycinus’ own description of the philosopher, in §75, as cited 
above. 
Throughout the conversation it emerges that Lycinus has only been 
playing with Hermotimus’ own understanding of philosophy in which there 
are only two paths; perdition or philosophical salvation. But the binary 
opposites found in the Hermotimus also create a game of mirrors in which every 
clichéd moral precept given by Lycinus, such as the terms ‘laymen’, ‘the life that 
is common to all of us’ and ‘to become a fellow-citizen with the majority’, are 
defined only in contrast to philosophical values and therefore Lycinus’ κοινὸς 
βίος is not an alternative to philosophical salvation after all.  
 
4. The Hermotimus’ Ἀπορία 
 
More plausible than Nesselrath’s interpretation is Möllendorff’s argument that 
the dialogue is open-ended, because learning how to know the right criterion to 
safely choose and trust a philosopher will prove impossible. By looking at the 
vocabulary of trust (πίστις), it is easy to see that the Hermotimus is an aporetic 
dialogue, since this is what takes the whole issue of αἵρεσις to ἀπορία.  
 The form of the Hermotimus is constructed upon Hermotimus’ own idea 
that philosophy is ‘beyond reach, even after a long time’, unless one remains 
intently fixed upon attaining her.73 In the first part of the dialogue, Hermotimus 
has deposited his trust in his teacher74 although neither it is easy to trust in 
                                                          
73 Luc. Herm. 1. 
74 Luc. Herm. 18. Note also that Hermotimus’ concept of virtue is based on τὸ πάντα 
ἐπίστασθαι βεβαίως πεπεισμένον ᾗ ἕκαστα ἔχει.Luc. Herm. 7. 
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Hermotimus’ reasons for choosing the Stoics.75 Hermotimus claims that he 
joined the Stoics from trust in himself and the outer appearance of respectability 
that he saw in others.76  But one can only know a person’s real hidden attributes 
(γνώρισμα) after many conversations and a great deal of interaction.77 
Sometimes not even then. 78 Therefore, not being able to know how to trust is  
 
where the whole puzzle is (ἡ πᾶσα ἀπορία ἐστίν). At the 
beginning of whichever path I go to, there is a man standing 
at the entrance, quite trustworthy (μάλα τις ἀξιόπιστος) 
[...]. The number of these roads and their dissimilarity causes 
me extreme confusion and leaves me perplexed (οὐ μετρίως 
ταράττει με καὶ ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ), and so above all do the 
guides over-exerting themselves and each praising their own 
paths, because I don’t know which road to turn off along or 
which of them it is better to follow so that I can reach the 
city.79  
 
Failing to understand the problem at stake, Hermotimus tries to release Lycinus 
from his aporetic perplexity,80 but fails to show how to know which is the one 
true road to Virtue.81 Perhaps Hermotimus might have argued that all roads 
lead to Rome, or that there is more than one road to Corinth, and yet the 
argument of the Hermotimus is based on the assumption that schools of 
philosophy are exclusive and that there has to be one true philosopher and one 
                                                          
75 οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐκείνοις ἂν αὐτοῖς ἐπίστευσας ἐπαινοῦσι τὰ αὐτῶν; καὶ κατὰ τὰ ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνων 
λεγόμενα ἐποιεῖτο τὴν αἵρεσιν τῶν κρειττόνων ἀξιῶν: οὐ γὰρ ἂν πιστεύσαιμί σοι τοιαῦτα 
λέγοντι, Luc. Herm. 17. 
76 ἀλλ᾽ οἶσθα, ὦ Λυκῖνε, οὐχὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις μόνον ἐπίστευον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐμαυτῷ, Luc. Herm. 18. 
77, Luc. Herm. 20-21. 
78 Luc. Herm. 9-12. In the end, just before Lycinus exposes his teacher, Hermotimus admits to 
never having seen a Stoic who is completely virtuous. Cf. Luc. Herm. 76 and 80-83. 
79 Luc. Herm. 26, see also 38 where Lycinus talks of the great impasse (Καὶ γὰρ αὖ τὸ τὴν 
πολλὴν ἀπορίαν παρεχόμενον τοῦτό ἐστιν) that it is to find out which of philosophers has the 
truth if they are compared to temple robbers, because when they are stripped off their clothes 
each of them is carrying a different object, one a cup, another a bowl, another a garland, and they may 
be of copper, gold, or silver. This is the equivalent of Agrippa’s first mode deriving from dispute. 
80 ἀλλ᾽ ἐγώ σε ἀπολύσω τῆς ἀπορίας: τοῖς γὰρ προωδοιπορηκόσιν, ὦ Λυκῖνε, πιστεύσας οὐκ 
ἂν σφαλείης, Luc. Herm. 27. 
81 οὐ τοίνυν ἀπέλυσάς με τῆς ἀπορίας ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι ὁμοίως ἀγνοῶ τῷ μᾶλλον χρὴ πιστεῦσαι τῶν 
ὁδοιπόρων ... ὃ δὲ δὴ μάλιστα εἰς ἀπορίαν με καθίστησιν Luc. Herm. 27. 
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true sect.82 This means that to make the right choice (αἳρεσις ἀκριβής),83 one 
would need to experience every philosophical persuasion to ensure that what 
they all have said (πειραθῆναι ὧν φασι) was reasonable (εὔλογον). But this is 
impossible in a lifetime,84 and so ‘as long as it is not clear which school is saying 
the truth in philosophy, choose none.’85  
 Once this assumption is solidly posed, it is now Hermotimus who finds 
himself thrown to perplexity.86 Not even philosophers can trust the members of 
their own sects completely.87 But, Lycinus claims that it is in their joint effort as 
friends that tha argument has reached its aporetic conclusion.88 Even he himself 
has been carried by the logos,89 and it is this that Hermotimus must blame as the 
reason for his upset.90 In the hope of becoming happy, Hermotimus believed he 
could trust the words of philosophers who claimed to be able to haul us all to 
the pinnacle of virtue, their logoi being just like Zeus’ golden rope.91  But 
Lycinus’ logos proves it is impossible to become happy through the study of 
philosophy, and therefore it ends in a logical impasse.92   
 The difference between Hermotimus’ own bewitching speech and 
Lycinus’ logos is that his tries to ‘sting’ people awake from their dreams of 
philosophy.93 Lycinus’ logos is instead a dissuasion from philosophical 
                                                          
82 Luc. Herm. 77 
83 Luc. Herm. 53.  
84 Luc. Herm. 54, see 52-54 and cf. 67. 
85 ἑνί τε λόγῳ ξυνελών φημι, ἄχρι ἂν ἄδηλον ᾖ τίς ἀληθής ἐστι προαίρεσις ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, 
μηδεμίαν αἱρεῖσθαι Luc. Herm. 34. 
86 ὅς με πλησίον ἤδη τῆς ἐλπίδος ὄντα εἰς ἀπορίας φέρων ἐμβέβληκας ἀδύνατον 
ἀποφαίνων τῆς ἀληθείας τὴν εὕρεσιν ἐτῶν γε τοσούτων δεομένην, Luc. Herm. 50. 
87 The members of different schools attack their own opponents when they say that there are 
some who know their own doctrines, while some others don’t, even if they are still completely 
trustworthy in others matters (εἶναι φασκόντων τοὺς μὲν εἰδέναι τοὺς λόγους ἑκάστους, τοὺς 
δὲ μή, καίτοι τά γε ἄλλα πάνυ ἀξιοπίστους ὄντας) Luc. Herm. 68. 
88 ἐγὼ δὲ μετὰ σοῦ σκεπτόμενος εὗρον τὸ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου ἀποβάν, Luc. Herm. 50. 
89 See Lycinus’ insistence on asking not him, but the logos, Luc. Herm. 63, and 64, 65, 71. 
90 Luc. Herm. 66. 
91 Luc. Herm. 3. 
92 Luc. Herm. 69, 70. 
93 Luc. Herm. 19; πολλὰ καὶ θαυμαστὰ ὀνειροπολοῦντα νύξας ὁ λόγος ἀπὸ τοῦ ὕπνου 
ἐκθορεῖν ἐποίησεν, 71. This is, of course, a reference to Plato’s Apology 30d-e. 
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eudaimonia, which is dreadful and hopeless,94 precisely because it forces people 
to create fictions of unattainable desires and hopes which they fail to satisfy.95 
Trust in the logoi of philosophers leads to aporía and absurdity. But, contrary to 
philosophers’ logoi, Lycinus’ aporetic logos is not philosophically perplexing, 
because he only uses the arguments of philosophers to prove the unattainability 
of philosophy and to curtail completely Hermotimus’ trust in his teacher, in 
Stoic philosophy and all other dogmatic sects.  
 However, what is important to understand is that the logos, which 
emerged from the conversation between Hermotimus and Lycinus and that left 
them at an impasse, is thrown inevitably back to Lycinus, thereby leaving 
Hermotimus in a position in which if he lays his trust in him it will be just as 
absurd as trusting a philosopher. This is because Lycinus has said that 
falsehood is generated because philosophers’ pupils take for granted basic 
tenets and believe that which follows from them, because they think that 
consistency is a sign of truth, but do not notice that the first assumptions that 
they granted were false.96  
 The majority of people believe (πιστεύουσιν αὐτοῖς) in such things 
because they are strange and bizarre (διὰ τὸ ξένα καὶ ἀλλόκοτα εἶναι) and 
because of the false beliefs made up by the free imagination (ἐλεύθεροι ὄντες 
ἀναπλάττουσιν) of philosophers, dreams, poets and painters and everyone 
that creates things that could have never existed.97 Students trust their teachers, 
without investigating if the things they say are feasible; they quite simply 
believed in them (μὴ ἐξετλασας εἰ δυνατόν, ἀλλὰ πιστεύσας). Once they have 
trusted it is impossible to disbelieve what philosophers say, because everything 
has been consistent from the start (τίς ἔτι ἂν ἀπιστήσειε ταῦτα λέγοντι αὐτῷ; 
ἀκόλουθα γὰρ τῇ ἀρχῇ). Students now cannot stop trusting teachers, because 
                                                          
94 ἀλλόκοτα καὶ ἀνέλπιστα ἐλπίζοντα, Luc. Herm. 51. 
95 Luc. Herm. 71-85 
96 Luc. Herm. 75. 
97 Luc. Herm. 72. 
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‘once one accepts the first thing, the rest comes flooding and it no longer 
stops’.98   
 The problem emerges when we realize that Lycinus has with disbelief 
exactly the same relationship that acolytes of philosophers have with belief. The 
definition of philosopher as those that have acknowledged that they have been 
deceived and that quit the journey and dissuade (ἀποτρέπειν) others from 
making a similar attempt, could be best applied to himself, and this is a highly 
ironic conclusion. The reason why Hermotimus admires his teacher is virtually 
the same reason he admires Lycinus at the moment of his conversion. As 
Lycinus notes: ‘the reason why you admire that old man, is because he casts his 
acolytes into perplexity and knows how to question and seem wise and cheat 
and snare them in impossible conundrums’.99 This is precisely what Lycinus has 
done to Hermotimus: he has seized him with a long philosophical argument 
from which they were not able to escape, he then reduced them to perplexity, 
dissuaded Hermotimus from his previous life, and instead persuaded him to 
live a βίος, which is simply the reverse of that which seemed at first to be the 
best choice. Perhaps Hermotimus should have remembered to remain sober 
and distrusted Lycinus and thereby he would have chosen no position and 
suspended his judgement, going back instead to the basic tenets of the 
conversation in order to see whether they are reasonable. Lycinus has been 
ironic all along, and as a result so is his proposal to live like everyone else. 
 
5. Hermotimus’ Conversion 
 
This first analysis of the form of the Hermotimus led us to the conclusion that at 
the end of the dialogue Hermotimus leaves the conversation with Lycinus’ 
unconvinced. However, throughout the conversation Hermotimus fails to grasp 
                                                          
98 Luc. Herm. 74. 
99 Luc. Herm. 79. 
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Lycinus’ ironic undertones. From the very start of the dialogue the reader is 
able to grasp Hermotimus’ callowness.  
 First, Hermotimus does not realize the cunning expertise of Lycinus and 
thinks of him as a friend who wants to join him in his philosophical quest;100 
accordingly, he too behaves in the manner of a friend. After suggesting that it 
might be impossible to become happy through philosophy, Lycinus encourages 
Hermotimus to continue to study it.101 Hermotimus perceives Lycinus’ remark, 
that he might die before completing his task, as a bad omen,102 but tries to 
escape its implications by arguing that he is already late for class. Lycinus, who 
tells him that the class has been cancelled due to his teacher’s hangover, thereby 
hooks him and pulls into a long debate. Thus, although Hermotimus believes 
that he is the expert and that Lycinus is a friend that must be guided in his 
quest to become a Stoic, the reader and Lycinus know that Hermotimus’ 
expertise is from the very start of the prologue a laughing matter. Through this 
realisation, the reader learns to maintain a distance between that which Lycinus 
really thinks and that which he says. 
 The more Lycinus reveals Hermotimus’ inability to compete with him, 
the more he needs to present himself as an inexperienced layman or as a 
stereotypical fool.103 In turn, Hermotimus’ lack of awareness increases the 
reader’s expectations on whether he will ever realize that Lycinus is playing 
with him. One key example of this playful exchange is found in Hermotimus’ 
inability to give a sufficiently rational criterion of choice for his preferred school 
of philosophy, and he ends up admitting that he followed the Stoic school by 
taking the gods’ advice. Here at last he seems to suspect that Lycinus argument 
may not be all that it seems.104  
                                                          
100 Luc. Herm. 1-20. 
101 Luc. Herm. 4. 
102 Luc. Herm. 6. 
103 Luc. Herm. 17. 
104 Luc. Herm. 21.   
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 The irony of the situation is made clearer after Lycinus tells the story of 
the old man, who offered him his services as a philosophical guide to the city of 
virtue. Lycinus could not trust him as he knew the pursuit to be in vain and yet 
despite this he pretends to share Hermotimus’ desire to become happy through 
philosophy.105 Lycinus continues to undermine Hermotimus’ hope for the rest 
of the conversation until Hermotimus is forced to admit that it is impossible to 
know whether the Stoic school is the one true philosophy. 106  
 Most ironic for the reader is Hermotimus’ desperate remark: ‘you alone 
have seen the truth, while the rest of the students of philosophy are mindless.’107 
Indeed Lycinus has seen the truth within the argument and not in the way that 
Hermotimus thinks. Lycinus does not lie when he claims to be an ally of truth, 
not because he knows what truth is in the philosophical sense, (he, like 
everybody else is ignorant of it), but because he reveals that which is false. 
From the perspective of the reader, the angrier and more desperate 
Hermotimus becomes, the more risible he becomes too. Hermotimus’ realizes 
that his adversary has a better understanding of philosophy that he himself 
does and by the time Lycinus has won the argument the roles of follower and 
followed are reversed completely.108  
 In the end, Hermotimus promises to change his appearance and his 
attitude and to do only the precise opposite of that which he used to as a 
philosopher. He will change his philosophical cloak (τὸ ἱμάτιον) for a purple 
robe (πορφυρίδα);109 he will also trim his long and shaggy beard and even 
considers shaving his head like one who has been delivered from the sea. The 
difference in Herotimus’ attitude is one of complete reversal and is greatly 
marked from the beginning of the dialogue in which Hermotimus agreed that 
                                                          
105 Luc. Herm. 25. 
106 Luc. Herm. 50. 
107 Luc. Herm. 53. 
108 Luc. Herm. 70. 
109 Luc. Herm. 23, 85. 
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not even during sleep would he rest.110 He now hastens to change his chastened 
lifestyle (δίαιταν κεκολασμένην) for a more relaxed and free attitude (ἄνετα 
πάντα καὶ ἐλεύθερα) and it is important that this change is evident externally. 
It must be made explicit to others that he is no longer a philosopher. Lastly 
Hermotimus wishes to cleanse himself on the inside and declares himself 
willing to take a large amount of hellebore, for the opposite purpose of that of 
Chrysippus, so as to forget everything that he has learned. But the most telling 
aspect of his change of attitude is that which he holds towards philosophers; he 
swears that if ever he encounters a philosopher again he will avoid him as one 
does a dog with rabies.  
 So it is that the conversion to which Hermotimus is sworn is simply the 
stereotypical opposite to the philosophical life. At the end of the text, Lycinus 
tricks and finally triumphs over Hermotimus by relieving him of his sadness 
and thereby transforms his previous anger into admiration. It is however, 
through this relieving and trustful state that Hermotimus’ also meets his doom. 
The fable introduced at the end of the dialogue summarises some of the ironic 
procedures of the Hermotimus. The moral stresses the importance of persisting, 
regardless of that which has past and that cannot be changed. But at the same 
time, like the fox, Lycinus tells Hermotimus to abandon the futile and useless 
study of philosophy, in favour of another unsuitable, and arguably worse, form 
of happiness. It is in this way that on downward slope to the city of the layman 
Hermotimus is tricked twice. The reader will accordingly laugh twice at him, 
but will also crucially doubly praise Lycinus. 
*** 
 
The fact that everything that seems to be an alternative to philosophy is 
presented for the sake of exposing philosophers, and not for furthering or 
promoting moral values, allows the reader to know that the Hermotimus is a text 
                                                          
110 Luc. Herm. 1-2. 
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of binary oppositions in which it is impossible to know whether Lycinus is 
trying to persuade Hermotimus of anything other than the opposite of what he 
has been doing. Lycinus is persuading Hermotimus to abandon the 
philosophical life, and to live a life that is not philosophical, but it is not 
possible to know what this life is. Hermotimus’ ‘conversion’ is a reassurance of 
a line of argumentation that opposes philosophers with laymen. In this sense 
the dialogue may leave the reader worried on Hermotimus’ behalf; indeed he 
does not seem aware of himself but instead seems to think that he has been 
definitively rescued, and that the advice to ‘live like anybody else’ is an 
unproblematic formula for a happy life. We, the readers, however, can reflect 
(helped by that which Lycinus has said earlier about human foolishness and the 
incidence of bad behaviour in ordinary communities) that there are all kinds of 
potential pitfalls in ‘living like anybody else’. As outside observers to the 
conversation, the ‘readers’, acutely aware of the dangers of perishing as part of 
the crowd, should admit that the better arguments are those that belong to 
Lycinus.  
The effect is one of admiration for Lycinus’ superior knowledge of 
philosophy as a non-philosopher, and derision for Hermotimus owing to his 
own lack of philosophical argumentation despite having studied for more than 
20 years. Indeed, it is amusing that after 20 years of hard study, Hermotimus is 
yet to become a philosopher, and indeed it appears he has at least another 20 
years of hard work still to come. It is also comic that after dedicating himself to 
his study and to his teacher for two decades that Hermotimus chooses to drop 
out of the school so readily. It was after all, just one conversation in the street. 
Perhaps the reader should ask himself at the end of this text whether Lycinus is 
really rescuing Hermotimus at all or whether the conclusion of the Hermotimus 
is instead unsettlingly ironic, inconclusive and aporetic regarding the life options 




The Moral Message of the Hermotimus 
 
La utopía está en el horizonte. Camino dos pasos, ella se aleja dos pasos  
y el horizonte se corre diez pasos más allá.   
¿Entonces para que sirve la utopía? Para eso, sirve para caminar. 
F. Birri and E. Galeano1 
 
This reflection, introduced by Eduardo Galeano synthesizes the practical 
reasons in which utopia can provide a useful methodology for individual, social 
and political transformation, and not simply goals to be achieved.2 Utopia is a 
method to discover ways of overcoming perilous stagnation and to create 
through dreams new possible worlds that differe from the one in which we live. 
In the following section I want to show that the Hermotimus, in spite of being an 
aporetic dialogue, contains a moralizing and anti-utopian message so explicit 
that it is hard to believe that Lucian’s own readers would have missed it.  
 The sheer number of allegories and paradigms in the Hermotimus 
complicates the binary situation of philosophers and laymen which 
characterises the end of the dialogue. However, many commentators have 
failed to appreciate the use of metaphors and the manipulation of 
commonplaces and as a result tend to have regarded the Hermotimus as dull, 
mechanistic and arid. And yet, paradoxically, it is only by paying attention to 
the use of metaphors in the text that we learn that the real moral message of the 
Hermotimus is to warn us against walking towards the impossible worlds 
offered by masters of truth. As Robert Joly has argued, the refutation and the 
discussion of the pertinence of metaphors in an argument reveals one of 
Lucian’s most serious literary aspects.3   
 
                                                          
1 Phrase attributed to the Argentinean filmmaker. F. Birri by E. Galeano in an 2011 interview.  
2 For an excellent and very complete study on utopia the concept of utopia and utopia as 
method see Levitas (2010) and (2013).  




In this dialogue, Hermotimus not only fails to give appropriate answers to a 
reasoned line of questioning, but is also incapable of finding the right 
metaphors. Lycinus, on the contrary, proves himself to be an expert in 
comparison and in the manipulation of literary and philosophical 
commonplaces. 
 The eikonomachia between Hermotimus and Lycinus is easy to perceive. 
Lycinus compares Hermotimus’ chances of conquering philosophy to that of 
conquering mount Aornos,4 but Hermotimus deems this comparison 
inappropriate. Although the goal of philosophy is expressed as the ideal city of 
virtue, Hermotimus found himself before a multiplicity of roads and guides 
none of which he was able to trust.5 There is an elaborate example of a dialogue 
within a dialogue in the episode of the resurrection of the old philosophers,6 
and of the Ethiopian who, without having ever been abroad, proposes to his 
elders a hypothesis that white or yellow-skinned people might exist.7 
Hermotimus tries to argue that knowing that the Stoics are the carriers of truth 
is like adding 1+1 or like trying to find a culprit between two temple robbers.8 
But this previous metaphor is reformulated and improved by Lycinus, who 
states that there are many robbers and that they steal different things. He then 
gives a superior example in which he refers to the method that judges use at the 
Olympics when choosing wrestlers.9 Just as one should know all the schools 
before judging them, one must also see all the men and have in place a criterion 
                                                          
4 Luc. Herm. 1-8. 
5 Luc. Herm. 25-26. 
6 Luc. Herm. 29-30. The resurrection of philosophers is the main theme of Lucian’s Fisherman; for 
the structure of Fisherman see Anderson (1976), 135-139. 
7 Luc. Herm. 31-32. 
8 Luc. Herm. 37-39. Temple robbers are a recurrent topic in Lucian (Luc. Tim. 4, 9; Phal. B. 2; Icar. 
24). See how Epicharmus is used in Plat. Gorg. 505e and Thaet 152e. 
9 Luc. Herm. 39-44. 
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by which to decide which of is the most handsome.10 Lycinus is an expert in 
drawing examples from mythology: Epicharmus’ dictum is a useful criterion 
that presents itself as a way in which Lycinus and Hermotimus might be lead 
out of the problem of knowing which sect has the truth, just as the thread of 
Ariadne helped Theseus to escape from the labyrinth.11 Lycinus makes use of 
classical paradigms and suggests that to make the right choice one must behave 
like the elders at the court of the Areopagus, who listen to trials at night so as 
not to see the speaker, and listen only to his words.12 Lycinus also uses 
metaphors from everyday life to explain the impasse that has been reached by 
the dialogue, as he describes the way in which he and Hermotimus act like 
fishermen convinced that they have captured something big, but that when 
they pull in their line discover nothing on the end nothing but a jar.13 What they 
need, he argues, is a method by which to find the possessor of truth,14 which he 
describes as being similar to finding a missing bean in 20 hands filled with 
beans. He says they must behave like assayers of silver in distinguishing truth 
from falsehood and he continues by giving several comparisons of what might 
happen to one who does not possess that skill.15 Lycinus’ logos has the effect of 
awakening Hermotimus who is compared to a master woken from a wonderful 
dream by his slave, and who subsequently becomes preoccupied by everyday 
practicalities.16 
 Hermotimus too takes examples from classical Athens to show that it is 
possible to know that the Stoics possess truth, just as Pheidias knew the size of a 
lion after he had seen its claw.17 He also uses examples of everyday life, 
comparing the search of true philosophy with a jar of wine and philosophers to 
                                                          
10 Luc. Herm. 45. 
11 Luc. Herm. 47.  
12 Luc. Herm. 64. 
13 Luc. Herm. 65. 
14 Luc. Herm. 66. 
15 Luc. Herm. 68. 
16 Luc. Herm. 71. 
17 Luc. Herm. 54-55. 
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wine-sellers;18 but Lycinus proves the comparison to be lacking and corrects it 
by likening the search for true philosophy to a mixture of seeds, philosophers to 
wine-sellers and philosophy to poison.19 In the end, it is not just that Lycinus 
has a better argument than Hermotimus, but that he is much better than him at 
making comparisons which allow him to prove that, in spite of the ἐλπὶς that 
people have in it, philosophy is nothing but a wonderful promise (ὑποσχέσεις 
θαυμαστάς), a dream (ὄναρ), and a product of the imagination (αὐτὸς 
ἀναπλάσας). The goddess Εὐχή, ‘who is rich in gifts and refuses nothing’, 
falsely fulfils these desires by allowing men to think they can have anything 
they ask for, even if it is impossible. The philosophical goal is imagined as the 
impossible desires of laymen who may dream of flying, becoming instantly 
rich, or possessing superhuman power and strength. This is τὴν κενὴν 
μακαρίαν. Hermotimus’ enthusiasm is the same as that of someone who 
believes a storyteller (μυθοποιός), an over daring poet (λέγοντος γάρ τινος 
τῶν μεγαλοτόλμων τούτων ποιητῶν), or a mathematician.20  
 As becomes clear when Hermotimus threatens to drink hellebore so that 
he can forget everything that he has learnt from the Stoics,21 or when he says 
that the mist has been lifted and that now he can see,22 that both in terms of 
argumentation and in terms of the use of metaphors, Hermotimus is left with 
no option other than to accept that Lycinus has triumphed over him in his use 
of philosophical and metaphoric language.  
 Attempts to argue that the Hermotimus is more philosophic than 
metaphoric are neither straightforward nor easy to achieve, since the logical 
argument presented by Lycinus depends almost entirely on the comparison of 
philosophy with the metaphor of the road, which is the focus of the following 
                                                          
18 Luc. Herm. 58-60. 
19 Luc Herm. 61, 62. 
20 Luc. Herm. 73-74. 
21 See Nav. 45 for a similar image of the taking of hellebore. 
22 See. Herm. 19, 20, 53 and 64. 
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analysis. As much as it might be said that Lucian shows a greater commitment 
to philosophy, it may also be said that he displays a commitment to the study of 
the rhetoric of philosophy. 
  
2. The Philosophical Quest: a Road, a Maze and a Stormy sea 
 
Chapter 6 will look at how the Hermotimus is a parody of protreptic discourses 
and metaphors, including that of the road and the destination of philosophy. 
Certainly, the first metaphoric feature that catches the eye of any reader and 
which imbues the whole of the dialogue’s vocabulary is the comparison 
between the philosophical quest and the road. The Hermotimus starts off with a 
comparison of happiness being the prize on reaching the top of a mountain at 
the end of the path of philosophical virtue. Hermotimus humbly admits that 
after 20 years of study he still finds himself at the very start of the road, in the 
foothills of the mountain, on top of which, as Hesiod (WD 289) says, lie virtue 
and happiness. In this section, however, I will attempt to show that the allegory 
of the road is the basis for the whole dialogue and that it is in its manipulation 
that the Hermotimus is given its sense of fragmentation and of immobility. It is, 
therefore, not hard to see how the whole argument leads the conversation 
literally and metaphorically to an a-poria, a dead end. To cite Eduardo Galeano 
again, we could say that it leaves us ‘here sitting down, watching how they kill 
our dreams’.23 
 From the perspective of philosophy, the world is thus divided into 
philosophers, who arrive at the glorious pinnacle of philosophy, and laymen 
(ἰδιώται) or the rabble which move at ground level. The task of reaching the top 
where virtue lies is presented as more difficult to achieve than Alexander’s 
conquest of Mount Aornos. Similarly, walking the length of the philosophical 
road takes so long that one could travel in the same time from the Pillars of 
                                                          
23 Galeano (1989), 124.  
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Heracles in Spain to India three times and back. It is perhaps, therefore, not 
unreasonable that philosophers like Hermotimus' teacher, who have reached 
the top of the mountain of virtue, look down from their vantage point at the rest 
of mankind and consider them to be no more than ants or Pygmies. To those 
looking up from the foot of the mountain, philosophers might seem to be 
among the gods and to be living with them above the clouds.24  
 Philosophy is compared with the journey to the city of virtue. The 
multiple philosophical schools are presented as being in disagreement with one 
other, and are compared to doors that once were open to Hermotimus, in his 
early days of studying philosophy.25 Anyone is allowed to try to take the road 
to this city, regardless of whether they are ‘inferior or superior, noble or 
ignoble, enslaved or free,’26 and at each entrance the traveller finds a 
gatekeeper, who is also a philosopher, who claims that his road is the only one 
that leads to truth.27 If the seeker after of true happiness enters through the 
wrong door (θυρίς) he will be lost and arrive at the wrong destination. As there 
is only one road that leads to the true city, if he makes a mistake he might end 
up in Babylon or Bactra, or head towards the Hyperboreans or to India.28 It is 
unwise ‘to go where our feet take us, the proverb says’,29 and for this reason 
travellers must find the appropriate guide who might lead them to true 
happiness. But just as only one road can be true, there can also only be one true 
entrance to this road and it is wishful thinking to believe that a prophet will 
reveal the shortcut to a happy life, thereby helping the traveller avoid delays 
and complications.30 There are as many philosophical roads as paths in a 
                                                          
24 Luc. Herm. 1-6. 
25 Luc. Herm. 13-19. 
26 Luc. Herm. 24. 
27 Luc. Herm. 25. 
28 Luc. Herm. 27. 
29 Luc. Herm. 28; Theoc. 13. 70; Hor. Od. 3.11.49. 
30 Luc. Herm. 57. 
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labyrinth and once somebody starts on the road it is not easy to go back.31 Like 
Theseus, a seeker of truth is in need of Ariadne’s thread, here manifest in a 
criterion by which to choose it and an appropriate guide whether in the form of 
a sect or a philosopher.  
However, even after so much toil Hermotimus and Lycinus are still just 
where they started.32 As it is proved that it is not possible to find a suitable 
criterion Hermotimus and Lycinus are described as two individuals who have 
been ‘running in circles and have returned to their starting point’.33 Before 
starting off along a road, one must verify whether somebody has the truth and 
false and true philosophers are as dangerous as ignorant guides who might 
forcefully take one along a straight path.34 If a philosopher-guide were to 
confess that it is impossible to know whether there is such a thing as 
philosophical virtue, he would fall from the top of the mountain.35 ‘The man 
standing just outside the door is as much outside the threshold and in the open 
as the man far off’, the only difference, according to Lycinus, is that the former 
is more distressed because he has a better view of that which he cannot 
possess.36 
 As aforementioned, Lycinus’ definition of those that can be called 
philosophers, refers, paradoxically, only to those that acknowledge that they 
have been deceived and that quit the journey and dissuade (ἀποτρέπειν) others 
from making a similar attempt. The rest do not know the truth, and even if they 
do know that it is impossible to know the truth, they conceal that knowledge 
for the sake of their honour and pride.37 Hermotimus’ vocabulary at the 
moment of his conversion makes use of the allegory of the road and the 
                                                          
31 Luc. Herm. 47. 
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33 Luc. Herm. 70. 
34 Luc. Herm. 73. 
35 Luc. Herm. 74-75. 
36 Luc. Herm. 77. 
37 Luc. Herm. 75. 
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allegory of navigation. Lycinus is described as having saved Hermotimus when 
he was being carried along by a torrent and indeed he promises that he will 
shave his head like that of a shipwrecked sailor, as an offering of thanks 
following his deliverance from the sea. Furthermore, if Hermotimus does 
choose to join the common life he will start learning again and will not be 
ashamed of the change (μεταχωρήσεις) in his direction. He sees in Lycinus a 
‘god from the machine’, who has spared him from continuing to pursue a 
useless task. Hermotimus is convinced that if he ever encounters a philosopher 





In addition to the metaphor of the road, the Hermotimus’ philosophical quest is 
also compared to the experience of navigation. Lucian’s dexterity in running 
two or more metaphors in parallel can be best appreciated in §28: 
 
I don’t think that in matters as important as these we should 
take a perilous risk or confine our hopes narrowly, wanting to 
cross the Aegean or the Ionian Sea on a mat, as the proverb 
goes,39 seeing that we couldn't fairly blame Fortune either, [...] I 
think that one can imagine that the danger is not small, if 
instead of the straight road because we are ignorant we fall 
upon one of the ones that go astray, hoping that fortune will 
make a better decision on our behalf. [...] Once someone has 
already entrusted himself to the wind, having cast off the 
cables mooring him to the land, it is necessary to be carried 
along on the open sea, suffering from seasickness for most of 
the time, and afraid, and suffering from a headache because of 
the swell, when what one should have done at the outset, 
before setting sail, was to climb to some vantage-point to see 
whether the wind was blowing in the right direction and was 
                                                          
38 Luc. Herm. 86. 
39 Eurip. Fr. 397 N; Ar. Pax. 699. 
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favourable for those that wish to sail all the way to Corinth, 
and, by Zeus, to choose one great captain and a ship that is 
well-built enough to stand up against such big waves. 
 
When Lycinus reveals that not even the most critical attitude is enough to know 
which of the schools leads to happiness, he compares Hermotimus’ and his own 
present situation to that of fishermen who haul up jars instead of fishes on the 
end of their lines. Hermotimus confesses that he is trapped by Lycinus’ fishing-
net like argument, but Lycinus raises his spirits by telling him that with god’s 
help he should be as able to swim as well as everyone else.40 Unfortunately, 
Hermotimus does not know how to swim, and ultimately, as he is whisked 
along by a rough and turbid torrent, he abandons himself to the stream and 
Lycinus has to come to his rescue. It is at this point that Hermotimus considers 
shaving his head like one rescued from a shipwreck, as an offering of thanks for 
his deliverance from the sea.41  
  
3. Lycinus’ Attack against Hope 
 
That the argumentative and metaphoric levels of discourse lead Hermotimus to 
aporia does not mean that Lycinus does not give a conclusive moral message. 
On the one hand, distrusting and remaining both sober and critical forms only 
part of the message of the Hermotimus. On the other hand, what complements 
this picture and reveals to the reader that which could be considered the 
dialogue’s moral message, is the criticism it presents of hope and of ambition.  
  The dialogue presents Hermotimus as one who hopes to become happy, 
but does not knowing exactly when this is likely to be achieved.42 Lycinus’ 
warns him that failure and necessity (τὸ χρεών) may drag him ‘by one foot 
                                                          
40 Luc. Herm. 65. 
41 Luc. Herm. 86. 
42 Luc. Herm. 4. Hermotimus’ hope is also expressed thought the use of the optative in 5 and 6. 
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from a hope uncompleted’.43 Lacking a suitable criterion with which to 
determine the true philosophical school threatens Hermotimus’ hope of 
becoming happy through philosophy, 44 and yet finding one also provides a 
secure hope.45 The only certain hope that exists for Hermotimus (μόνη σοι αὕτη 
πιστὴ καὶ βέβαιος ἐλπὶς ἐπὶ τὴν ἀλήθειάν τε καὶ εὕρεσιν αὐτῆς) is an ability 
to separate truth from falsehood, whithout which his hope is hopeless 
(ἀνέλπιστα ἐλπίζοντα).46 If Hermotimus had the power and skill to examine 
every philosophical school, the job would be easy, but the argument proves that 
finding somebody to teach that skill is impossible, precisely because 
philosophical hope is as unattainable (τινας ἐλπίδας ἀνεφίκτους ἐλπίζοντα) 
as the monstrous product of dreams and the imagination of poets and 
painters.47  
 All those who have trusted hope perish trying to obtain it.48 Certainly 
when Hermotimus first began learning philosophy his hopes were more than 
just appearing to be more respectable than everyone else.49 Thus, Lycinus’ 
recommendation to Hermotimus is that not only would he do better if he 
‘decided to live the life that is common to all of us and to become a fellow-
citizen with the majority’, but also if he abandoned his ‘hopes for anything 
bizarre and conceited’.50  
 The moral message of the Hermotimus resides ultimately in the 
acceptance that both the hopes of philosophers and laymen alike lead them to 
equally laughable aporias. Unless reasoning works against hope, the trust of any 
logos is unsound. Hope in the Hermotimus is therefore imagined as twofold. 
                                                          
43 Luc. Herm. 6.  
44 Luc. Herm. 50. 
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the activities of fishermen hauling up something heavy with the expectation of a big catch, but 
losing their hopes when they find themselves pulling up a stone or a jar filled with sand.  
46 Luc. Herm 51. 
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48 Luc. Herm. 75. 
49 Luc. Herm. 83. 
50 Luc. Herm. 84. 
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Hermotimus and the teachers’ younger students are presented as all having 
personal desires to become ‘the only king’, and yet equally, as Lycinus’ 
exemplifies with the city of virtue, hope takes on an important political 
dimension. Lycinus is also in love (ἐρῶ) with the utopias of philosophers, and 
prays (εὐξαίμην) that this kind of happiness might be possible; although one 
cannot prove that a city of virtue can exist. 
 More importantly, Lycinus presents a direct attack against philosophical 
utopias by proving that they are as impossible to attain as the hopes of those 
laymen who suffer from philotimía.51 Philosophers believe that, due to their 
moral superiority, the common crowd looks to them as though they were 
‘above the clouds’52 and reveres them as though they were gods. But in the end, 
as previously mentioned, it is impossible to know whether the kind of 
happiness offered by philosophers is achievable. Furthermore, philosophers 
trick people in order to pursue those earthly things that they are supposed to 
despise, and they do this by inspiring within their students the desire for 
impossible utopias. The result of this craving for glory and wisdom is love, as 
people fall in love with the possibility of fulfilling their own wishes. Similarly, 
Hermotimus first fell in love with the idea of being as virtuous as his teacher.53 
Like other students of philosophy, and people in general it is due to a lack of 
criticism of their own ‘erotic desire and alacrity’54 that they long for inexistent, 
but luring and consistent lies.55 Unlike philosophers and all other people, 
Lycinus is critical from the start about the possibility of the existence and 
                                                          
51 Lucian only highlights the negative aspects of philotimia. For a complete study of ambition in 
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52 Luc. Herm. 5. 
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ultimate attainability of the individual and social utopias offered by 
philosophers, and sees nothing in them but another form of ambition.  
 Both philosophers and laymen are under the dominion of Εὐχή, which 
refuses nothing of what one wants (θέλῃ) regardless of how impossible this 
might be. Those who wish to become happy through the study of philosophy 
lack criticism of their own hope, which is a problem as all (unsafe) hope is 
deceiving, and all (unsafe) desires and wants misleading. The need to be critical 
towards one’s own desires in order to discover whether they are feasible or not 
makes Lycinus’ recommendation for the need to act according to virtue 
clearer.56 Lycinus makes it seem that the moral values he proposes are the exact 
opposite of Hermotimus’ philosophical values, but the reader can recall that 
what Lycinus means is that because there is no other city but this ‘real city’ and 
that one should avoid all impossible self-utopias and social utopias. Everyday 
life and necessity are far more pressing than ambitious hopes for a better future. 
Lycinus’ advice is to work with temperance against one’s own utopian 
horizons. 
 As a reinforcement of this anti-utopian moral message, the Hermotimus 
also contains an attack against τύχη. The possibility of coming by chance upon 
the correct path to true happiness is hinted at, but according to Lycinus ‘it is not 
a good idea to trust to chance and go where our feet take us’, even if in the past 
someone might have stumbled across the truth in this way. Lycinus also warns 
the reader that ‘in matters as important as these we ought not to take a perilous 
risk, or confine our hopes narrowly, wanting to cross the Aegean or the Ionian 
Sea on a mat, as the proverb goes, seeing that if we do so we couldn't fairly 
blame Chance either’. For Lycinus: 
 
The danger is not slight, if instead of the straight road because 
we are ignorant we fall upon one of the ones that go astray, in 
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the hope that fortune will make a better decision on our behalf 
(ἐλπίζοντες ἄμεινον αἱρήσεσθαι τὴν τύχην ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν).57 
 
When chance presents itself as an alternative to logos in finding oneself facing 
in the right direction, the metaphor of the road and the guide is soon replaced 
by the metaphor of the sea and ship-captain. However, trusting Chance to 
become eudaimon and failing in this choice is also compared to ‘shooting with 
an arrow or hurling a javelin and not hitting the only true target among a 
thousand false ones’, a challenge that not even for Teucer, -‘who when he 
should have hit the dove, cut the rope’, was  possible.58 Neither through 
philosophy, nor with the help of the gods (κατὰ θεόν εἱλόμην),59 is one able to 
choose the right philosopher and to become happy.  
 Therefore, via all means philosophical happiness is impossible to achieve 
and any hope of fulfilling one’s wishes in the Hermotimus is negative and 
deceiving. In any case, the individual is to be blamed for trusting in his own 
hopes, which are themselves the result of individual desires. One cannot curse 
Chance for not giving him what he wants, because that which he desire does 
not even exist. Certainly, there are other external forces which ensure that 
individuals like Hermotimus become the victims of impossible hopes and this is 
best exemplified with the figure of Hermotimus’ teacher and other philosophers 
who are responsible for selling to their students the illusion of impossible and 
wonderful promises.60 Philosophers are undoubtedly the creators of false hopes; 
nevertheless, it is individuals themselves who are responsible for thinking that 
they can fulfil such hopes without considering first whether they might even be 
achievable. It is the lack of a criterion on the part of the individual which leads 
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them to trust external forces and their own imagination and dreams over 
reason.  
 The aim of Lycinus’ argumentative and metaphoric battle is literally to 
sober Hermotimus from his lofty thoughts and high hopes and to bring him 
back to Earth. This message should not strike us as anomalous. The Hermotimus 
is not the only place in Lucian’s work in which the reader is given adviced to 
beware of hope. This is best perceived in the Charon or The Observers, a dialogue 
in which the ferryman of the dead is guided by Hermes to the world of mortals 
driven by his desire to understand why those who crosse the boundaries of 
death shed at least one tear, and to see everything in life (τὰ ἐν τῷ βίῳ 
ἅπαντα).61 In the Charon humanity is depicted in a pyramidal structure in 
which at the bottom lie the massess (τὴν πληθύν), and above them a crowd of 
forms (ὁ περιπετόμενος ὄχλος) commanded by φόβος and ἐλπίδες.62 Charon’s 
logos is that to have hopes of becoming richer or more powerful without 
knowing the cost of such an effort, which is ultimately in vain, because death 
comes to all men, is the folly (ἄνοια) and ignorance of  humanity.63 Indeed, the 
greatest power of Alexander of Abonouteichos is his capacity to put fear and 
hope, the two tyrants of mankind, at his own service.64 According to Demonax, 
the characteristic of the truly happy man, by contrast, is that he neither hopes 
for nor fears anything.65 
 
4. The Descent from the Utopian to the Real City 
 
What is precisely meant by bringing Hermotimus down to Earth is perceived in 
one of the most interesting sections of the Hermotimus in the utopian city of 
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Virtue as described by Lycinus is used to exemplify what philosophical 
happiness might look like:  
 
L: [...] Virtue, in my opinion, can be represented as a sort of 
city, whose citizens are happy (as your teacher would say if he 
could come back from where he is), wise to the limit, all manly, 
just, and almost god-like. Plundering, violence, greed and 
things alike, all that happens among us no one dares to do in 
this city, people say, but its citizens live in a peaceful and equal 
society, as is natural. I imagine that it is because they got rid of 
all the things which in other cities give rise to quarrels and 
competitiveness and all the things over which people plot 
against each other. They are not after gold, or pleasure, or 
fame, so as to argue over them, but have long since expelled 
those things from their city in the belief that they are not 
needed for civic life together. Therefore, they live calmly and 
happily with excellent laws, equality, freedom, and every other 
good. 
 
H: What then, Lycinus? Shouldn’t everyone wish to be a citizen 
of such a city, neither taking account of the toil expended on 
the journey nor giving up in view of the length of time it takes, 
if when they arrive they will be enrolled and will be part of the 
city-life? 
 
L: Yes, by Zeus, Hermotimus, one must make all efforts to 
make this possible and neglect everything else. One should not 
pay much attention to one's homeland here if it takes hold of 
one, nor be moved by children or parents, if one has them, 
holding one back and whimpering, but ideally one should 
exhort them too to follow the same road, and if they are 
unwilling or unable, one should shake them off and head 
directly for this totally happy city, even throwing off one's 
cloak if they were to seize hold of this and hold one back - 
because there is no reason to fear that anyone will shut you out 
from this place even if you arrive naked. A long time ago I 
heard an old man relating how things were there and he 
impelled me to follow him to the city. He said he would guide 
me and once I got there he would give me citizenship, make 
me a fellow tribesman and give me a role in his own phratry, 
so that I could be happy along with all of them. ‘But I wouldn’t 
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be convinced’ because almost 15 years ago I was imprudent 
and puerile. If I had done so, I would be by now at the 
outskirts and at the gates. He mentioned many other things 
about the city, as far as I can remember, especially that not only 
is everyone there a stranger and a foreigner, and that no one is 
native, but that also that there are many barbarians that hold 
civil rights and slaves, cripples and dwarfs and paupers and 
that, to sum it up, anyone who wants to can be a citizen. For it 
is their custom not to give the citizenship because of property 
or dress, size, beauty, origin or the length of one’s beard; no, 
these things are not esteemed by them, but instead intelligence, 
the desire for the good, toil, perseverance, if he does not give 
up and does not weaken when he faces all the hardships in the 
way, are enough for a man to become a citizen, so that whoever 
can manifest these qualities and continue his journey all the 
way to the city, as soon as he arrives at the city will become a 
citizen, equal to everyone else; being lesser or greater or noble 
or common or slave or free are things that do not even exist 
and are not even spoken of in this city.66 
 
Here, the ideal philosophical life is not just for the individual, but can also be 
applied to the construction of a utopian πόλις, and it is hard to imagine that 
Lucian’s readers, who would have been used to seeing the injustices of slavery, 
debt and money, would not have seen that here Lycinus is attacking specifically 
the utopian potential of philosophy to unsettle conventional hierarchies.  
 The Hermotimus presents the non-philosophical society as divided into 
binary oppositions: inferior or superior, noble or ignoble, enslaved or free, 
foreigner and native, disabled or ‘normal.’ Lucian shows through the activities 
of citizens the wider spectrum of characters from ‘slum-naturalism’ which 
include: temple robbers, wine-sellers, fishermen, teachers and students, 
husbands, wives, uncles, kings, Ethiopians, assayers of silver, landlords and 
debtors, athletes, archers, mathematicians, poets, judges, Olympic judges, 
spectators, prophets, prophetesses at Delphi, nurses, young boys, adolescents 
and mature men, handsome men and women, cripples and midgets, gods, 
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resurrected philosophers, etc. All dwellers in the real city judge wrongly that 
which is admirable, yearn for riches, glory, sensual pleasures and are enslaved 
by fear, anger, desire, and grief and all other passions that philosophers are 
supposed to despise.67  
 This caricature of the common city serves to show that philosophers like 
the student of Hermotimus’ teacher,68 or the man who is awoken by a slave,69 
take loans and have debts which they cannot pay, are anxious about how they 
will provide for their families, have drinking problems, and are gluttonous.70 In 
short, they are just like the worse kind of common people; they are low-life and 
constantly fail to achieve their own targets as they too are subject to human 
passions and behaviours.71 This is accecerbated by their pretensions to appear 
better than everyone else and their inability to take criticism easily.72 But the 
true reason why philosophers continue their vain pretentions is that, like 
anybody else, they cannot pay their debts, and get angry when students do not 
pay their fees on time.73 Quarrelsome students of philosophy can even seem to 
be the worse kind of thugs, studying philosophy just to distinguish themselves 
from laymen, but in reality they are rapists, they smuggle alcohol into the 
homes of their parents and they even hit their own mothers.74 They are 
therefore, just like everyone else. Indeed, Hermotimus has yet to see a Stoic 
who is not enslaved by fear, anger, desire and grief, and all other passions, 
which philosophers are supposed to despise.75 Converting to philosophy should 
mean more than just wearing a philosophical robe and following a chastened 
lifestyle, which distinguishes the philosopher from the common crowd or 
                                                          
67 Luc. Herm. 5-7. 
68 Luc. Herm. 10. 
69 Luc. Herm. 72. 
70 Luc. Herm. 3, 8, 9, 10. 
71 Luc. Herm. 16. 
72 Luc. Herm. 12.   
73 Luc. Herm. 10, 39, cf. Luc. Herm. 72. 
74 Luc. Herm. 80-83. 
75 Luc. Herm. 76. 
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ἰδιώται, who are in the eyes of the perfect philosopher no more than a rabble.76 
But philosophers, like the inhabitants of any city, crave all the wrong things, 
and are in fact worse than everyone else, since instead of admitting to their 
uncontrollable lust and desires for riches and glory, they pretend to be morally 
superior and in need of nothing.  
 In this way, laughter in the Hermotimus is not only restricted to the 
zealous, transcendent and divine philosopher. Its comic trick consists in 
equating the behaviour of philosophers to that of everyone else,77 and in doing 
so it also equates the ambition of philosophical happiness with that of laymen 
everywhere. The general moralizing message of the Hermotimus is to stop 
dreaming about another better world and fictitious hopes as proposed by 
philosophy, because this is the only real world, and one can only act according 
to how things are and have always been whithin it.  
 
5. The Moral Message of the Hermotimus 
 
In the last two chapters I have been arguing that in its form the Hermotimus 
appears to present iself as an aporetic dialogue, precisely because it leaves 
readers at an impasse over what to do with Lycinus’ ironic proposal to live like 
everyone else as opposed to an ascetic philosophical lifestyle. However, this 
reading does not mean that the Hermotimus does not have a moral message. In 
Chapter 5 we sawhow after winning an argumentative and metaphoric battle, 
Lycinus brought Hermotimus back to his senses by pushing him away from his 
hopes and desires and by showing to him that philosophers are no better than 
laymen. But because Lycinus’ proposal to live like everyone else is ironic, we 
cannot say that the Hermotimus is a protreptic text, as it does not positively offer 
the reader a βίος.  
                                                          
76 συρφετός, cf. Luc. Herm. 1, 21, 61. 
77 Luc. Herm. 76. 
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Instead, the Hermotimus presents an ἀποτρεπτικός λόγος, a guideline, 
which tells the reader how to avoid false and ambitious hopes that might cause 
distress if unfulfilled. Getting rid of one’s hopes allows the individual to live a 
relaxed life, to be content with what he has, and to desire nothing more. 
Distrusting one’s own desires leads to the emancipating realization that what 
once was hoped for is in reality impossible. The reader is offered a better, more 
real view of the world and is invited to laugh at those who due to their greed, 
waste their life striving to reach their dreams. Behaving justly, wisely and 
bravely and being virtuous is to be distrustful of the hope of getting anything 
more than what one already has. The Hermotimus recommends that 
Hermotimus and the reader alike seize the day and to forget about imagining a 
new future which is after all always uncertain.78 The reader should continue to 
do what he is already doing, and to distrust all impossible hopes of getting all 
that he desires. He should avoid at all costs people such as ascetic philosophers, 
poets and storytellers whose logos suggests suggests that transforming oneself 
and one’s society is possible when in reality it is not.  
 While Hermotimus’ conversion is sincere, we have seen that living like 
everyone else as proposed by Lycinus’, is not an alternative in its own right. 
When Lycinus exposes the philosophical logoi he becomes caught in a self-
exposing situation in which he acts like those philosophers he so despises. This 
self-exposure has in addition, the look of self-praise, since Lycinus’ definition of 
a philosopher could also be applied to himself. Lycinus, like other characters in 
Lucian’s writings, can be seen as a satirical hero. In Camerotto’s terms, the 
satirical hero is one made appropriate for the satirical genre, which has criticism 
as its final goal.79 On the one hand, Lycinus is partly superior, and yet he is also 
an outcast when compared to the rest of his society, as he needs to adopt a 
position of appropriate distance in order to point out all of society’s 
                                                          
78 Cf. Luc. Herm  6, 78. 
79 Camerotto (2014), in particular 112 and 290. 
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contradictions. On the other hand, he is a man of the crowd, for as part of the 
carnivalesque in which roles are inverted, he needs to be crowned and 
reaccepted by society once carnival-time has passed and common order is 
restored. While there are reasons to think that Lycinus is in some ways Lucian’s 
spokesperson, we should not think that the story between the old man in 
Hermotimus 24 and Lycinus is autobiographic. This is simply the example of 
what Hermotimus should have done before trusting in the Stoics, and 
furthermore there is no evidence suggesting that the old man is Nigrinus. It is 
therefore impossible to prove that this dialogue is autobiographic in any way 
and, in this sense, we should discard the possibility of the Hermotimus 
contributing to any developmentalist approach to Lucian. 
 Contrary to that which occurs in a Platonic dialogue, in Menippean satire 
the character’s point of view does not change when he is faced with a situation 
of estrangement. His ideology too remains unchanged during the process so 
that the contrast of role switching becomes more evident. As such Lycinus is a 
fictional character who has little to do with Lucian the author and yet at the 
same time he is a satirical hero and an unchangeable and eternal literary-
character, who expresses something of his creator, namely, that one should 
distrust one’s own hopes of becoming happy individually or socially through 
philosophy, and become happy instead through the pursuit of wealth and 
power. The attack against the ideal philosophical life in the Hermotimus, which, 
owing to its construction of a utopian πόλις reaches political dimensions, is a 
conservative message that should make us think carefully about Lucian’s 
readers and the aim of his works. Insofar as much as this is a text against 
philosophical dogmatism and the excluding and exclusive life offered by 
philosophical schools, it is also a text that prevents the reader from imagining a 
different social and individual life. It is also a text that uses the rhetoric and 
arguments of philosophy specifically to undermine utopian possibilities of 
philosophy, which are based on asceticism.  
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The truth awakened in the reader is that both the wise man and the fool 
are figures to be laughed at.  But philosophers are more risible since they 
pretend not to be fools and claim to be able to create better worlds. At the end 
of the dialogue, Lycinus, an authoritative voice and a Lucianic hero, has shared 
with the reader a more convincing perspective of the world, and it is through 
this perspective that the reader can in turn laugh at Hermotimus and his 
attempts to become happy through Stoicism as well as his sudden conversion. 
The reader can laugh too at all other mediocre philosophers, and laymen who 
try and fail to transcend the human condition. Perhaps it is this that should 
make us wonder to what degree the technique of estrangement of the order of 
things through the presentation of a philosophical utopia is a way of reinforcing 
the reader’s real social position as a member of the privileged elite. In this sense, 
the vantage-point reached by the satiric hero of Menippean satire could 
represent a caricature of the lower classes made by the riche and more powerful 
as opposed to an aspect of the popular and the carnivalesque.  
The result is that Lycinus’ ἀποτρεπτικός λόγος is serious, and conveys 
the author’s moral message that one should not trust one’s own hopes in 
becoming happy through philosophy as much as one should avoid becoming 
over-ambitious. The ironic procedures in the text are explicit and the reader is 
able to detach Lycinus’ intentions from Lycinus’ protreptic logos. The ending of 
the Hermotimus is aporetic, only in the sense that at the end of the dialogue the 
reader is left with no alternative but to choose between the philosophical life 
and that of the laymen. In this sense, the Hermotimus disappoints those scholars 
inclined to read Lucian in a unitarian fashion in which the author is de-
centralized and all of his authorial and authoritative opinions made relative.  
 The purpose of this formal analysis has been not to uncover the (un)-
intended meanings in the text, but simply to explain how it might be 
interpreted through its structure. In the next two chapters I will explore the 
ways in which the Hermotimus is a parody of protreptic literature and aporetic 
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literature, the two most distinctive philosophical genres par excellence. In this 
way the reader will be able to analyse the ways in which this dialogue emerges 




The Hermotimus as a Parody  
of Platonic Themes 
 
Detailed textual analysis has shown that the ending of the Hermotimus presents 
an aporia, in which one is unable to choose between the life-style of the layman 
as proposed by Lycinus, and the philosophical life, as Lycinus’ proposal of 
living a life like everyone else is evidently ironic. In this sense, we should not 
think of the Hermotimus as a protreptic dialogue that encourages us to live like 
everyone else, yet neither is it an aporetic dialogue because it conveys the clear 
message of avoiding the perils of hoping to become happy by living a life that is 
out-of-the-ordinary, whether seeking luxury and power or religious asceticism.  
To understand how Lucianic texts might have interacted with a diverse 
paideutic context, in which ‘classical’ texts, serious philosophical texts and 
traditional scholarly texts circulated, this chapter will show that the Hermotimus 
uses Platonic texts and other clichéd philosophical rhetoric to target not just 
philosophical asceticisism, but also the utopias that philosophical texts might 
encourage us to pursue. The Hermotimus, I argue, invites critically thinking 
about the rhetoric of Platonic philosophical discourses. The use of Platonic 
models, however, addresses the issue of what is ‘classical’ about philosophers, 
and in this sense it also has the effect of engaging with a much wider 
philosophical culture.  
 
1. Lycinus as a Parody of Socrates 
 
The Hermotimus is a parody of the Socratic-Platonic question on whether virtue 
can be taught and who it is able to teach it. As such, the Hermotimus is a 
caricature that borrows elements from Platonic texts to create stereotypes about 
philosophers and philosophy as to parody the Socratic search for virtue and 
eudaimonia as well as other classical Platonic themes of protreptic literature. 
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Much of the joy of reading the Hermotimus lies in the realization that Lycinus 
can be interpreted as a second Socrates who uses all of his powers of anti-
philosophical persuasion to convince the clichéd philosopher, Hermotimus, to 
abandon philosophy.1 The dialogue starts in the convention of a familiar 
Platonic situation; a philosopher encounters an individual on the street, the two 
strike-up a serious conversation, and the result is that the philosopher is 
encouraged to think philosophically about conventional ideas.2 However in the 
Hermotimus, immediately after the standard scene is set, what follows is in fact a 
reverse situation in which the dialogue serves as to dissuade Hermotimus 
entirely from his philosophical pursuit. In this encounter Lycinus discovers the 
painfully slow pace at which Hermotimus is learning philosophy from his 
teacher. This can be seen as a parody of Socrates’ encounter with the sophists 
Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, a couple of πάσσοφοι ἀτεχνῶς,3 who claim to 
be the fastest teachers of virtue. Their boastful statement is initially disbelieved 
and then later proved wrong by Socrates, who jokes that if they are the great 
teachers that they claim to be then they must be far richer than the proverbial 
king of Persia.4 The sophists in the Euthydemus, who are credited with the 
practice known as ἀντιλογία, ultimately fail to elaborate fully in an epideictic 
discourse on why it is that one must philosophize and pay attention to virtue 
(χρὴ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι).5 In the Hermotimus, an anti-
Socrates proves to a ἡμίσοφον in just one conversation not only that it is 
impossible to know who can teach virtue, but also that philosophers who claim 
to do so are driven by the same vulgar ambitions as everyone else. Instead of 
arguing on both sides, Lycinus’ argument concludes that neither the 
philosophical life nor the ordinary life are an option. 
                                                          
1 This was first proposed by Schwarz, A. (1863). 
2 Hunter (2012), 1-4.  
3 Plat. Euthd. 271c. 
4 Plat. Euthd. 273d-274a. 
5 Plat. Euthd. 275a. 
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 Thus, Lycinus is nothing but the inversion of the Athenian gadfly.6 At the 
beginning of his inquiry into how it is that Hermotimus chose to become a 
follower of the Stoics, Lycinus ironically asks Hermotimus if he chose his 
teacher by asking the Oracle. Hermotimus’ response is first that of denial and 
then grudging acquiescence, once he realises that he lacks a rational answer for 
choosing to follow the Stoics.7 Later, Hermotimus blames Lycinus for hating 
philosophy and accuses him of thinking himself to be the only person who has 
seen the truth.8 Lycinus answers Socratically, in fact he is as ignorant of truth as 
everyone else, but at least he is able to reveal that which is false. This is, of 
course, a parody of the role of Socrates in the Apology, in which the anti-
philosopher describes how it was that a particular type of wisdom gave him a 
bad reputation. The Oracle of Delphi told Chaerophon that Socrates was the 
wisest man alive, but that in trying to figure out what this meant, and since 
Socrates claims to know nothing at all, Chaerophon discovered that some of the 
people who think themselves wise are in fact not at all. In exposing falsehood, 
Socrates became hateful.9 The effect of sophistry is similar to that of the 
initiation of Corybantic rites on neophytes.10 Lycinus similarly suggests that if 
Hermotimus is really determined to continue his search for the criterion of truth 
he can dismiss Lycinus’ foolish chat (ἔα ληρεῖν) as he would a Corybant 
dancing. Lycinus, like Socrates, needs his interlocutor.11 However, just like the 
Platonic Socrates, Lucian portrays the impact of Lycinus’ irony either as simple 
mockery,12 or later as constantly offensive (ὑβριστὴς ἀεὶ).13 When Hermotimus 
says that Lycinus is βίαιος, just like Socrates, Lycinus says that he himself has 
been dragged too by the argument as it is much more forceful than he is (τάδε 
                                                          
6 Plat. Apol. 30e. 
7 Luc. Herm. 15. 
8 Luc. Herm. 53. 
9 Plat. Apol. 20c-21e. 
10 Plat Euthd. 277d. 
11 See Plat. Gorg. 487e 495ab, 500b, and Men. 83d, Lach.193c.  
12 Luc. Herm. 21; 58. See Plat. Gorg. 481b; Resp. 1. 337a4. 
13 In Plat. Symp. 215b, 219c Alcibiades makes this same remark of Socrates. 
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πολλῷ βιαιότερα φαίη ἄν σοι ὁ λόγος).14  Finally, Lycinus’ praise of the 
ordinary life looks very much like an inversion of Socrates’ last speech in the 
Gorgias. Lycinus too falls to defending temperance by unveiling the 
philosopher’s lack of restraint. However, his praise of the ordinary life, and the 
claim that philosophy is a distraction from important and real things, are much 
closer to Callicles’ position. Furthermore, Lycinus’ insistence on the fact that 
justice is to be found in deeds opposes Socrates’ claim that justice will be 
dispensed in the afterlife. Lycinus is conscious that he can be irreverent and 
even sacrilegious against philosophy when he makes ironic comparisons 
between it and hemlock and this too reminds the reader of Socrates’ death in 
the Phaedo.15  As Socrates’ lover and friend, Alcibiades compared him to a statue 
of Silenus. In the Hermotimus, Lycinus claims to save his friend from 
philosophy, by telling him that he is wrong and it is as if he had fallen in love 
with a statue.16  
 
2. Hermotimus as Opsimath 
 
Foucault wanted the Hermotimus to be a proof that in antiquity there were no 
limits of age to education.17 Nevertheless, Hermotimus with his advanced years 
has not yet become an expert philosopher and this is comic precisely as it 
departs from the stereotypical narration of the conversion to philosophy, a 
discipline to which often the youth of society were encouraged.18 Hermotimus 
seems to be an opsimath.19 The most striking similarity between the Hermotimus 
and the Gorgias is indeed in Callicles suggestion that ‘it is fine to have a share in 
                                                          
14 Tackaberry (1931) 68 noticed that Lycinus, like Socrates, urges not to give up the search. See 
Plat. Gorg. 461b. 
15 καὶ μή με νομίσῃς βλασφημεῖν περὶ αὐτῆς, Luc. Herm. 62. 
16 Plat. Smp. 215a-b. 
17 Foucault (1986) 49-50. For old age in antiquity see the articles in Falkner and Luce (1989). 
18 Trapp (1997), XX n. 20 and XX-XXII. 
19 For this figure see Diggle (2004), 477-486. 
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philosophy far enough for education, and it is not shameful for someone to 
philosophize when he is a boy. But whenever a man who’s older still 
philosophizes, the thing becomes ridiculous.’20 For Callicles, a young man who 
philosophizes is a free man, whereas ‘a non-philosophizer is not free’, but is 
‘someone who will never expect anything fine or noble from himself.’ On the 
other hand, an older man who is still philosophizing on the other hand is a 
disgrace and needs a good beating, because such activity is a sign of his 
unmanliness:  
 
even if he has an altogether good nature; for he shuns the city 
centre and the public squares where the poet says men win 
good reputations. He is sunk away out of sight for the rest of 
his life, and lives whispering with three or four boys in a 
corner, and never gives voice to anything fit for a free man, 
great and powerful.21 
 
Thus, Hermotimus can be seen as a playful recreation of the Platonic 
philosophical late-learner as he appears in the Gorgias, a dialogue in which 
Plato also introduces virulent attacks against those who challenge the utility of 
the theoretical life.22 Contrary to Callicles, for Socrates it is never too late to 
learn and Plato seems to have been aware of the opinion that Socrates himself 
was a late learner, and hence was also aware of the problems facing other 
Athenians who tired to commit themselves to a life of learning and 
contemplation. The beginning of the Protagoras resembles scenes like that of 
Strepsiades and the students in the Clouds,23 and Socrates is mocked for coming 
late to his learning of harp as the student of Connus in the Euthydemus.24A 
similar situation occurs in Plato’s Menexenus.25 It could even be said that if 
                                                          
20 Plat Gorg. 484c. 
21 Plat. Gorg. 485b-d 
22 A similar attack can also be found in Plat. Soph. 251–52. 
23 Plat. Prot. 235c-e. 
24 Plat. Euthd. 272. 
25 Plat. Menex. 235e. 
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Lycinus behaves like an inverted Socrates, then Hermotimus and his teacher 
appear to the reader to behave like the unwise and perverted Cephalus. 
Perhaps however the most illustrative account of the problems of living a 
theoretical life and how others misunderstand it comes from Plato’s Theatetus,26 
which tells the popular story on how it was that Thales of Miletus fell into a 
well while being distracted by his heavenly contemplation and hence becomes 
the object of laughter not only of a Thracian servant-girl but of an entire crowd.  
The topic of the opsimath was not unique to Plato. It was in fact present in 
philosophical texts and old comedy alike, and was often used in reference to the 
quarrel held between philosophers and sophists about the utility of the 
theoretical life.27 When Timaeus described Aristotle as a σοφιστὴς ὀψιμαθής, 
Polybius and Plutarch had to return the insult to him.28 In the Aristotelean 
tradition, represented by Theophrastus, the opsimath comically forgets the 
verses he has tried to remember for the occasion of a symposium, even though 
he is 60 years old.29  
The opsimath is a character of comedy too. Aristophanes’ Clouds contains 
quite a serious, and yet nonetheless hilarious criticism of the utility of the 
philosophical and contemplative life and its impact on the practical life. Just as, 
on the one hand, Aristophanes presents the issues caused by the sophistic 
power of making the worst argument seem the best for the sake of self-privilege 
and gives Socrates as an example of this rhetorical abuse,30 on the other, 
Strepsiades in the Clouds is much like Hermotimus, a late-learner.31 Like 
Pheidippides and his father, the pupils of Hermotimus’ teacher are keen to 
learn from philosophy how best to get away with debt and crime. 
                                                          
26 Plat. Theaet. 174b. 
27 For the relationship between Socrates, the comic poets and Plato, see Mitscherling (2003). 
28 Plb. 12.8.4; Timae. FGrH 566 F156; Plb 12.4c.1=566 T 19. 
29 Theophrast. 27 
30 Ar. Nub. 880-1105. 
31 διδάξομαι αὐτὸς βαδίζων εἰς τὸ φροντιστήριον. Ar. Nub. 127-128. The chorus leader also 
points at Strepsiades’ old age Ar. Nub. 358. 
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Finally, we find a short story in Philostratus that strikingly resembles a 
summary of the Hermotimus:  
 
Here is another admirable saying of Lucius. The Emperor 
Marcus was greatly interested in Sextus the Boeotian 
philosopher, attending his classes and going to his very door. 
Lucius had just arrived in Rome, and asked the Emperor, who 
he met going out, where he was going and for what purpose. 
Marcus answered: ‘‘It is quite a good thing even for one that is 
growing old to acquire knowledge. I am going to Sextus the 
philosopher to learn what I do not yet know.’’ At this Lucius 
raised his hand to heaven and exclaimed: ‘‘Oh Zeus! The 
Emperor of the Romans is already growing old, but he hangs a 
tablet around his neck and goes to school, while my Emperor 
Alexander died at thirty-two!’’ What I have quoted is enough 
to show the kind of philosophy cultivated by Lucius, for these 
speeches suffice to reveal the man as a sip reveals a bouquet of 
wine.32 
 
Parallels between the Hermotimus and this story are found not only in the 
vocabulary of both texts bu also in their themes. Lycinus recognizes that 
Hermotimus is going to his class because of τῇ τοῦ βαδίσματος σπουδῇ and his 
book. Lycinus also invites Hermotimus to compare philosophy with Alexander 
the Great’s invasion of Mount Aornos, but Hermotimus deems the comparison 
wrong, since virtue cannot be won, ‘even if innumerable Alexanders attack it’.33 
Marcus might not be in his 60’s, but he is likely in his middle-age and like him 
Hermotimus also thinks that even in an old age one must continue trying to 
perfect philosophical paideia.34 Like Sextus of Chaeronea’s joke, Lycinus’ 
argument of the unattainability of philosophy relies greatly on the statement 
that life is too short, 35 a topic that is common to both satire and philosophy. 
And yet there is a great difference between Lycinus’ intentions and those of 
                                                          
32 Phil. Vit. Soph. 2, 557 (trans. Wright, 1921). 
33 Luc. Herm. 4. 
34 Luc. Herm. 13. 
35 See Luc. Herm. 1, 4, 6, 46, 75, 77. 
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Sextus, since the latter’s advice points to the distracting effect that philosophy 
can have on the imperial achievements of Rome. By contrast, Lycinus’ 
dissuasion of the pursuit of philosophy points at abandoning philosophical 
virtue on behalf of a relaxed and free lifestyle. Indeed, the greatest value of a 
comparison between the Hermotimus and the short story in Philostratus lies in 
comparing not just the characters, but the stories in their entirety, because, as 
the passage from Philostratus’ shows,  there is a kind of θαυμάσιον humour,36 
which might be deemed as a way of cultivating philosophy.37 
 
3. The Philosophers of the Hermotimus as Platonic Sophists  
 
The Hermotimus appears to contain that which seems to be a loose definition of 
the virtuous and good life. For Hermotimus, as for Socrates, everyone desires 
success and εὐδαιμονία.38 Hermotimus assumes that his teacher, much like the 
guardians of Kallipolis, is completely happy,39 as he is virtuous. The first 
definition of virtue given by Hermotimus is theoretical and singular and 
consists of σοφία, ἀνδρεία, τὸ καλὸν αὐτό, τὸ δίκαιον and τὸ πάντα 
ἐπίστασθαι βεβαίως πεπεισμένον ᾗ ἕκαστα ἔχει.40 Philosophers’ actions, 
however, are portrayed by Lycinus as the antithesis of self-control or 
σωφροσύνη. Theirs is, in the end, a false definition of virtue precisely because it 
is grounded in theory. The true definition of virtue is plural, consists of ἐν τῷ 
δίκαια πράττειν καὶ σοφὰ καὶ ἀνδρεῖα,41 and lies in deeds and not in words. 
Being virtuous, in the second part of the Hermotimus, is to stay away from the 
                                                          
36 Even though Philostratus does not refer to Sextus’ sayings as perplexing, they do seem to 
present a kind of puzzle. It is attractive to think that the θαυμάσιον that he experiences is 
related to the wonder which arouses philosophy in Arist. Met. 1.2 982 b12-13. See. Matthews 
(1999), 11-12.  
37 See for example Seneca’s Stoic treatise De Brev. Vit. 1.1in which he quotes the same aphorism 
of Hippocrates as in Luc. Herm. 1.  
38 Plat. Euthd. 278e-281a. 
39 Plat. Resp. 419a-420a, 465d-466c. 
40 Luc. Herm. 7. 
41 Luc. Herm. 79. 
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false and over-ambitious dreams of laymen, in which they imagine themselves 
as becoming rich instantly, ruling the world, or becoming the wisest man. In 
practice, Lycinus’ conceptualization of virtue implies the negation of 
philosophic εὐδαιμονία; and yet, the letting go of philosophy also implies not 
only emancipation from the disturbance caused by philosophy, but living the 
more relaxed life of everyone else, without feeling the need to chase impossible 
ambitions.42 Clearly, in the Hermotimus the definition of virtue and the good life 
is both Socratic and Platonic. It is a parody and a simplification of the problem 
of the individual components of virtue and their ultimate unity, and of the 
necessary relationship between virtue, knowledge and εὐδαιμονία.43  
The morally correct life of the Hermotimus is exemplified by the model of 
all philosophers, Socrates, whose teachings show that honour based on the 
common concept of virtue and consisting of high-birth, wealth, authority, 
health and even good-luck is vanity.44 Socrates walks barefoot, and always 
wears a shabby cloak,45 but although he is so ugly that he is hard to look upon,46 
he can see more than everyone else.47 Similarly, owing to the fact that he can 
always distinguish good from bad he is able to keep control of his appetites and 
passions. Indeed, Socrates’ choice is to live a life of πενία.48   
The dog-like guardians of the ideal city, and the philosophers running 
the state, complete the picture of the model of the ideal philosopher. These 
almost divine human beings would live in perpetual contemplation if they 
could,49 however they content themselves with a life free from possessions in a 
                                                          
42 Luc. Herm. 86. 
43 That the unity of virtue leads to happiness is something stated in Plato’s Protagoras. For 
Socrates’ arguments about the unity of virtue, common beliefs and happiness, self-control of 
desires, and the good, justice and the Socratic enquiry see especially Irwin (1995), 31-51. 
44 See, especially Euthd. 279a-282e, and book I of Resp. challenges these conventional values. 
45 Xen. Mem. I. 6. 2. 
46 Xen, Smp. 2. 18. 
47 Plat. Phaed. 86d. 
48 Plat. Apol. 23c, D.L. 2.27. 
49 For philosophical dogs see Plat. Resp. 375e-376c. For the divine nature of philosophers see 
Plat. 492e, 497c, 400c-d. For the ideal of the contemplative life see 519c-d, 611c-612a. 
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special kind of communism.50 Philosophers love and pursue wisdom;51 they also 
love the sight of truth,52 and are the only ones that recognize it from behind the 
multiplicity of appearances and derive pleasure from it.53 The reason why 
philosophers are able to run the city better than everyone else is because they 
possess the immutable knowledge of what virtue is, and for that reason too they 
hate ever-changing falsehood.54 Philosophers, according to Socrates, are capable 
of grasping the idea or the Form of the good, and to acting in correspondingly 
to it.55 Because failure in skill does not allow for mistakes, philosophers never 
miss the target when aiming at the good. For that reason, the pleasures of 
philosophers are greater than ordinary pleasures.56 Similarly, they are always 
self-controlled57and courageous.58 As their lives are dedicated to morality and 
justice, philosophers are in addition the best guardians of political εὐδαιμονία, 
and reside safe in the knowledge that the virtuous life is also the happiest life 
and the most pleasant.59 
The method used to measure the appropriateness of philosophers is the 
ability to create coherence between their deeds and their words in the way in 
which they conduct their lives. In the Gorgias, Socrates often defends his way of 
life in order to prove that he is more than just mere talk.60 However, a 
discussion on this topic is better found in Plato’s Laches.61 Even though this is an 
                                                          
50 Plat. Resp. 416e-417a, 457d-465d, 466b—c, 543b. 
51 Plat. Resp. 475b-c. 
52 Plat Resp. 475e. 
53 Plat. Resp. 476a-b. 
54Philosophers love and prefer what does not change to that which becomes Plat. Resp. 485a-b, 
485c. 
55 Plat. Resp. 351e, 369a, 432b, 434d, 441c, 472c-e, etc... 
56 Cf. Plat. Resp. 583b-587b. 
57 Plat. Resp. 485d-e. 
58 Plat. Resp. 486a-b. 
59 Plat. Resp. 35d-354a, 580b-c, 585c-e, 591a-592b, 618c-619a. 
60 Plat. Gorg, 472ab  473a-467a, 480b, 486ab, 512d-513a, 521e-522c. 
61 See O’Brien (1967), 110-117. The Socrates of Plato’s Laches 194a-199d puts himself and his 
interlocutors in a vicious discussion about the unity of virtue, based on the assumption that 
courage is only a part of virtue rather than the sum of virtue. See Matthews (1999), 21-26 
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aporetic dialogue about the discussion of ἀνδρεία, and its relation to virtue and 
wisdom, there is the suggestion that a virtuous person should possess a 
harmony - otherwise known as Dorian-, between his words and his actions 
(ἔργα καὶ λόγοι).62 Socrates, in the end, is the embodiment of this harmonious 
man; he is brave for not running away from philosophical inquiries and, like 
Solon, for trying to learn for as long as he lives.63 The Hermotimus need not have 
been a direct parody of Plato’s Laches, Republic, or Gorgias. The insistence on the 
coherence between deeds and words was a common topic for practical 
philosophy in the imperial period, and in particular, Stoicism had borrowed the 
idea that a philosopher’s life has to be coherent with his thoughts from different 
authors of classical Athens,64 as well as Cynicism.65 Nevertheless, the discussion 
in Plato’s Laches about the bravery that one needs in order to continue studying 
philosophy, and the potential foolishness of this decision seem to be 
appropriate themes for parody since Lucian has managed to write a dialogue 
that starts from the assertion that virtue lies more in words than in deeds, only 
to then reverse it. Most ironically, as an inverted Laches, Lycinus, a man of 
words and arguments, defends the proposition that true virtue lies not in words 
but in deeds.  
Those who practice philosophy can be at odds with those who guide 
their lives according to conventional moral values. The example of Callicles is 
particularly useful here as for him virtue and εὐδαιμονία are a luxury, and 
intemperance and freedom worth nothing (φλυαρία καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξια).66 In the 
Hermotimus, philosophers are a mismatch of the ideal Platonic-Socratic 
                                                                                                                                                                          
discussion on this, and his reasons for thinking that Socrates is being sincere when he says at 
the end of the dialogue (200e) that ‘we are all in equal perplexity’. 
62 Plat. Lach. 188d. 
63 Plat. Lach. 188b; Resp 536d Solon Fr.18 Bergk. 
64 Thuc. 2.40. 2-3. Democr. Fr.55, Fr. 82 DK, 145 DK. On Stocism, deeds and words see Max. Tyr. 
25.2 and Sellars (2003), 20-21. 
65 Pseud. Diog. Ep. 15; Jul. O. 7.214 and Christ. Matt 23.3 Rom. 2: 1 21-23 John 3.18  1. Clem. 30.3 
Ign Eph. 15.1. 
66 Plat. Gorg.  492c. 
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philosopher and the equally ideal anti-philosopher, or sophist. According to 
Socrates, rhetoricians and sophists are incapable of teaching, and are therefore 
substantially different from philosophers.67 Furthermore, the only thing that 
students of philosophy seem to learn is how to follow Calliclean precepts 
against self-control which argue that which is good and just according to nature 
(φύσις), as opposed to custom (νόμος), allows appetites to grow without 
restraint (κολάζειν). Once these appetites have reached their peak, the follower 
of Callicles must use his bravery and wisdom to acquire the power to serve 
them, and to fill them with whatever appetite he may have at any given time.68 
The definition of rhetoric in the Gorgias (πειθοῦς δημιουργός ἐστιν ἡ 
὆ητορική), and Callicles accusation that Socrates is a mob-orator and a sophist 
who forcefully uses dialogue for philosophical vulgarities, fit well with the 
description of philosophers as creators of false logoi.69 Indeed, for Callicles, 
Socrates’ wisdom (τὸ σοφόν) lies in his arguments (ἐν τοῖς λόγοις).  In the 
Hermotimus we see that Hermotimus’ teacher perverts the young. This is, of 
course, a pun on the accusation against Socrates for corrupting the youth in the 
Apology as if he were no different from the rest of the sophists. The behaviour of 
philosophers in the Hermotimus resembles that of the doxosophoi or philodoxoi,70 
and the impostors in the Republic,71 who disbelieve that which is truly good and 
are philotheamones.72 Philosophers in the Hermotimus suffer like Thrasymachus 
from pleonexia, and are never able to be truly satiated.73 They are likewise 
carried away by their love for discussions. Much like a mob of Alcibiadeses, 
                                                          
67  See Socrates definition: Ἡ ὆ητορική δημιουργός ἐστιν πιστευτικής οὐ διδασκαλικής. The 
rhetorician cannot be a διδάσκαλος of jurors and the masses about the just or the unjust. Plat. 
Gorg. 455a. Cf. Euthd. 277e-278a. Thaet. 199a. 
68 Plat. Gorg. 492a. 
69 Plat. Gorg. 447a-454b; 481b Luc. Herm. 75 
70 Plat. Apol. 21d3-7. 
71 Plat. Resp. 494e-496a, 535c. 
72 Plat. Resp. 493e. 
73 Plat. Resp. 343a-344c. 
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philosophers ruin symposia and, unlike Socrates, are greatly affected by 
alcohol.74  
The desire of philosophers to become powerful,75 and Hermotimus’ 
accusation that Lycinus is jealous (ὑπὸ φθόνου δηλαδή) because he has been 
reluctant to study philosophy all these years,76 evokes an issue posed by Polus 
of whether Socrates envies tyrants and dynasts, or whether he simply pities 
them. The ambition that ordinary people have of becoming rich and famous 
seems to be borrowed from Socrates’ argument that political power is not the 
supreme goal.77 Tyrants are unhappy because the happy (εὐδαίμων) have no 
evil, or are in the process of getting rid of evil. According to Socrates, he who is 
evil, but does not rid himself of it, lives the worst life. People equip themselves 
with money, friends, and rhetoric to avoid paying justice, but the greatest evil is 
to do injustice and not to be punished. Thus, tyrants live the worst life, because 
they are powerless and because they are unhappy.78   
The same might be said of philosophers in the Hermotimus and indeed, it 
is a text that plays on the notion that the peak of immorality and injustice is to 
give the impression of morality.79 As a result, ironically, it is philosophers who 
are as immoral as tyrants and sophists.  
 
4. The Parody of the Socratic Investigation of Virtue 
 
The most distinctive feature of the Hermotimus is that it parodies the 
philosophical investigation of virtue. Both Lucian’s Lycinus and Plato’s Socrates 
use elenchus to expose the contradictions of their interlocutor’s opinions, which 
are based on common conceptions of philosophy and rhetoric, and yet Lycinus 
                                                          
74 Luc. Herm. 8-12. Plat. Smp. 212c. 
75 Luc. Herm. 16, 81. 
76 Luc. Herm. 63. in Plat. Gorg. 468e 6-9.   
77 Plat. Euthd. 290e-292e. 
78 Plat. Gorg. 472d-479e. 
79 Plat. Resp 361a. 
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uses this most philosophical weapon for non-Socratic purposes. According to 
Socrates, cross-examination is the method by which one can know what the 
good life is and therefore come to enjoy it. As is well known, in the course of 
cross-examination, Socrates often uses irony to extract the truth from 
conversations.80  Socratic investigation often deals with the problem Τί ἐστι; 
(what is the good-life? What is virtue? What is justice? What is knowledge? 
What is bravery?). In Platonic fashion, the Hermotimus touches upon the issue of 
defining philosophy (according to Hermotimus); however, unlike Socrates who 
is interested in finding out which branch of knowledge can bring individual 
happiness,81 Lycinus uses his elenchos to show that philosophical eudaimonia is 
impossible, and that philosophers can never be virtuous, as their conception of 
virtue is non-philosophical and can even come across as tyrannical.   
The real question behind the Hermotimus is who is a philosopher in the 
city. In this sense, Lycinus’ enquiry is similar to that of Socrates in Plato’s 
Gorgias, when he uses the elenchus to investigate who is (ὅστις ἔστιν) Gorgias 
as a rhetorician, and what he promises and teaches. In the attempt to establish 
who Gorgias is as a rhetorician, Socrates warns Polus not to display his 
rhetorical μακρολογία, and to stick to brief speeches and ἐλέγχε καὶ ἐλέγχου.82 
In the Hermotimus Lycinus, in the guise of an inverted Socrates, asks 
Hermotimus whether students of philosophy are allowed to argue when they 
think something is not expressed correctly. However, he is allowed to ask 
questions and argue at the same time as Hermotimus tries to deliver an 
exhortation to philosophy.83  But this exhortation backfires as Hermotimus is 
always running short of arguments, and Lycinus delivers very long and ironic 
protreptic discourses.  
                                                          
80 For a definition of Socratic irony see Vlastos (1991) 21-44 
81 Plat. Euthd. 288b-292e. The Republic is, of course, dedicated entirely to this project by trying to 
define what is justice. 
82 Plat Gorg. 461b-462b. 
83 Luc. Herm. 13. 
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Lycinus uses the Socratic method against philosophy. Philosophers are 
on the one hand no different from Plato’s sophists, however, on the other hand, 
this portrait of philosophers might also be used in reference to virtuous 
rhetoricians. Thus, Lycinus is a character who ambiguously positions himself in 
the zone between both philosophy and sophistry. Hence, whilst in Plato the 
elenchus is a method used to discover truth, even if this leads to the impasse that 
it cannot be reached, it seems that in Lucian the elenchus indulges a mere 
rhetorical joy in using the weapons of philosophers against those philosophers 
who are, in Platonic terms, sophists. In this sense, the question behind the 
Hermotimus and who is a philosopher, can be answered simply as ‘the 
philosopher is a sophist’, and this conclusion reinforces the suspicion that 
Hermotimus’ conversion is ironic as neither the philosopher, nor the sophist, 
nor the laymen are in a position to lead one to the good-life.  
Perhaps of all of the Platonic dialogues, it is Plato’s Meno that Lycinus’ 
method of investigation resembles most clearly, as it focuses upon finding out 
who is virtuous and who is capable of teaching. Socrates, who claims to have 
been educated by Prodicus in the matter, admits to Gorgias’ student,84 Meno, 
that he does not know what virtue is,85 and yet despite this fact, he offers to help 
Meno in discovering it for himself. Meno then poses an objection known 
commonly as Meno’s paradox: how can one search without knowing what one 
is searching for? For, if one knows what one is looking for, then inquiry is 
unnecessary. If one does not know what one is looking for, then the search is 
impossible. Therefore, inquiry is either unnecessary or impossible. Indeed, this 
conclusion resembles in many ways that of the Hermotimus in which the 
philosophical quest is presented ultimately as both unattainable and pointless. 
To solve Meno’s paradox, Socrates brings a slave to whom he presents a 
geometric problem. The slave, though uneducated, solves the geometric 
                                                          
84 Plat. Men. 96d. On Socrates being the pupil of Prodicus see Plat. Crat. 384b. 
85 Plat Men. 71b-79e. 
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problem and Socrates arrives at the conclusion that all learning is recollection 
and that everyone can participate in philosophical virtue.86 This perspective is 
vividly depicted and parodied in the Hermotimus.87 However, the search for 
virtue in this dialogue is closer to the second half of the Meno, in which Socrates 
explores the possibility of virtue being teachable if one begins the search with 
the hypothesis that virtue is knowledge, especially knowledge to administer 
homes and cities according to what is good.88 But if virtue can be taught then 
surely teachers of virtue should exist. Some sophists claim to teach virtue in 
general, but Athenians like Anytus and Socrates do not believe this possible. 
Anytus argues that noble Athenians can teach virtue, but Socrates says that if 
this were true the sons of the best of the Athenians would be virtuous too, and 
both Anytus and Socrates agree this is not the case, since in practice the sons of 
the Athenians do not surpass their fathers,89 with the result that very few good 
men seem to be in existence.90  
The use of the metaphor of the road in the Hermotimus can furthermore 
be read as a parody of the conclusion of the Meno, in which Socrates argues that 
he who knows which road leads to Larisa is as good a guide, as somebody who 
had been there before and already knows the way.91 Lycinus questions this 
reasoning into question; without a good guide, he says, one might end up 
reaching a completely different city, without even knowing that one has done 
so. 92 
Recognizing the Platonic guise of the Hermotimus is important for a 
modern reader, just as it would have been for a reader of the second century, as 
it reveals the parodic procedures of this text. Through the subversion and 
                                                          
86Plat Men.  79e-86c. 
87 Luc. Herm. 24. Compare the mixture of races in Plat. Resp. 546-547. 
88 Plat Men. 86c-89c. 
89 Plat Men. 86c-96c. 
90 Plat Men. 96d. 
91 Plat Men. 96d-97b. 
92 Plat Men. 98c-100b. 
 150 
inversion of Platonic themes, such as the search for the good and virtuous life 
and philosophical excellence, Lucian creates a spectacle of transvestism in 
which ‘philosophers’ hide their sophistic nature under their Socratic garb. 
Although for the attentive reader discovering specific parodies of Platonic texts 
in the Hermotimus is enjoyable, readers already familiar with clichéd images of 
philosophers can also find the general inversion of themes entertaining. The use 
of Platonic models serves the purpose of playing with what is ‘classical’ about 
philosophers, and by extension engages with a much wider philosophical 
culture. 
 
5. Parody of the Metaphor of the Road and of the Destination of Philosophy 
 
In the Hermotimus Lucian not only employs the metaphor of the road and the 
‘choice of the better life’, he also parodies it. The parody of the metaphor of the 
road embraces an aspect of the aesthetics of protreptic literature that goes back 
to Homer and Hesiod.93 However, it is through Lucian’s choice to use the 
metaphor of Works and Days 40 and 287-289 that the interest of the reader is 
really piqued.94 Indeed Lucian might have placed more emphasis on Homer, or 
Parmenides, Empedocles, and Heraclitus.95 Pindar too re-creates the metaphor 
of the road, comparing poetry to a path,96 and in reference to the path 
differentiates between vulgar and high-style poetry.97 It is worth noting that 
                                                          
93 Hom. Il. 9.410; Od. 5. 191-229. See Worman (2015), 73.  
94 In Somn. 1, 3 Lucian uses the same Hesiodic hypotexts in reference to the variation of the 
theme of  the choosing of one’s profession as if in a trial (cf. Somn. 2). He also uses typical 
vocabulary of  protreptics (Eg. ἀγαλμάτια μικρά τινα κατασκευάζων ἐμαυτῷ τε κἀκείνοις 
οἷς προῃρούμην; καὶ τό γε πρῶτον ἐκεῖνο καὶ σύνηθες τοῖς ἀρχομένοις ἐγίγνετο; οὐδὲ 
προτρεπτικῶς μου κατήρξατο), but in the context of the passing from childhood to early 
adulthood. Certainly Paideia’s promise is both philosophical and sophistic (cf. Somn. 13-10, 15). 
The conversion story and the exemplary main character (Somn. 17-18) have some kind of 
paideutic usefulness, despite their ironic undertones.    
95 Parm. Fr. 1.2,B1; Emp. (DK 3.3-5, 35.1-3), Herac. Fr. 45, 59, 60. 
96 Pind. P. 2 and 4.246-248; 85-86; N. 7.51; Pai. Fr.- 52h.18-20; O. 9; I. 2; Worman (2015), 73-78 and 
320-332.  
97 Harriot 1969: 63, who also cites Bacch. 5.176-78, 10.51-52, 19.1-8. 
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Justin Martyr uses in the Dialogue with Trypho in rhetorical contexts that are 
particularly interesting for the interpretation of the Hermotimus,98 although his 
inspiration seems to have come from the Jewish texts, rather than Hesiod.99  
However, I believe it pertinent to speculate on the reasons why Lucian 
chooses to parody Works and Days and I propose that he did so as he wanted to 
parody the way in which the ‘road of the hill to virtue’ represents the ‘classic’ 
Socratic passage in order to discuss how Hermotimus chooses which 
philosophical path to follow. It seems too that this was one of Prodicus’ 
favourite themes, as it is preserved in Xenophon’s famous myth of the Choice of 
Heracles,100 later passed on to the Cynics.101 The bond of the metaphor of the 
road to an exclusively philosophical context became more robust after Plato’s 
Republic, in which it was used to prescribe the correct age for pursuing the 
philosophic good life. In his investigation into justice, Socrates argues that he 
must learn from people such as Cephalus, because ‘they’ve gone on ahead of 
us, as it were, on a road on which we too will probably have to travel, and we 
ought to find out from them what the road is like, whether it is rough and hard 
or easy and smooth.’102 Socrates, in particular, is especially pleased with 
Cephalus’ opinion about old age, because he is, as Homer describes it, ἐπὶ 
                                                          
98 See Dial. Tryph. 8.2 ἱκανοὶ δυσωπῆσαι τοὺς ἐκτρεπομένους τῆς ὀρθῆς ὁδοῦ; 39.2ὡς 
τεμόντας ὑμᾶς ἀπὸ τῶν ψυχῶν ὑμῶν τὴν ἐλπίδα ταύτην σπουδάσαι δεῖ ἐπιγνῶναι, δι' ἧς 
ὁδοῦ ἄφεσις ὑμῖν τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν γενήσεται; ἀπολείποντας τὴν ὁδὸν τῆς πλάνης; 
44.4ἐπιγνόντες διὰ ταύτης τῆς ὁδοῦ δίδοσθαι παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ εὐδαιμονεῖν, πάντως καὶ 
αὐτοὶ ἡμῖν ὅμοια ποιήσητε, τὸ ἡμῶν εἶναι τὸν Χριστὸν τοῦ θεοῦ.  
99 Dial. Tryph. 13.5; 24.4; 32.6; 35.3; 38.1. 40.8,10, etc… 
100Prodicus’ myth in Xen. Mem. 2.1.21-34. See Waites (1912) for an analysis of allegorical debates 
in Greek literature and the metaphor of the road. Basset (1925) gives an analysis tracing the 
sources of Quintus Smyrnaeus (Posthomerica, V, 6-101), in which he talks about the Hill of Arete. 
101 The connection between Prodicus myth and the metaphor of the road was well established in 
Cynic circles. See Ps. Diog. Ep. 30 and 37. See also Emeljanow (1965). But these derived from the 
Socratic discussion of Prodicus and Hesiod, see Wolsdorf (2008). Also Sextus Empiricus (P. 1. 
69) laughs at Chrysippus’ dog argument, in which a dog comes to a crossroad and having 
traced two different roads along which a wild animal did not go, takes a third road and yet fails 
to track him down. The example of the dog argument appears elsewhere; Ael. Nat Anim. 6. 59: 
Plut. De Sollert. Anim. 968f-969b; Philo De Animal. 45-46. According to Sextus Empiricus, 
Aenesidemus considers Scepticism to be a path towards the philosophy of Heraclitus (P. 1. 120), 
for Sextus’ interpretation of Heraclitus, see Polito (2004). 
102 Plat. Resp. 328e. 
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γήραος οὐδῷ.103 Plato later extends the metaphor, when he writes that ordinary 
people and poets all agree in:  
 
how self-discipline and morality may be commendable, 
but are also difficult and troublesome (χαλεπὸν μέντοι 
καὶ ἐπίπονον,), whereas self-indulgence and immorality 
are enjoyable and easily gained, and it’s only in people’s 
minds and in convention that they are contemptible.104  
 
Socrates even talks about the ἄλλη γὰρ μακροτέρα καὶ πλείων ὁδός that 
philosophers must embrace if they want to discover whether the individual 
possesses in his soul the three parts from which can be formed the ideal city.105 
The guardians too must take a different and longer route in order to reach the 
best possible vantage point, one which will turn out to be longer than 
previously thought.106 It does not escape Lucian’s notice that Plato might even 
make the road of philosophers go as far as to the skies and flight of the soul is 
parodied when Lycinus suggests that he will pray to Hermotimus along with 
the gods, now that he is above the clouds and that has ascended to that place 
that he has long been striving for.107 As this scene shows it is largely the mortal 
aspect of the improvement in virtue that it is parodied in the Hermotimus.  
It must be noted that Aristophanes also makes good use of this metaphor 
in the Clouds.108 The Roman satirist Persius also uses the metaphor of the road in 
relation to philosophers.109 The depiction of the real city is also a satire of the 
                                                          
103 Hom. Il. 22.60; Od. 15, 246. 
104 Plat. Resp. 364 d. 
105Plat. Resp. 435d. 
106 Plat. Resp. 504a-d. 
107 The word ὑπερνεφέλος (see also Icar. 2) is a pun on Plato’s Phdr.247c, who uses this word to 
describe the final destination of the flight of the soul and a place that holds true knowledge and 
which is visible only to the mind. In Bis Acc. 33 Dialogue narrates his fall to earth from the sky 
as an inversion of the flight of the soul as it is exposed in the Phaedrus.  
108 Arist. Nub. 68-77. 
109 Pers. Sat. 3. 56. Juvenal in his Sat. 3, 56-57 makes a parody of the Pythagorean ‘Y’. For Lucian 
and Roman Satire see Jones (1989), 81 and the bibliography found therein. 
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city as Lucian and as some other Greek and Roman authors often portray it.110 
However, in spite of its ‘classical’ context and its similarity with the impressions 
of other satirists, the imagery of the road in the Hermotimus is well suited to 
express criticism of the idea of progress. The metaphor of the road also serves to 
challenge the contemptus mundi of the Stoics, as it is indeed preserved in Seneca: 
 
Today I have some free time, thanks not so much to myself as 
to the games, which have attracted all the bores to the boxing-
match. No one will interrupt me or disturb the train of my 
thoughts, which go ahead more boldly as the result of my very 
confidence. My door has not been continually creaking on its 
hinges nor will my curtain be pulled aside; my thoughts may 
march safely on, – and that is all the more necessary for one 
who goes independently and follows out his own path (quod 
magis necessarium est per se eunti et suam sequenti viam). Do I then 
follow no predecessors? Yes, but I allow myself to discover 
something new, to alter, to reject. I am not a slave to them, 
although I give them my approval.111 
 
It is not very difficult to see how the Hermotimus might be read against this 
passage. In conclusion, in much the same way as the Cynics claimed to be able 
to guide their followers via a short cut to virtue, the Hermotimus too can be seen 
to challenge the very notion of philosophy as a teachable τέχνη.112  
However, it is not only the philosophical quest but also the destination of 
philosophy that is parodied in the Hermotimus. The city of virtue, to which 
Hermotimus wishes to climb finds its echo in Hesiod’s road of justice (ὁδός ἐς 
τὰ δίκαια) that leads to paradise. Likewise, the ordinary city can be understood 
as the place for those who choose ὕβρις over justice,113 and who travel the easy 
                                                          
110 Juv. Sat. 3 and Hor. Sat. 1. 4. 1-7. 
111 Sen. Epist. 80. 1. (trans Gummere). 
112 The best analysis of Lucian’s concept and criticism of philosophy as τέχνη is that of 
Nesselrath (1985), 141, but see 56-58 in relation to happiness and, 12, 124, 126, 153-155, 168, etc. 
for its relationship with rhetoric.  For Stoic imagery in the Hermotimus see Edwards (1993) and 
Tackaberry (1930), 15-20. 
113 Hesd. Op. 216-285. 
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and smooth road only to quickly find themselves in a place of misery.114 
However, the city of virtue as depicted in the Hermotimus is clearly a parody of 
philosophical utopias. Antisthenes’ On the State, Xenophon in the Constitution of 
the Spartans, Hiero, and the Education of Cyrus, and more importantly in the case 
of Lucian, Plato in his Republic constitute, in a manner of speaking, constitute 
the canon of classical texts on communal utopias. Added to this is the 
knowledge that Diogenes the Cynic and Zeno in all likelihood also wrote their 
own versions of the Republic.  
It is possible that Lucian might have taken inspiration for his depiction of 
the unjust city of laymen from Thrasymachus’ description of tyranny.115 
However, it seems that Lycinus’ parody of the city of virtue is targeted at 
Hermotimus’ Stoic belief that virtue is equally accessible to all, slaves, women 
and foreigners alike. For this reason, Lucian’s model seems more likely to have 
been that of Plato’s or Zeno’s Republic. This idea found its roots in Platonic 
communism.116 Plato introduced the idea of women as participating in virtue 
and the possibility of them becoming guardians of the ideal city,117 as well as the 
idea that virtue cmight be learnt and taught to slaves.118  
In Plato’s and Zeno’s utopias, friendship and concord played a crucial 
role,119 and in both the practice of a certain form of asceticism and the voluntary 
detachment from the common pursuit of civil honour seems to have been 
important. However, in the Republic, Socrates clearly states that there has to be a 
natural predisposition towards virtue in the guardians to be, and education is 
that which serves as the filter by which to choose those suitable to rule.120 
Regarding Zeno’s Republic, almost everything that we know comes from a 
                                                          
114 Hesd. Op. 286-288. 
115 Plat. Resp. 344a-e. 
116 Plat. Resp. 415d-417b; 423e6–424a2; 451c and Leg. 739c-740b. 
117 Plat. Resp. 451c-457b. 
118 Plat. Men. 82e. 
119 See Schofield (1999) on the subject of the Stoic city, in particular regarding Platonism and 
Stoicism, 128-129. 
120 Plat Resp. 370b1-2. 
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passage in Diogenes Lartius which cites that Cassius the Sceptic, the rhetorician 
Isidorus of Pergamum, and others who attacked Zeno for dismissing common 
education (ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία), and for calling all those who are not virtuous 
(μὴ σπουδαίος) an enemy, a slave, and thus making parents foreign to children, 
brothers to brothers and friends to friends. Some notions of the Cynic ideal city, 
such as the fact that because its citizens live according to virtue they have no 
need for weapons and do not fight for glory, are also clearly evident in the 
Hermotimus.121  
However, it seems much more likely that Lucian blended Platonic, Cynic 
and Stoic concepts of the virtuous city. Like Plato, Zeno proposed that women 
should be held in common, although men and women should be dressed 
equally with their genitals visible to everyone. Furthermore, he added that no 
temples should be built in the city, and that coinage should be used for 
exchange or for travelling abroad, an interesting suggestion that suggests it 
should not be accumulated.122 Zeno also seems to have written his Republic in 
opposition to Plato’s and later Stoics were not proud of his vision that embraced 
the idea of the universe as the cosmic city. Seneca, Musonius Rufus, Epictetus, 
Marcus Aurelius, Philo Judaeus and Dio Chrysostom also seem to have 
conceived of the true city as the cosmic city.123  Thus, we might consider that 
Lucian was referencing a tradition in Stoicism with which the Stoics of his time 
were not in agreement. 
It should be noted that the Hermotimus is not the only anti-utopian text of 
Lucian. The attack on imagined and impossible better places is also carried out 
in the True History, a book that takes to the extreme ideas from a range of other 
texts and traditions of antiquity.124 Lucian, the narrator and character of this 
text, not only criticizes alleged historians like Ctesias of Cnidus and Iambulus, 
                                                          
121 D.L: 6. 85.  
122 D.L. 7. 32-4. 
123 Schofield (1999), 93. 
124 See Nesselrath (1993), who makes an excellent argument for the VA as parody.    
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along with other authors, who invent stories of faraway and unknown places, 
but also assumes that the reader will recognize his sources.125 It is this very 
recognition which reveals that, contrary to those historians who write lies that 
seem like truth, the only truth contained in the two books of the True Stories is 
that everything in them is a lie.126  
Lucian, in the fashion of the Homeric Odysseus embarks with his 
companions on a voyage which will take him to the reknowned yet never 
visited, Isles of the Blessed. One of the most well known and religious utopian 
sites of the ancient world, here Lucian delivers a letter from Odysseus to 
Calypso, and meets with well-known authors from antiquity including Homer. 
After a short period of time Lucian is forced to abandon the place, but the king 
of the island, Rhadamanthys, reveals to him a ritual that provides him with 
good hopes of returning to the island.127 This last remark, on how one might 
attain a happy and immortal life through ritual, appears to be sarcastic in tone, 
and thus can be seen to form part of the Lucianic criticism of religion. What the 
reader is supposed to think is, of course, is the exact opposite; that rituals 
cannot give hopes of getting any closer to the Isles of the Blessed. In the next 
unnamed island visited by fictional Lucian, we find a different kind of criticism 
of utopian places, which resembles Hermotimus’ steep road to the perfect city. 
On this unnamed island, Lucian guided by Nauplius, climbs up a steep and 
stony path, crosses earth covered with swords, passes through a river of blood, 
one of fire, and one of mud, until he reaches a road where he meets Timon of 
Athens. After this encounter Lucian witnesses the punishment of many kings 
and learns the reason for their punishment. And yet, it is not kings but false 
                                                          
125 Luc. VH 1, 3. 
126 Luc. VH 1, 4. In particular Ferguson (1975), 174-175 has an accurate view about Lucian, the 
True Histories and utopianism: ‘the important point is that he has shrewdly hit the real 
weakness of Iambulus’ picture, the element of fantasy therein. Political theory which ignores the 
hard facts of material existence is in the last resort sterile, and wishful thinking is no substitute 
for the working out of a sound economic structure.’ On the point of Lucian’s lies to unveil the 
falsehood of historians see also Ní-Mhellaigh (2009). 
127 Luc. VH 28. 
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historians like Ctesias of Cnidus and Herodotus, who receive the most severe 
punishment, and all because of the many lies that they have told through their 
writing. As Lucian has never told any lies, he is confident for his future.128 In 
this way, the Hermotimus might be read in the same way as the True Stories, that 
is as a text that attacks political fiction by creating fiction and utopia by 
parodying utopia.129  
 Perhaps the most telling case in point of Lucian’s parody of the metaphor 
of the road and his fiction against the utopian potential of philosophy is the Ship 
or the Wishes, a dialogue in which philosophers are to blame for wishing for 
non-philosophical happiness. One of the principal narrative tricks of this 
dialogue consists in letting the reader know explicitly, and in the very last 
sentence, that Lycinus’ friends are philosophers. In this dialogue, Lycinus, 
Samipus and Adeimantus travel from Athens to the Piraeus to see the 
monstrous corn-ship, The Isis, clearly a symbol of mercantile wealth, which has 
just arrived from Egypt.130 Once there, a Platonic philosopher, with the Platonic 
name of Adeimantus, gets lost amid a crowd of spectators.131 Meanwhile, 
Lycinus and Samipus encounter Timolaus, an insatiable sightseer 
(φιλοθεάμων) who just like them has come from Corinth to marvel at the 
vessel. In this first part of the dialogue we see a typically Lucianic philosophical 
quarrel as Samipus attacks Adeimantus claiming that he must have gotten lost 
as a result of following a young Egyptian boy. But it is Lycinus who fuels the 
discussion when he says that such a fact is unlikely since Adimantus is 
particularly popular among young and good looking Athenian boys, and not 
brown skinned Egyptians.132 Such physical features would deem the Egyptian 
boy unappealing, until Timolaus then explainns to Lycinus he is a noble 
                                                          
128 Luc. VH 32. 
129 Bowersock (1994), 2-7. 
130 Houston, 1986 thinks that it is not upon literary materlial that Lucian describes the 
monstruous size of the Isis, but on the realistic features of ships.   
131 Plat . Rep. 327 c The son of Murrinos Pl Symp. 176d. 
132 Luc. Nav.1-5 
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Egyptian, and therefore such physical attraction is justified in terms of power. 
The philosophers then begin a discussion of the τέχνη of the ship’s captain 
Heron, whom they deem not only to be wiser than Proteus in matters of the 
sea,133 but also useful and somebody with whom it is worth being associated134 
in nautical emergencies.135 Lycinus, however, remains unimpressed by the 
deeds of the captain and his skill, and uses his own paideutic skills to relativise 
the image of the wise old man who is an expert in some skill: Heron must be a 
wonderful captain, equal in age and a ‘comrade’ of Nereus, if he so completely 
lost his way.136 In a similar way to the Hermotimus, here Lycinus adopts the role 
of an awakener of dreams and a dissipater of impossible wishes as embodied in 
his character as the pirate or murderer at sea (καταποντιστῆς).137  
 The next section of the dialogue begins when Lycinus finds Adeimantus, 
distracted as he ruminates on a matter of concern in his mind.138 On being asked 
by Lycinus what he is thinking, Adeimantus first says that it is not something of 
importance (οὐδέν χαλεπόν) and nothing but just an empty thought (τις κένη 
ἔννοια). However, the charm of such a thought is powerful enough to make 
him deaf to Lycinus’ call as he concentrates so intently upon it.139 Embarrassed 
of his non-philosophical manner Adeimantus does not want to tell his friends 
the cause of this distraction,140 but after being pushed by Lycinus who suggests 
that he must have been consumed by an erotic thought,141 he confesses that he is 
in fact imagining a non-philosophical kind of happiness. He is, he claims, 
dreaming of wealth, and that which the majority calls an ‘empty bliss’, and 
indeed he has been caught at the peak of this vision of abundance and 
                                                          
133 θαυμάσιος τὴν τέχνην Luc. Nav. 7. 
134 Luc. Nav. 8. 
135 Luc. Nav 9-10. 
136 Luc. Nav. 6-10. 
137 Luc. Nav .14 
138 Luc. Nav. 11 
139 ἐποίησεν ἀτενὲς πρὸς αὐτὴν ἅπαντι τῷ λογισμῷ ἀποβλέποντα. Luc. Nav. 11 
140 αἰσχύνομαι ἔγωγε εἰπεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς, Luc. Nav. 11 
141 μῶν ἐρωτικόν ἐστιν; Luc. Nav. 11  
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luxuriousness.142 The trigger of his thought about the happy life he might have 
derives from him having heard that the income of the ship is of at least twelve 
Attic talents a year.143 If only a god could give him such a ship then he would 
become the envy of passengers and the terror of the crew, who would consider 
him to be almost a king.144 But now Lycinus has woken him from his dream and 
he thinks of his sunken wealth rather differently: his dream only just started 
when his ship was blown by the fair wind of his desire.145 It is in this way that 
the Ship or the Wishes leads to follow a competition of wishes between 
Adeimantus, Timolaus and Samipus, in which each participant is allowed to 
ask the gods for whatever they want (infinite riches, infinite imperial power 
and divinity).146 But philosophers will only be able to create their utopia by 
enacting one of the physical aspects that characterize philosophers best, in this 
case: walking from Piraeus to Athens, engaged in a conversation that distracts 
them from the effort of the journey and at the same time is enjoyable in itself.  
 Because there are four interlocutors in this particular dialogue, Timolaus 
proposes that they imagine their journey as if it consisted of four roads.147 In the 
same way as those philosophers who wonder about the perfect society and the 
perfect life, the enjoyment of the exercise consists in being ensnared by a 
pleasant dream of their own choosing.148  They are encouraged to desire things 
even if they are physically impossible to acquire149 and throughout the dialogue 
Lycinus goes on to tear down each one of their empty wishes, with thewarning 
                                                          
142 τινα πλοῦτον ἐμαυτῷ ἀνεπλαττόμην, ἣν κενὴν μακαρίαν οἱ πολλοὶ καλοῦσιν, καί μοι ἐν 
ἀκμῇ τῆς περιουσίας καὶ τρυφῆς ἐπέστητε, Luc. Nav. 11 
143 ὡς εὐδαίμονα βίον ἐπεβίωσα, Luc. Nav 13 
144 Luc. Nav 13. 
145 Luc. Nav. 13 
146 In particular Hermes, the god of profit, Luc. Nav. 17; gods that can do anything, even that 
which seems to be extraordinary, τὰ μέγιστα εἶναι δοκοῦντα 28; cf Luc. Nav. 42. 
147 τετραχῆ τὴν ὁδὸν Luc. Nav. 16. Adeimantus, Samipus (17-27), Timolaus (37-45) 
148 οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἡμᾶς ὅ τε κάματος λάθοι καὶ ἅμα εὐφρανούμεθα ὥσπερ ἡδίστῳ ὀνείρατι 
ἑκουσίῳ περιπεσόντες, ἐφ’ ὅσον βουλόμεθα, εὖ ποιήσοντι ἡμᾶς· παρ’ αὐτῷ γὰρ ἑκάστῳ 
ἔστω τὸ μέτρον τῆς εὐχῆς, Luc Nav. 16 
149 τῇ φύσει ἀπίθανα ἔσται Luc. Nav. 16 
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that he will not be envious of common riches,150 and that he will sober them up 
from their dreams.151  When Lycinus is asked to make his own wish he answers 
straight away that he does not need one, they have reached the Dipylon, and 
now that the philosophers have been woken from the sweetest of dreams, they 
too must, like actors that play the part of kings on a stage, starve, be upset and 
be sad. Just like Icarus, the higher the philosophers are carried away, the harder 
they will hit the ground. And yet, for Lycinus, it was enough to laugh at all the 
things they had wished for, ‘even more because you praise (this) philosophy’.152 
 This last speech of Lycinus in the Ship gives the dialogue a closed ending, 
which enables it to be interpreted more easily than the ending of the 
Hermotimus and aims towards a parody of the metaphor of the road. Whilst in 
the Ship Lycinus uses metaphors and allegories to defeat the false pretentions of 
philosophers, who behave like the majority of the people, in the Hermotimus we 
see Lycinus behaving better and according to a philosophical code of behaviour 
that has, at its core, the Socratic’ elenchus and irony, but not Socratic lifestyle. 
Lycinus’ search for truth appears to expose the impossibility of all wishes to 
become eudaimon in any way other than that which follows ‘common sense’ and 
is in accordance with ‘things as they are’.  
                                                          
150 Luc Nav. 17. 
151 ἐγὼ δὲ νήφειν ᾤμην καὶ σοὶ ὕπαρ ἀποφανεῖσθαι τὴν γνώμην, Luc. Nav. 35. There exist 
other readings of this section. I follow here MacLeod’s edition. The manuscripts say καὶ οὐ 
παρὰ τὸ φανεῖσθαι. This is Bekker’s emmendation. Jacobitz reads οὐ παραποφανεῖσθαι τὴν 
γνώμην.  
152 Luc. Nav. 46. 
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Chapter 7 
Perplexity as Lucian’s aesthetic Aim 
 
This study of the parody of Platonic motives has attempted to demonstrate that 
the Hermotimus is an invitation to think critically about the rhetoric of 
philosophy, and in particular about the rhetoric of the model of all 
philosophers, represented by the figure of Socrates.  In this sense, as much as 
the dialogue can be considered philosophical, it can also be read as an attempt 
at ὆ητορικὴ φιλοσοφοῦσα.1 By focusing on the parodic procedures of the 
Hermotimus it is possible to demonstrate that Lucian is able to blur the artificial 
differences between rhetoric and philosophy. Importantly, it is a text that also 
shows that Lucian’s interest lies in using irony as a means to make his readers 
think about the ways in which classical philosophical texts can be read, and to 
emphasise the different ways in which these texts are ‘classically’ used in 
exhortations to philosophy. Indeed, it is not just the parody of Platonic themes 
that is entertaining in the Hermotimus, the text also offers itself as an invitation 
to the reader to question fundamentally the ways in which classical and 
contemporary protreptic and apotreptic arguments function, and the ways in 
which an aporetic dialogue can be used to deliver a clear moral message. 
However, in order to understand better how the Hermotimus can be read as a 
parody of protreptic literature, let us look at the ways in which this dialogue 
can be read as a parody of protreptic arguments through the specific example of 
the Tabula of Cebes. Illustrated here will be the ways in which the Hermotimus 
parodies not only protreptic literature but aporetic dialogues too in order to 




                                                          
1 Phil. Vit. Soph. Praef. 1. 
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1. The Parody of Protreptic Discourse 
 
In the course of rejecting rhetorical display (ἐπίδειξις) as a way of persuading 
the crowds to join philosophy, Epictetus, a Stoic philosopher and contemporary 
of Lucian, mentions three different philosophical styles. The first implies 
exhortation (προτρεπτικός), the second refutation (ἐλεγκτικός) and the third 
implies instruction (διδασκαλικός). These three styles are related to Diogenes 
the Cynic, Socrates, and Zeno of Citium.2 Epictetus considers rhetorical display 
to be illsuited to him and his students as it appears to be frivolous and 
indulgent. The other three styles have the potential to make the reader 
uncomfortable by showing him that his consideration of that which is truly 
worth pursuing is wrong. As is well known, the Socratic method of inquiry or 
elenchos often takes the conversation to an aporia.  
The aim of protreptic literature is to orientate the reader towards the 
philosophical life,3 in order to convert him to philosophy.4 However, the 
different schools of philosophy disagreed about the nature of virtue and, 
therefore, each philosophical persuasion prescribed different dogmas on how to 
live a virtuous life that would lead to absolute human fulfilment. How to make 
oneself virtuous and therefore eudaimon was the main preoccupation of the 
philosophical schools of Lucian’s time.  
The surviving philosophical protreptic literature of the second century is 
the result of the proselitizing activities of philosophers and intellectuals. 
Perhaps Parmenides’ poem is the first example we have of a philosophical 
protreptic discourse. Although each school of philosophy possessed a canon of 
philosophical works appropriate for its own proselitizing purposes, all the 
                                                          
2 Epict. Diss. 2.13.14; 3.23.32; 3.24.38; 3.26.23 with Long (2002), 74-89 and 57. 
3 For a definition of protreptic literature see Slings (1994), 59-60. 
4 For the topic of conversion to philosophy see Nock (1933), 164-186; (1939). His opinions about 
Lucian and about Apuleius should at times be read and interpreted with care. See also Winkler 
(1985) and Schäublin (1985). 
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schools were able to borrow from the protreptic material available in the 
writings about Socrates. These were chiefly found in Plato’s Apology, and some 
sections of the Euthydemus, though perhaps the most influential protreptic text 
in Lucian’s time was the Platonic Alcibiades I. Aristotle also wrote a Protrepticus, 
which in all probability was one of the classics of protreptic literature. 
Furthermore, some protreptic undertones are found in Epicurus’ letters,5 and 
the proem in Lucretius’ On the Nature of Things is in many ways an exhortation 
to join Epicurean philosophy. Marcus Aurelius mentions a fragment of 
Menander which claims that all is vanity (τῦφον εἶναι πᾶν ἔφη) in reference to 
the opinions of Monimus of Syracuse who was a pupil of Diogenes the Cynic 
and a follower of Crates, who also wrote a Protrepticus.6 Diogenes Laertius 
corrects Menander’s mockery of the philosopher by saying that he was very 
grave (ἐμβριθέστατος), always despised opinion and only cared for truth. 
However, Diogenes Laertius also says that Monimus’ Protrepticus, and his other 
text On Impulses (Περὶ ὁρμῶν) were entertainment (παίγνια) and were mixed 
with hidden seriousness (σπουδῇ λεληθυίᾳ μεμιγμένα).7 Monimus is also 
credited with some of the Letters of Pseudo-Diogenes, in which the method to 
reach eudaimonia is compared to a road.8 It is hard to tell whether Monimus’ 
Protrepticus was an exhortation to live the Cynic life, or a parody of 
philosophical discourses and perhaps even of all education. However, the 
information that we do have about Monimus should push us to consider that 
readers in the second century may have been prepared to read parodies of 
protreptic discourses owing to the existence of other texts, such as the Pseudo-
Platonic Clitophon, which were a parody of protreptic literature. 
Although Epictetus considered that the protreptic style was a genre 
almost exclusive to philosophy, the famous doctor Galen wrote a Protrepticus, 
                                                          
5 D.L. 10. 122. 
6 Men. 249 Kock; Marc. Aur. Med. II. 15.  
7 D. L. 6. 82-83. 
8 Epist. 38, 39.  
 164 
and in the Affections and Errors of the Soul tells us that he studied all philosophies 
before becoming a doctor.9 Other good examples of protreptic literature of the 
period are Clement of Alexandria’s Exhortation to the Greeks, in which he tries to 
persuade the Greeks to abandon paganism and to adopt Christianity, and the 
Tabula of Cebes. The Tabula is a dialogue that promises to rescue whoever pays 
attention to its message, by offering him the possibility of becoming wise and 
happy by taking him to ‘true education’. Finally, the Letter of Mara Bar-Serapion 
can be taken as a further example of protreptic literature in Syriac.10  
In spite of Epictetus’ effort to distinguish between rhetorical epideictic 
literature and protreptic literature as a form of exhortation to philosophy, 
protreptic discourses were close to epideictic counselling and advice (parainesis, 
sumboulê), and vituperation (psogos). Attacking other philosophical sects was 
also part of praising one’s own philosophical standpoint and Plutarch is one of 
the best examples of this two-fold practice. In praising Platonism and defending 
it from other philosophical sects, he produced many works that showed 
contempt for Epicurean philosophy (Against Colotes, Is the Saying "Live in 
Obscurity" Right?) and others which were directed against the Stoics (On Stoic 
Self-Contradictions, Against the Stoics on Common Conceptions). However, in many 
of his dialogues Plutarch also sought to persuade his readers of particular 
philosophical aspects, and in particular to study philosophy (On Listening to 
Lectures).  
As noted by Bompaire, Schwartz and Jones, the Hermotimus appears to 
be a parody of the metaphor of the road and the ascent to true Paideia as it 
appears in the Tabula of Cebes.11 Not only does Lucian make an explicit parody 
                                                          
9 Gal. Aff. Dig. 1.8 (= Kühn 5.41-42). 
10 The text can be found in Cureton (1855), 70-76. Merz and Tieleman (2007).  
11 Jones (1985), 79, 24-25, 153; See Nesselrath (2005), 45-47. For the Tabula of Cebes in general see 
the commentary by Hirsch-Luipold et all (2005), and Trapp (1997). All the following translations 
of the Tabula of Cebes come from Fitzgerald and White (1983). For a summary of the content and 
structure of the text see Squire and Grethlein (2014) Fitzgerald and White’s commentary (1983), 
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of the Tabula in On Salaried Posts in Great Houses but the metaphor of the road is 
also prominent in the Rhetorum Praeceptor. One might furthermore find 
resonances of the text in the Heracles and the Charon or the Observers.12 This 
evidence, in my opinion, deems it probable that in spite of all the other 
references to the metaphor of the road, Lucian must have had the Tabula in 
mind when he wrote the Hermotimus. To date, however, a study of what the 
implications of this might be has yest to be carried out in great detail. 
 
2. The Comparison of the Tabula of Cebes and the Hermotimus 
 
To read the Tabula alongside the Hermotimus is to strengthen the hypothesis that 
Lucian had the former in mind whilst writing the later. Direct comparison 
between these two texts reveals how the Hermotimus presents a critical response 
to protreptic discourses and teaches different ways of reading and exploiting 
the common themes and variations of the topics of dogmatic thinkers.  
The Tabula of Cebes begins (1-3) with a group of visitors (περιπατοῦντες) 
who arrive at the temple of Cronus and find, among other offerings set up in 
the precinct, a tablet that depicts in an unusual visual form peculiar fables (ἦν 
γραφὴ ξένη τις καὶ μύθους ἔχουσα ἰδίους). The visitors discuss with one other 
for a long time the possible meaning of the fable (Ἀπορούντων οὖν ἡμῶν περὶ 
τῆς μυθολογίας πρὸς ἀλλήλους πολὺν χρόνον) until an old man who is 
standing nearby tells them that it is common to be perplexed (ἀποροῦντες) by 
the painting, and that indeed not even the local inhabitants are able to 
                                                                                                                                                                          
9-11, and Trapp (1997), 5-6, which contains an updated bibliography. In some respects my 
reading of the Tabula is similar to Elsner’s (1995), 17-20.  
12 Charon compares himself with Protesilaos, the first Achaean to die in Troy, who was later 
resuscitated for three hours or one day. He goes to the over-world in order to understand why 
it is that  everyone  who crosses the boundaries of death sheds at least one tear, and to see 
everything in life although Hermes will show only the most important things. This appears as a 
transgression to Zeus’ and Hades’ rule, but it is nevertheless permitted, because Charon had 
asked for the permission of Hades, and because Charon and Hermes are not attacking heaven 
when piling up the mountains to reach a ‘point of epiphany’. See also Hom. Od. 11. 305-320.  
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understand it. The old man then offers his services to interpret its meaning. As 
he explains to the visitors, he is able to explain the plaque because as a young 
man, he met and marvelled (καὶ ἐθαύμασά γε) at its creator, a venerable old 
man, who at the time spoke of serious things (σπουδαῖα διελέγετο), and was of 
‘exceptional wisdom, who was emulating in word and deed a Pythagorean and 
Parmenidean way of life’. This last comment is important, as even if there exists 
disagreement between scholars about the affiliation of the author of the Tabula 
of Cebes, it is clear that the content of the painting of which the old man speaks 
is philosophical, and that he is able to interpret it as a philosopher. In this way, 
the critiques of literature are done from the perspective of philosophy.  
The visitors are keen to hear the insights of the old man but then he 
warns them that:  
 
The explanation of the painting carries an element of danger 
*<+ if you pay attention and understand what is said, you will 
be wise and happy. If, on the other hand, you do not, you will 
fare badly in life *<+ for the explanation is similar to the riddle 
that the Sphinx used to pose to men: if someone understood it 
he was spared, but if he did not understand he was destroyed 
by the Sphinx. It is just the same in the case of this explanation. 
You see, for mankind, Foolishness is the Sphinx. Foolishness 
speaks in riddles of these things: of what is good, what is bad, 
and what is neither good nor bad in life. Thus if anyone does 
not understand these things he is destroyed by her, not all at 
once, as a person devoured by the Sphinx died. Rather he is 
destroyed little by little, throughout his entire life, just like 
those who are handed over by retribution. But if one does 
understand, Foolishness is in turn destroyed, and he himself is 
saved and is blessed and happy in his whole life.13  
 
The old man’s words charge the visitors with a great enthusiasm (εἰς μεγαλήν 
τὶνα ἐπυθυμίαν ἐμβέβληκας ἡμᾶς), and they beg him to be quick in his 
                                                          
13 Tab. 3. 
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explanation which they in turn will pay attention to.14 The allegoric narration 
depicts an entire journey through the good and bad choices of human life and 
the different paths that these choices lead to. For the purpose of this chapter it is 
not necessary to summarize the entire journey but only to draw attention to the 
role of literature (Γράμματα) in the Tabula of Cebes in relation to Education and 
Happiness. 15  
Literature is an activity of the lovers of False Education, who ‘have been 
deceived into thinking that they are consorting with true Paideia’. Its members 
are ‘poets, orators, dialecticians, musicians, mathematicians, geometricians, 
literary critics, hedonists, peripatetics and all others like them’.16 The Daimon, 
scroll in hand, points to those who are about to be inducted into Life (οἱ 
μελλόντες εἰσπορεύεσθαι εἰς τὸν βίον) and the path they must follow if they 
are to be saved.17 But the role of literature is not crucial to achieve True 
Education.18 In fact ‘Literature and those other studies which even Plato said 
have for youth the force of a bridle, so that they are not diverted to different 
pursuits’ are useful to advance more quickly along the journey to True 
Education,19 but it is possible to advance without them. What we have in our 
hands, of course, is not a tablet, but a book with Socratic and Platonic 
borrowings, a literary piece, and hence it is a self-referencing as it explains both 
the usefulness and the limits of interpreting the Tabula of Cebes. That this is a 
self-referencing becomes even clearer when the old man refers to the role of 
                                                          
14 See also the exhortation at Tab.Ceb. 4 Οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις τοίνυν διηγούμενος ὡς ἡμῶν 
προσεξόντων οὐ παρέργως, ἐπείπερ καὶ τὸ ἐπιτίμιον τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν and the passage already 
quoted in which Hermotimus first gives his life options in Herm. 1 and Lycinus’ excitement to 
join him in Luc Herm. 13 ‘I might also start my journey from here and join yours later’. See also 
in this chapter the concession to ask questions of the Hermotimus and in the Tab. 33. 
15 Tab. 12-29. 
16 Tab.  13. These activities represent the seven liberal arts comprising of the ἐγκύκιλιος παιδεία 
or ἐγκύκιλιος μαθήματα, cf. Marrou (1956) 243-255, p. 527-530, quoted in Fitzgerald and White 
(1983) 146, where is also explained the preference for  the term κριτικοί instead of γραμματικοί; 
see also Marrou (1937), 216 n. 3. 
17 Tab. 4. 
18 Tab. 33. 
19 Idem. 
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interpreters: ‘just as we sometimes gather what is said from an interpreter, 
nevertheless it is useful to know the language ourselves to understand more 
accurately. In the same way then, nothing prevents one from becoming better 
even without these lessons’.20 The learned (μαθηματικοί) have no advantage 
over the rest of mankind, because one can know literature and the rest of the 
disciplines (οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει εἰδέναι μὲν γράμματα καὶ κατέχειν τὰ 
μαθήματα πάντα) and at the same not know the true nature of good and evil. 
The visitors agree that one might come across many people like that.21 
The limits of the exegetic role of the old man, the instructions on how to 
use the book, and the limits of the benefits of reading it are conclusively 
underlined in the concluding chapter. Even if the story has come to an end, the 
visitor is still lacking: 
 
That habit by which you might adopt this very disposition of 
soul. Therefore, throughout your course of life strive to put into 
practice these things which I have briefly set before you, so that 
my words may be etched on your minds and become a habit in 
you. However, if you are still perplexed about anything, return 
to me that I may give you an explanation that will dispel your 
doubts.22 
 
This ending of the Tabula of Cebes establishes a new relationship with the reader 
as he adopts the role of the visitor and the text becomes the guide. The reader 
must trust its content, for which reason he is invited to come back to the The 
Tabula of Cebes. To this extent it offers an exegesis of a μυθολογία, nevertheless, 
it is only in this way that that the visitor-reader is released from perplexity, 
since in order to be completely saved from False Education he will need time to 
practice the teachings. In the Tabula the reader, like the visitor, trusts the old 
man’s exegesis of the tablet, and hence trusts the book.  
                                                          
20 idem. 
21 Tab. 34. 
22 Tab. 42. 
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Early in the Hermotimus the relationship between guide and guided, 
expert and inexpert, is inverted.23 Lycinus defeats Hermotimus by subverting 
his understanding of philosophy on his own terms. However, because Lycinus 
plays the role of a philosopher, his counterargument is also self-deceiving and 
the reader therefore is highly aware of the sarcastic tone at the end of the 
dialogue. Hermotimus has not been rescued, but drowned in his own life 
alternatives. Those readers who think Lycinus serious, and do not realise the 
sarcasm find themselves at the end of the text reduced to perplexity. In the 
Tabula of Cebes, Deceit leads man astray and makes people drink from error and 
ignorance before entering life.24 On reaching life only those who arrive first at 
Repentance,25 go from there to Education and, ‘are purified and have cast all the 
evils they possess such as opinion, ignorance and the rest [and] will be saved. 
But those remaining here with False Education will never be freed, nor will any 
evil leave them as a result of these lessons’.26 The reader of the Hermotimus, on 
the other hand, has to prove himself a true pepaideumenos or an educated 
member of the elite so that he might know to laugh and therefore be released 
from perplexity. We should be wary to think that this means that the 
Hermotimus is nothing more than banal entertainment as not only does the logos 
of the Hermotimus have the exact opposite effect to the exegesis of the 
μυθολογία, but also the reader of the Hermotimus is challenged to perform the 
right exegesis of the logos. The seriousness and wit of Lucian’s dialogue invite 
the reader to consider the positive values which are proposed in the course of a 
work whose philosophical imagery, language and topic of choice and moral 
progress are crucial both to the members of other schools of philosophy and to 
others writing protreptic literature, and which are rooted in earlier 
                                                          
23 Luc. Herm. 13, 21.  
24 Tab. 6. 
25 Tab. 11. 
26 Tab. 14. 
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philosophical thought. There is a philosophical side to the comedy of the 
Hermotimus that is not prescriptive but literary. 
Lastly, as in the Hermotimus, distrust is an essential critical skill for the 
ascent to True Education. The recommendations of the Daimon for the ascent to 
True Education are to have confidence,27 and to be indifferent to the gifts of 
Fortune and ‘not to place any trust in that woman, neither to regard whatsoever 
one might receive from her as safe or secure, nor to consider it private 
property.’28 While this book inspires confidence, trust, and even distrust in 
Fortune, in the Hermotimus Lycinus’ unclear and unsettling intentions prompt 
the reader to extend distrust towards the text itself.   
We can compare this hunt for false philosophers with the literary 
strategies of the Hermotimus. Lucian has inverted the relationship between the 
exegesis of a μυθολογία, the trust in the old exegete, the distrust for Fortune 
and ultimately the salvation of the reader as it appears in the Tabula of Cebes. In 
the Hermotimus the old teacher and all other philosophers are untrustworthy, 
since it is impossible that even they know whether they have arrived at the 
summit of Virtue. On the other hand, Lycinus presents himself as an inverted 
Socrates, who has in his hands the power of the elenchus and Sceptic modes of 
argument. However, unlike the old exegete of the Tabula of Cebes, Lycinus gives 
to his reader every indication not to trust his own persuasion and it is therefore 
at this point that the reader must come back to the Hermotimus in order to 




                                                          
27 Θαρρεῖν, ἔφη. διὸ καὶ ὑμεῖς θαρρεῖτε·, Tab. 31; cf. Luc. Herm. 4: ἀλλἀ θαρρεῖν χρῆ καὶ 
θυμὀν ἔχειν ἀγαθὸν ἐς τὸ τέλος τῆς ὁδοῦ ὁρῶντα καὶ τὴν ἄνω εὐδαιμονίαν.  
28 μὴ πιστεύειν καὶ βέβαιον μηδὲν νομίζειν μηδὲ ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι, ὅ τι ἂν παρ’ αὐτῆς τις λάβῃ 
μηδὲ ὡς ἴδια ἡγεῖσθαι. In this same chapter the recommendation of the Daimon is not to be 
surprised at whatever she does (διὰ τοῦτο οὖν τὸ Δαιμόνιον κελεύει μὴ θαυμάζειν), Tab. 31. 
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3. Lucian’s Pun on Academics, Pyrrhonists and Stoics Ending in Aporia. 
 
In this chapter, we have seen how the Hermotimus is modelled upon classical 
Platonic themes and situations such as the Socratic pursuit of virtue, the 
denunciation of sophists and tyrants, and even the Socratic method itself. The 
main characters of Lycinus and Hermotimus are parodies of Socrates and the 
opsimath and the Hermotimus is therefore a caricature made out of Platonic 
themes. However, this Platonic dialogue is designed to invite the reader to 
philosophize, even if it fails to produce absolute conclusions. In this sense, the 
Platonic aporetic dialogues are also protreptic. And yet, unlike Socrates who 
often commits himself to providing positive ideas, the Lucianic character is an 
outsider to philosophical problems, and does not commit to the advancement of 
theories or to proposing solutions. The design of the form of the Hermotimus 
does not enhance knowledge but what Lucian does do is highliting its 
philosophical potential thereby encouraging his readers to rethink the possible 
ways in which classical philosophical texts can be used as rhetoric. In this sense, 
the Hermotimus helps its attentive reader to think critically about philosophic 
literature and its rhetoric. The Lucianic dialogues are not, however, protreptic, 
and the Lucianic heroes do not experience aporia. For this reason, before moving 
into the next section it is important to stop and reconsider the function of aporía 
in relation to Lucianic comedy. 
In the Hermotimus Lucian combines two philosophical genres (aporetic 
literature and protreptic literature), which on the surface appear incompatible, 
and thereby creates a mixture whose end is not only to entertain, but also, as 
has shown, to provide the tools to think about how these two genres function. 
In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 it was argued that due to the different comic 
procedures in the Hermotimus any reader is capable of distinguishing between 
Lycinus’ apotreptic logos and the irony of the proposal to live like everyone else. 
Therefore, to understand how the Hermotimus invites readers to think critically 
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about aporetic texts it is necessary to understand how aporía is, for Lucian, an 
aesthetic end in its own right. 
Primarily, Lycinus not getting anywhere with his argument and 
Hermotimus’ descent to the life of laymen seem to match Lucian’s satirizing of 
the Pyrrhonists and Academics and their inability to reach happiness. In the 
introduction to Lucian’s other long work, the True Story, we are told that only 
laymen would believe the content of the book, just in the same way that they 
would believe Odysseus’ stories.29 But the narrator adds that the only truth 
contained in the two books is that everything in them is a lie.30 One of these 
stories tells of the time in which Lucian and his companions arrived at the Isles 
of the Blessed. Here they were told that none of the Stoics had arrived yet as 
they were still trying to get there; and that none of the Academics had arrived 
either, as even though they had wanted to come, they were still investigating 
and suspending their judgment (ἐπέχειν δὲ ἔτι καὶ διασκέπτεσθαι), and could 
not agree on whether such an island existed or not.31 The narrator’s opinion, 
however, is that:  
 
Academics feared Rhadamanthys’ judgment, because they 
themselves had abolished standards of judgment. Though it 
was said that many of them had set out to follow those who 
were coming, but through slowness they couldn’t keep up, and 
so fell behind and turned back halfway.’32  
                                                          
29 Luc VH 1. 3 The following translations are by Costa (2005), 203-233. 
30 Luc. VH. 1. 4. For a recent commentary of this work see Gergiadou and Larmour (1998). The 
entries to this topic, however, can go into much more depth. Strategies that debunk the 
credibility of the authority of the main voice also occur in Lucian’s introductory speeches. 
Unlike in dialogues, in a speech the reader is much more tempted to believe that because the 
narration is in the first person singular, then it must be the author’s –in this case Lucian’s- voice 
who speaks, and therefore that the words contained in its discourse are sincere. See Hösle 
(2006), 136-152 who suggests that to find an authorial intention in an author who writes 
dialogues, one must compare them with prose in the first person singular. Yet as in the case of 
the introduction of A True History, Lucian does enjoy creating neither wholly reliable nor 
wholly unreliable voice in the first person singular. The About the Dipsades is yet another good 
example of this strategy.  
31 Luc. VH 2. 18. 
32 Luc. VH 2. 19. 
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The lies contained in the novel are not only there for the sake of entertainment. 
Just like for athletes relaxation is the most important part of their training, so it 
is for intellectuals:  
 
It would be suitable recreation for them to occupy themselves 
with the kind of reading which not only affords simple 
diversion derived from elegance and wit, but also supplies 
some intellectual food for thought –just the qualities I think 
they will find in these works of mine.33  
 
What we might draw from the comparison with A True Story is that in the 
characterisation of the Hermotimus, the Stoic, and Lycinus the Sceptic-like 
philosopher, we find a variation of the joke about Stoics, Academics and 
Pyrrhonists. Furthermore, this tells us a great deal about the special type of 
entertainment, of which Lucian’s literature was a part, which includes a kind of 
θεωρίαν οὐκ ἄμουσον, even if it is not oriented towards truth. The reader will 
be attracted by the exotic subject matter, the seductiveness of the purpose of the 
text, and its various lies which are persuasively and plausibly realised (ὅτι 
ψεύσματα ποικίλα πιθανῶς τε καὶ ἐναλήθως ἐξενηνόχαμεν), and which 
contain allusions to various poets, philosophers and historians.  
Academics and Pyrrhonists unable to make up their minds, appear 
elsewhere in Lucian. The Academic or Pyrrhonist in the Symposium stares at the 
dispute between an Epicurean and a Stoic and involuntarily ridicules himself 
by cooling down the quarrel.34 In the Sale of Lives, the Pyrrhonist doubts his own 
existence, causing perplexity (ὢ τῆς ἀπορίας) in his buyer who later thinks that 
the philosophical life is βραδύς and νωθής. The buyer also asks him what is the 
                                                          
33  Luc VH 1.2. 
34  See Luc. Symp. 39, 43. 
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aim of his philosophical knowledge (ἀλλὰ τί σοι τὸ τέλος τῆς ἐπιστάσεως;) to 
which he answers: ἡ ἀμαθία καὶ τὸ μήτε ἀκούειν μήτε ὁρᾶν.35 In Icaromenippus  
 
two men offered conflicting prayers and promised equal 
sacrifices, so he *Zeus+ didn’t know (ἀποροῦντα) which one to 
favour, and found himself in the predicament of the 
Academics: he couldn’t come to a decision, so, like Pyrrho, he 
put it off while he pondered the matter’.36  
 
As in A True Story, the Icaromenippus also shows us how Lucian can make his 
main character and his apparent porte-parole suspicious, even when he is trying 
to solve an ἀπορία. In this dialogue, an anonymous friend meets Menippus, 
who tells him that he has just arrived from an extraordinary voyage. In trying to 
establish the dimensions and the composition of the cosmos Menippus sought 
the help of philosophers37 who, however, only chattered about it, and threw in 
his direction their unsolvable puzzles, which left him in an even greater 
perplexity (εἰς μείζους ἀπορίας) than before.38 The only solution and release 
available to him was to find out for himself, 39 and after grabbing a pair of 
wings, one of an eagle and one of a vulture, he flies from one mountaintop in 
Greece to another, and even ventures a long-distance flight to the moon, which 
is the first stop between Earth and the house of the gods. 
Once on the moon, it is only from the Colossus of Rhodes and the 
lighthouse at Alexandria that Menippus is able to recognize Earth as the tiny 
spot that he sees far off in the distance. Immediately afterwards he claims to see 
the lives of all men and of ‘everything that the earth, the giver of grain, 
nourishes.’40 The anonymous friend notices the contradiction in Menippus’ 
                                                          
35  Luc. Vit. Auct. 27. 
36 Luc. Icar. 25. 
37 καί μοι ἐνταῦθα πολλήν τινα παρεῖχε τὴν ἀπορίαν πρῶτον μὲν αὐτὸς οὗτος ὁ ὑπὸ τῶν 
σοφῶν καλούμενος κόσμος· Luc. Icar. 4. 
38 Luc. Icar. 5. 
39 μίαν δὲ τῆς συμπάσης ἀπορίας ἀπαλλαγὴν ᾤμην ἔσεσθαι, Luc. Icar. 10. 
40 ὁπόσα τρέφει ζείδωρος ἄρουρα, Luc. Icar. 12. Cf. Hom. Il 2, 548, Od 3, 3; 4, 229. 
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narrative. How could he first struggle to recognize the Earth and all of a sudden 
describe it in such detail? To escape the objection, Menippus says that he forgot 
to say the most important thing as whilst unable to see the details of the Earth 
he was greatly perplexed,41 and then, all of a sudden, a lunar daemon, 
Empedocles, came to his aid and told him that all he needed to do was flutter 
his eagle's wing and he would instantly be able to inspect all life on Earth and 
humanities’ follies.42 Following this explanation, the anonymous friend is 
subsequently near-silent for the rest of the text following this explanation, and 
only occasionally soes he encourage Menippus to continue narrating his 
journey to the house of the gods.43 Menippus’ closing tale, which is the climax 
of the dialogue, is ultimately framed by the utter silence of his anonymous 
friend.  
Left with Menippus’ narration as the last word, the reader is invited to 
share the silence of the anonymous friend. From the start of the dialogue the 
friend, and hence, the reader have been amazed by the narration, but have also 
remained suspicious of its veracity.44 They can both sympathize with Menippus’ 
criticism of ridiculous philosophical speculation and pseudo-science as well as 
the follies of humanity. Thet may even support his proposal of going to the 
moon to test the theories about the cosmos. But at the same time how can one 
trust the opinions of a hypernephelos madman, who thinks that he has just 
arrived from the house of the gods, via the cosmos; a claim that is an obvious 
and extraordinary lie as nobody has ever been there before. The open ending of 
the Icaromenippus invites the reader to share the silence of the anonymous 
friend, and to balance and rethink his trust in Menippus’ as well as other 
                                                          
41 καὶ πολλὴν παρεῖχε τὴν ἀπορίαν, Luc. Icar. 13. 
42 Luc. Icar. 12-13. 
43 Luc. Icar. 15, 16, 19. 
44 See Luc Icar. 1: Μὴ θαυμάσῃς, ὦ ἑταῖρε, εἰ μετέωρα καὶ διαέρια δοκῶ σοι λαλεῖν; and the 
invitation to disbelieve in 2: Καὶ μὴν ἐγώ σοι παρ’ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου τοῦ πάνυ Διὸς ἥκω τήμερον 
θαυμάσια καὶ ἀκούσας καὶ ἰδών· εἰ δὲ ἀπιστεῖς, καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὑπερευφραίνομαι τὸ πέρα 
πίστεως εὐτυχεῖν. 
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philosophers’ opinions about the cosmos, regardless of how extraordinary they 
may appear. 
As a matter of fact, it is reasonable to read the epilogue of the Hermotimus 
not only as the aporetic result of the discussions between philosophers, but 
even as a literary challenge to the procedures in one of Plato’s most celebrated 
moments of ‘conversion’. It is much harder to prove that Lucian had this text in 
mind when he wrote the Hermotimus than as in in the case of the Tabula, but 
Alcibiades I was in Lucian’s time one of Plato’s most widely read texts. Indeed, 
in his Prologus, Albinus placed it alongside a list of Platonic dialogues that the 
student of philosophy should read.45 Being a Platonic enthusiast, it is not 
inconceivable that Lucian was aware of the fame of Alcibiades I and therefore by 
extension it is possible to read Hermotimus’ conversion as a parody of that of 
Alcibiades. Whilst in Alcibiades I the reader is left with a ‘conversion’, the 
Hermotimus presents a parody of a real ‘conversion.’ In Alcibiades I, Socrates, a 
mature man, waits for the right occasion to talk to Alcibiades, a noble, rich, 
beautiful and courageous young man.46 Alcibiades wants to be a ruler, but 
Socrates argues that political leadership is a matter of justice and that 
Alcibiades has neither learnt it from teachers nor has he taught it to himself. 
Socrates then promises that in return for his approval, he will teach Alcibiades 
all that he needs in order to know to become a useful politician. Socrates’ 
recommendation is that Alcibiades takes care of himself so that he might rule 
over the Athenians, and excite the envy of Persians and Spartans.47 Taking care 
of oneself is what is needed for good political leadership, but this also requires 
knowledge of what the self is. Alcibiades acknowledges that he needs Socrates’ 
help for this task, at which point Socrates concedes that he is able to teach self-
                                                          
45 See R. Tarrant’s book (2015), 140-141 and in particular 108-140 for the impact of Alcibiades I on 
the academy and Platonists. A good example which proves the fame of Alcibiades I in Lucian’s 
time is Apuleius’ citation of it in Apol. 25. 
46 Plat. Alc. 103a-106a. 
47 Plat. Alc. 119a-124a 
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knowledge.48 At the end of Plato’s Alcibiades I the hope is that Alcibiades will 
return to Socrates, although it is more probable that he will not keep his 
promise. In contrast to Alcibiades, Hermotimus leaves the conversation 
convinced that Lycinus has liberated him from the burden of Stoic philosophy; 
he will convert to the life of a layman. However, the reader is also aware of 
Lycinus’ Socratic-Ironic strategies and suspects that this ‘conversion’ will not 
take place, since the proposal to live like everyone else is not an alternative in 
its own right. 
On the other hand, the Hermotimus and the Icaromenippus might not be 
the only dialogues ending in aporía. In On Pantomime Dancing,49 Lycinus 
discusses the philosophical, literary and cultural value of pantomime with the 
Cynic Craton, for whom pantomime is only an effeminate activity and 
unworthy of the attention of a serious and educated philosopher. His 
discussion is not as logical in this dialogue, but reads as a summoning of 
authorities. Lycinus then makes a long encomium of the art of pantomime, 
which combines entertainment with intellectual challenges, and gives examples 
of mythology, history, literature, and authorities of old.50  It excels in tragedy 
and comedy,51 and involves the rest of the liberal arts.52 The dancer must be 
knowledgable not only of Greek, but of universal culture;53 he must express 
with the body what the orator does with words;54 have ethical knowledge;55 and 
prepare himself both mentally and physically.56 He must also be careful not to 
be considered by others as a false pantomime.57 But, after this magnificent 
                                                          
48 Plat. Alc. 124b-129b. 
49 See Lada Richards (2008), 298-304 for a different approach to the ending of the text. Also see 
the discussion of Petrides (2013), 445-46.  
50 Luc. Salt. 8-25. 
51 Luc. Salt. 26-32. 
52 Luc. Salt. 35-36. 
53 Luc. Salt. 37-61. 
54 Luc. Salt. 62-64. 
55 Luc. Salt. 68-70. 
56 Luc. Salt. 74-78. 
57 Luc. Salt. 80-4. 
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speech, Craton promises to go to a performance and experiences a conversion 
almost with complaints.58 This leaves open the question of whether Lycinus is 
sincerely trying to persuade his interlocutor, or whether he uses his superior 
culture to mock Craton, who will do whatever is necessary, even betraying the 
Cynics, to assert himself as an educated philosopher.  
In this way, one might conclude that the Hermotimus is a longer variation 
of a joke on the Stoics, the Academics and the Pyrrhonists not getting 
anywhere, and furthermore that it is not uncommon for Lucian to end a 
dialogue at an impasse.   
 
4. Perplexity as an aesthetic Aim in Lucian’s Fiction 
 
There is an aesthetic aspect of Lucian’s work that is most important. We have 
seen that the reason that Hermotimus admires his teacher is the same reason 
why he admires Lycinus at the moment of his conversion. However, this 
conclusion is also highly self-ironic for the reader. Just like a philosopher, an 
over-daring poet, a storyteller or mathematician, Lycinus has captured 
Hermotimus with a long philosophical argument that leads to an aporia from 
which he is not able to escape. Hermotimus’ belief that he has been safely 
rescued by Lycinus’ logos is false, and as such it is comparable to belief in 
mythical beasts such as Hippocentaurs, Chimeras and Gorgons. This 
comparison between false beliefs and monsters should not be taken light-
heartedly, for as a matter of fact, it shows Lucian’s own aesthetic interest in 
creating aporetic literary situations. 
Hippocentaurs are a perplexing presence in all three of Lucian’s works in 
which they appear (Twice Indicted, Zeuxis and To one who said you’re a Prometheus 
in Words). Their effect is always in relation to Lucian’s great achievement of 
mixing comedy and dialogue. In Twice Indicted, Dialogue prosecutes the Syrian 
                                                          
58 Luc. Salt. 85. 
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for forcing him to climb down from his lofty Platonic pretensions and for 
putting him at the same level as the majority (ἰσοδίαιτον τοῖς πολλοῖς 
ἐποίησεν). He also accuses him of changing his tragic mask into a comic, satiric 
and ridiculous one, and complains that 
 
He kept me locked up with Jest, Lampoon, Cynicism, Eupolis 
and Aristophanes, men terribly skilled at mocking what is holy 
and scorning what is right. And at last he even unearthed 
Menippus, one of the Cynics of old, who looks like a real biter 
with sharp teeth; he brought against me that really dreadful 
dog with his furtive bite, who grins as he bites. Haven’t I been 
terribly offended, when I no longer play my own proper part, 
but I’m a comedian and a buffoon and act out bizarre roles for 
him? What is most extraordinary of all, I have been turned into 
a baffling mixture and I neither walk prosaically on foot nor 
ride proudly on metre, but seem to be something made up in 
the manner of a Hippocentaur, and a strange mirage to my 
listeners.59 
 
In the case of Twice Indicted Lucian uses the image of Hippocentaurs to talk 
about the effect that the prose and verse in the dialogue have on the listeners, 
but this effect, I believe, should not be separated from the aesthetics of his 
literary composition, which even if novel, also possess a formal control and 
sense of tradition.60  
In the dialogue entitled Zeuxis or Antiochus we find a similar situation in 
which Lucian complains about the students that praise him, when they say in 
relation to him such things as ‘Oh what novelty, by Heracles, what a use of 
paradox. How creative! The sprightliness of his thought finds no comparison!’61 
For Lucian such high prise represents a distraction from the real appeal that his 
texts should have: 
                                                          
59 Luc. Bis Acc. 33. 
60 See Camerotto, (2009). See Halliwell’s (2008), 432-436 excellent discussion of this chapter of 
the Twice Indicted in relation to Lucian’s comedy. 
61 Luc. Zeux. 1.  
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So for them the only charm of my works lies in the fact that 
they are unfamiliar and that they keep off the beaten track, but 
when it comes to fine phrasing in them and its composition in 
accordance with the ancient canon or intellectual sharpness or 
an element of subtlety, or Attic grace, or harmony, or overall 
craftsmanship, my work is perhaps far from all these.62 
 
Lucian knows that, just as Homer says, ‘it is the new song that delights an 
audience’ (τὴν νέαν Ὠδὴν κεχαρισμένην ὑπάρχειν τοῖς ἀκούουσιν), although 
for him it is other qualities of his work and not its novelty that his readers 
should really admire:  
 
As a result I was being excessively puffed up and I took the 
risk of believing them when they said that I was the only one of 
my kind in Greece and other flatteries of this kind. As the 
proverb goes, my treasure turned to ashes, and the praise I got 
from them was not much different from the one that they give 
to an illusionist.63  
 
Lucian’s readers risk putting his works in a place where they are appreciated for 
the wrong reasons. As is the case of Zeuxis’ painting, his readers do not notice 
that beyond the novelty of his works there is also a sense of tradition. In what 
follows in chapters 3-8, Lucian compares the fate of his texts to the painting of 
Zeuxis, described as ‘a female hippocentaur with her hippocentaur family as 
background’. Zeuxis’ audience praised the strangeness of the painting’s idea 
(τῆς ἐπινοίας τὸ ξένον), but its novelty distracted them from that which they 
should have praised instead, namely its technique and accuracy of detail. Lucian 
hopes that the audience of this speech, unlike Zeuxis’ viewers, will be capable of 
                                                          
62 Luc. Zeux. 2. 
63 Luc. Zeux. 2.  
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appreciating his art, because as he says, ‘they are painters and can examine each 
detail with expertise’.64 
Finally, in To one who said you’re a Prometheus in Words Lucian makes a 
fictitious defence against the accusation of being called a Prometheus. Just like 
the Syrian in the Bis Accusatus, Lucian claims to have forced dialogue and 
comedy to come together, but that the marriage must also be harmonious and 
symmetrical. This is because:  
 
The result of putting two beautiful things together can be 
weird; the most obvious example is the Hippocentaur. You 
wouldn’t say that this is a pleasing creature, but that it is quite 
loathsome, to judge from painters who evoke their 
drunkenness and feasts. What then? Isn’t it possible that on the 
contrary something composed of the two best things is well 
formed, just as the mixture of wine and honey is the most 
delightful drink? I’d certainly say so. I couldn’t however 
maintain that mine are of that kind, but instead I’m afraid that 
the mixture completely ruined the beauty in each of them.65  
 
Dialogue was forced to accept Comedy’s critiques, even when previously they 
were, figuratively speaking, playing two octaves apart. Nevertheless, adds 
Lucian, ‘I dared to make them get along with each other and to agree, even if 
they are not compliant and even if they don’t tolerate so comfortably their 
cohabitation.’66 In this dialogue, the comparison of hippocentaurs to a 
combination of two foreign and apparently incompatible genres should be 
taken as an expression of false modesty. In other words, Lucian says that he 
took the best of Comedy and Dialogue in order to create something better and 
that therefore, it is not a contradiction when in the Zeuxis hippocentaurs serve 
as a positive image that praise the foreignness, novelty, innovation and use of 
                                                          
64 τὰ δὲ ἄλλα μάτην ἄρα τῷ Ζεύξιδι πεποίηται; ἀλλ’ οὐ μάτην—γραφικοὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς καὶ 
μετὰ τέχνης ἕκαστα ὁρᾶτε. εἴη μόνον ἄξια τοῦ θεάτρου δεικνύειν, Luc. Zeux. 12. 
65 Luc. Prom. Es. 5. About the Hippocentaur being the most outrageous of beasts and how 
Lucian thnks of his works as an affront to literary tradition see Whitmarsh (2001), 77.  
66 Luc. Prom. Es. 6. 
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paradox in Lucian’s lessons, and of the text itself. In making his literature seem 
a misunderstood innovation, Lucian praises his own innovation, and it is this 
that provokes both admiration and surprise in the reader. 
Our investigation has led us to two different proposals about the kind of 
comedy of the Hermotimus, which have been so far treated separately. On the 
one hand, we have recognized the apotreptic elements of the Hermotimus as 
Lycinus’ argument aims at changing Hermotimus’ mind about his own opinion 
of philosophy and through the use of his own terms. While at the start of the 
dialogue Hermotimus believes that the philosophical life offers an alternative to 
the ordinary life, by the end, Lycinus’ argument proves that philosophical 
happiness is unattainable and in this sense the Hermotimus is only apotreptic, as 
it shows that the philosophical quest and its goal, when taken seriously and on 
its own terms, is an unattainable ambition that one should retract from. On the 
other hand, however, we have also seen how, Hermotimus, persuaded by 
Lycinus’ argument, decides not only to abandon his philosophical studies, but 
also to join the life he previously shunned, by living like everyone else in 
ordinary cities. And yet, this last invitation - to live like everyone else - has only 
the appearance of being a protreptic invitation. It’s seriousness can be 
challenged in three distinct ways:  
 
1. Regarding dogmatic philosophy, Lycinus’ proposal does not represent 
an alternative in its own right, but only the exact opposite of 
Hermotimus’ own idea of the philosophical life. 
  
2. The comic trick of the Hermotimus consists in arguing that the ambitions 
of philosophers are not only impossible, but that they are also the same 
as the ambitions of laymen. The only difference between laymen and 
philosophers is that the latter hide their intentions behind the 
respectability of their garb. The talk that they use to achieve their 
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ambitions is directed towards material success, which according to their 
own official moral theories is worthless. Therefore, when at the ending of 
the Hermotimus we are left with the scene of Hermotimus blindly trusting 
Lycinus without reviewing the basic tenets of the conversation, 
especially bearing in mind Lycinus’ comments on the incidence of bad 
behaviour in ordinary cities,67 we find all kinds of potential pitfalls in 
living an ordinary life in an ordinary city.  
 
3. By ironically inviting Hermotimus (and by exension the reader) to live 
like everyone else, whilst at the same time portraying himself as an 
inverted Socrates, Lycinus exposes himself to the attentive reader as a 
fraudulent and ironic individual. These perplexing and deceiving 
techniques allow the reader to put himself at a distance from the usual 
protreptic philosophical discourse, and to instead become amused at 
Lycinus’ reproduction of an apotreptic philosophical discourse via non-
philosophical means.  
 
Chapter 6 we explored some of the ways in which the Hermotimus can be read 
as a text parodying classcial Platonic passages. Lycinus takes on the role of an 
anti-Socrates with some of the Socratic characteristics on his side (elenchos and 
irony), while Hermotimus resembles a somewhat unwise Cephalus. That 
Lycinus seems to be a fraud should therefore come as no surprise. The ending 
of the Hermotimus matches the description of Academics and Sceptics who 
cannot become fully happy, because of their own philosophical principles. 
Elsewhere, Lucian enjoys presenting narrators (as in A True History) or 
characters (as in the Icaromenippus) who are not completely trustworthy. Yet, the 
reason for doing so is precisely to challenge the reader and to nurture his 
intellect with entertaining reading. The ending of the Hermotimus, much like the 
                                                          
67 See Luc. Herm. 7, 22. 
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ending of On Pantomime, does not intend to convince the reader by showing one 
character as victorious over another through the power of the formwe to conver 
the latter. Lucian’s objective is to demonstrate that even if an argument or a 
display of elevated culture is reasonable and convincing, this does not mean 
that it is used for the purpose of proving an argument, and pointing somebody 
in the right direction of a particular way of thinking. Arguments, just like 
imagery, can also be used rhetorically. The reader that understands this level of 
interpretation will not be deceived and will therefore enjoy reading the text. 
The reader that does not understand, however, is in danger of becoming 
himself ridiculous.  
When Lycinus uses the imagery of Hippocentaurs, Gorgons and 
Chimerae and compares them with storytellers, over-daring poets, and 
geometricians, he exposes the activities of philosophers, but also exposes 
himself and his own activities. Since he is also an inverted Socrates, Lycinus 
develops an argument that is consistent, but based on an unreliable principle. 
Furthermore, Lucian uses the imagery of Hippocentars to describe the effect 
that the mixture of dialogue and comedy in his work has on his audience. Of 
course, all of the discussion about consistency in literature should also be seen 
against the problem of making fiction and verisimilitude, which goes back to 
Aristotle and Homer.68 
Yet it seems that Lucian’s choice of the image of the Hippocentaurs 
carefully makes reference to Plato’s Phaedo in which Socrates argues that every 
logos should, like a living being, have an organic shape with a harmony between 
its parts and the whole.69 In the composition of the Hermotimus Lucian seems to 
have borrowed and transformed the metaphor of the proportionate body used 
for the unity of a text, and uses instead the imagery of Hippocentaurs to create 
                                                          
68 Aristot. Poet. 1460a; Hom. Od. 19. 203. See Laird (2007). 
69 Plat. Phaed. 229c-e and 264c.  
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disbelief towards the logos in this same text.70 The comparison between the 
paintings of Zeuxis and literature might also find parallel with Aristotle who 
talks about the necessity of poets to represent people in action who are either 
serious or fools (ἤ σπουδαῖους ἤ φαύλους),71 better than real men or worse. 
ἤθος follows from these two categories ἤ σπουδαῖους ἤ φαύλους. But 
Polygnotus, who depicts better men was a ἠθόγραφος while Zeuxis and the 
tragedies of Aristotle’s time did not. A plot without proportions is not beautiful, 
because like a living being, its parts must be orderly arranged. Nothing too big 
or too small can be beautiful, because one cannot see the whole all at once, οἷον 
εἰ μυρίων σταδίων εἴη ζῷον. Hippocentaurs are another way of refering to 
non-existent beings.72 Because hippocentaurs are part of the realm of the 
monstrous and of the impossible, according to Artemidorus, if one has a dream 
about these monsters it means that one has false hopes that will inevitably be 
unfulfilled.73  
However, it is how Hippocentaurs appear in relation to the Stoics that is 
of greatest importance to Lucian’s Hermotimus. While reviewing Zeno’s 
precepts of impressions (φαντασίαι), physical perceptions (αἴσθησις) and 
thought (νόησις), Diogenes Laertius states that the ‘eyes on the chest’ are an 
example of those conceptions that come to us from transposition and that 
hippocentaurs are those that come to us from combination.74 Chrysippus’ 
similarly uses hippocentaurs in the context of telling lies,75 and it is possible to 
think that Sextus had this Platonic and Stoic background in mind when he 
                                                          
70 See Branham (1989), 43. 
71 Aristot. Poetic, 48a1-6; see also 1450a 26-27 and 1450b 27-31. See also the similarities in Dion. 
Hal. De Imit. fr. 6.1. See also Halliwell’s (1995) commentary, 91-101 and Heath (2013), 83-86 for a 
comparative study of Plato and Aristotle on unity. 
72 Xen. Cyr. 4.3.17. Lucr. Rer. Nat. 5. 878-900. 
73 Artem. Oneir. 2. 44, 4.47. Similarly, in Aelius Theon’s Progymnasmata, Pegasus and 
Erichtonius, Chimaeras and Hippocentaurs are recommended as useful citations against 
mythical narrations told by poets and historians about gods and heroes, whose natural shape 
has changed (Ael. Theon. Progym. 95). 
74 D. L. 7.53. 
75 Stob. Eclog. 2. 7, 106, 21. 
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summoned in the Outlines of Phyrronism the myth of the hippocentaurs as a 
favourite example (παράδειγμα) of unreality (ἀνυπαρξίας).76 Therefore, there 
existed in all probability a philosophical-aesthetic context for the imagery of 
Hippocentaurs, of which Lucian was aware. This context not only refers to the 
mixing of such styles, but also points to classical ideas of proportion and unity 
in a text. The aporetic aspect of the ending of the Hermotimus is hence veiled 
under philosophical seriousness. Regarding the relationship between Platonic 
perplexity and Lucianic perplexity we can say that, for the former, perplexity is 
a device with which to reinterpret the Socratic elenchus as a preparation for 
constructive philosophy and that it therefore establishes implicit hints of 
positive doctrine. In Plato, aporetic dialogues are also protreptic, and urge us to 
practice philosophy.77 In contrast, Lucian’s perplexity urges the reader to reflect 
on the blending of literature and on the rhetoric of a problem as part as the 
problem itself. Causing perplexity is an aesthetic aim of the Hermotimus and by 
mixing the two philosophical genres par excellence (protreptic and aporetic 
literature) they cancel each other out, urging us not to live philosophically but 
to be prepared to think critically about philosophical discourses. 
 By way of conclusion I would like to draw on some ideas about the 
poetics of fiction and falsehood as they appear in The Lover of Lies or The Doubter. 
In this dialogue Tychiades tells Philocles how while looking for his friend 
Leontichus came accross Cleodemus, a Libyan peripatetic philosopher, who 
works as a tutor, mainly of physics, at the houses of the rich.78 Deinomachus the 
Stoic, Ion the Platonic, and Antigonus the physician at Eucrates’ house, a former 
student of Pancrates the Athenian, who has some kind of foot rheumatism, are 
also there. Tychiades first learns about the ways in which philosophers 
prescribe different remedies to Eucrates according to their own philosophical 
                                                          
76 Sext. Emp. PH I. 162; but see also M I, 41; 8, 60; 9. 395; 9. 251 and cf. Cic Nat Deor. I. 38, 105; II. 
2 and 5. See Tackaberry (1930) 55.). 
77 For this definition see Kahn (1996), 100, 180. Cf. Matthews (1999), 123.  
78 Luc. Philops. 14.  
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doctrines.79 But then the discussion about medicine will lead them to discuss 
παράδοξα, or ghost stories, which are ultimately related to the belief in the soul 
and the gods.  Later in the dialogue, Arignotus, a Pythagorean and also pupil of 
Pancrates, joins them.80 As in the Hermotimus, in The Lover of Lies or The Doubter 
dialogue Tychiades is easily noticable for his scepticism, but in this case about 
methods of curing an internal illness with external remedies, which brings him 
closer to Antigonus who initially looked to help Eucrates with his profession 
(μετἀ τῆς τέχνης) by prescribing abstention from wine, a vegetarian diet and 
rest.81 Nevertheless, Tychiades ends up being accused of behaving like a 
layman,82 and of being an atheist.83 Like the Lycinus of the Hermotimus he is a 
character who doubts everything (ἀπιστῶν ἅπασιν),84 and that includes 
summoning divine names to cure the sick,85 and sacred books of magicians,86 
who are said to be able to fly and walk on water or on fire, and who can claim 
to be able to bring people back to life,87 to have efficient love-spells,88 and even 
to be able to change the course of the stars by creating eclipses.89 Scepticism 
places Tychiades closer to empiricism and to a belief in sight as a criterion of 
truth.90 He is loath to believe in spirits of any kind or philosophical 
metaphysical entities,91 and for this for reason too he admires Democritus of 
                                                          
79 Luc. Philops. 6-7. 
80 Luc. Philops. 29. 
81 Luc. Philops. 8. 
82 Luc. Philops. 9. 
83 Luc. Philops. 9, 38. 
84 Luc. Philops. 15. Tychiades is said to be made out of adamant in 29. 
85 Luc. Philops. 10. 
86 Luc. Philops. 12, 31. 
87 Luc. Philops. 26-28. 
88 In Luc. Philops. 15 Glaucias is in love with Chrysis so he hires a chaldean magician. He 
performs a ritual, but in the end Tychiades argues that Chrysis was bribed by the magician to 
fall in love with Glaucias. 
89 Luc. Philops. 13, and 14, see also 16 and 28 . 
90 Luc. Philopseud. 15, 29. Think also of the story in Luc. Philops. 7-20 of the living statue of 
Pellichus the Corynthian, which Tychiades suggests he might be an automaton like Talos the 
Cretan made by Daedalus. 
91 In Luc. Philops. 16 Tychiades disbelieves the metaphysical aspect of Platonism: the forms. 
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Abdera, a most wonderful man (μάλα θαυμαστὸν ἄνδρα), who similarly did 
not believe in disembodied souls.92 Although Tychiades’ scepticism is directed 
against superstition in general, The Lover of Lies is also a carefully elaborated 
attack against the sacred writings and teachings of Pancrates, and against the 
religious pilgrimage to his sect. This is evinced when we are told that in his 
youth Eucrates travelled to Amphilochus in Mallus, Pergamon and Patara,93 
only to end up in Egypt where he completed his education with Pancrates, 
Arignotus’ teacher and a holy man (ἄνδρα ἱερόν). Pancrates, although one of 
the scribes at Memphis who had acquired all the wisdom and paideia of the 
Egiptians, could no longer speak pure Greek (οὐ καθαρῶς ἑλληνίζοντα) and 
had become a believer in Isis.94 
 The Lover of Lies or The Doubter tries to answer the question of why people 
are so keen on lies (εἰς ἐπυθυμίαν τοῦ ψεύδους). One immediate answer to the 
question is, of course, that they are useful for them (εἰς τὸ χρήσιμον). However, 
Tychiades very rapidly moves on to the deeper question of why it is that people 
are fond of lying without any real need to do so (ἄνευ τῆς χρείας), and why 
they enjoy this activity (ἡδόμενοι τῷ πράγματι) and waste their time without 
any obvious valid motive (καὶ ἐνδιατρίβοντες ἐπ᾽ οὐδεμιᾷ προφάσει 
ἀναγκαίᾳ). His friend’s answer is simply stupidity (ἄνοια). However this is not 
all that satisfying an answer as there are many great men (ἄνδρες ἄριστοι) and 
trustworthy men (ἀξιόπιστος) who are lovers of lying (φιλοψεθδεῖς), such as 
Herodotus, Ctesias and the poets before them such as Homer, who not only 
deceived listeners (ἀκούοντας), but also made use of the written lie (ἐγγράφῳ 
τῷ ψεύσματι κεχρημένους), passing down from one generation of readers to 
the next their lies, preserved in the most beautiful words and verses. Perhaps 
the falsehood of poets and of cities can be pardoned because they have to 
                                                          
92 Luc. Philops. 32. 
93 Luc. Philops. 38. 
94 Luc. Philops. 33-34. 
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convey in their writing the delightfulness of the story (τὸ ἐκ τοῦ μύθου 
τερπνὸν), which is either the most alluring thing (ἐπαγωγότατον ὅν), or the 
most useful thing for their audience (οὗπερ μάλιστα δέονται πρὸς τοὺς 
ἀκροατάς), or to make cities more remarkable (σεμνοτέρας). If τὰ μυθώδη 
were taken away from Greece, nothing would prevent the guides (τοὺς 
περιηγητὰς) from dying from starvation, because foreigners (ξενοι) would 
never care to hear the truth even if they do not have to pay for it (ἀμισθί). 
However, it is those who have no motives for lying but who still enjoy it, who 
might be considered the most ridiculous.  
The social need for fiction and for falsehood (τὰ μυθώδη) implies the 
narrating (διηγεῖτο) of things with a special kind of poetics which cannot really 
be believed or trusted (τὰ ἄπιστα). A narrative can become so exaggerated that 
it can, like a Fury, drive out (ἐξήλασαν) of their minds reasonable men by 
going through in detail many unusual (τεράστια), portentous (ἀλλόκοτα) and 
varied (ποικίλα) things in which there is great deal of quackery (ἀλαζονεία). 
Words in  afiction can resemble those of a sorcerer (γόη)95 and old wives’ stories 
(γραῶν μῦθοι),96 although giction is all about old men (γέροντες ἄνδρες) 
telling strange stories (τερατολογοῦντες) with plenty of superstition 
(δεισιδαιμονία)97 and bragging (μεγαλαυχεῖσθαι).98 Creating fiction or lies 
implies making something wonderful (θαυμάσιόν τι διηγήσομαι),99 which has 
to be verisimilar, and neither too novel, unrealistic,100 or excesively marvellous 
to be believed by a fool.101  
The ending of the The Lover of Lies or The Doubter prescribes a remedy to 
the snares of fiction which is very similar to the one given in the Hermotimus. At 
                                                          
95 Cf. Luc. Philops 5, and 22 where narration is said to be able to make people tremble. 
96 Luc. Philops. 9. Cf. 37 μυθολογημάτων and 39 τῶν μυθολογουμένων. 
97 Luc. Philops. 37. 
98 Luc. Philops. 38. 
99 Luc. Philops. 11. 
100 Luc. Philops. 25. 
101 Luc. Philops. 26. 
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some point, Tychiades believed that Arignotus could save him like a deus ex 
machina,102 but in the end he ended up being affected by the same stupidity 
(ἄνοια) as the rest of the philosophers by believing that phantoms and spirits 
existed, and that the souls of the dead could come above the ground.103 
Tychiades ends up leaving the house of Eucrates, wishing to forget everything 
he has heard and feeling as if he has drunk too much wine and needs to vomit. 
He wishes that philosophers might be aided by the gods to participate in their 
telling of myths (συνεπιληψομένους ὑμῖν τῶν μυθολογουμένων), and know 
that they are now free to continue telling each other false stories.104 
Nevertheless, just as when one dog with rabbies bites another dog and then this 
dog bites a person who ends up getting rabies, Tychiades’ narration about 
falsehood has the same effect upon his friend Philocles. In the end, the only 
remedy to not becoming disturbed (ταράξῃ) by fiction is to refute its falsehood 
(ἀντισοφιστῇ τῶν ψευσμάτων),105 its truth (ἀλήθεια), and a correct argument 
for everything (τὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσι λόγον ὀρθόν).106 The main difference between The 
Lover of Lies or The Doubter, the Ship and the Hermotimus is that the first two 
oppose ‘fiction’ to ‘reality’ while the latter, through perplexity, uses the poetics 
of fictional narrative against fictional narrative itself. 
                                                          
102 Luc. Philops. 29. 
103 Luc. Philops. 32. 
104 Luc. Philops. 39. 
105 Luc. Philops. 37. 





In the first three chapters of this dissertation I discussed how in Lucianic 
studies two different opposing trends, the developmentalist and the unitarian, 
were formed as a result of the works of Lucian falling into the hands of 
Christians. Recent scholarship has been inclined to the unitarian account of 
Lucian and focuses its attention on the de-centralization of the authorial voice, 
the rejection of dogmatism, and an emphasis on the author´s nihilistic 
tendencies.  
 In the course of this thesis we have seen that the Hermotimus, as a kind of 
literary game, has its own kind of philosophical seriousness. In Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 6 it has also been proven that despite the aporetic ending of the 
Hermotimus, in which the reader is left unable to choose between the 
philosophical life and that of the ordinary man, Lycinus does convey a moral 
message, which is that one should distrust the hope of becoming happy 
through the study of philosophy just as one would distrust impossible and 
unrealistic dreams of becoming excessively rich or powerful.  
 The ἀποτρεπτικὸς λόγος of the Hermotimus appears to encourage 
readers not only to reflect philosophically on what the criterion of truth might 
be, and how to define the best life (and indeed this is part of its motivation), but 
also to reflect on the way in which the rhetoric of protreptic literature and 
exhortations to philosophy can be used for the sake of self-promotion, as 
opposed to that which is philosophically, morally or rationally correct. By 
giving the reader an ἀποτρεπτικὸς λόγος, Lycinus conveys the moral message 
of the need to distrust philosophical hope in impossible utopias and to 
recognise it both as ambition and the excessive desire for reputation. The 
aporetic aspect of the dialogue serves to reinforce the conclusion that one 
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should avoid hope, and this is a message that is also found in the Charon, 
Alexander, and Demonax.  
 In Chapters 6 and 7 I argued that there is nothing unusual in the 
Hermotimus’ ending being inconclusive and aporetic, as the creation of 
paradoxical situations is an aesthetic aim of Lucian’s comedy. By portraying 
Hermotimus as an opsimath and Lycinus as an anti-philosphical Socrates, and 
by mixing clichéd images of the philosopher and sophist as they appear in 
Plato, Lucian invites the reader to think about the adequacy of classical 
philosophical discourses and how they might be used for non-philosophical 
purposes. In the end, the Hermotimus presents a fascinating mixture of 
protreptic and aporetic literature and in such a way as they appear to cancel one 
other out. It is a text that urges us not to live philosophically but to think 
critically about philosophical discourses. In this way, it is both an attack on 
philosophical asceticism and utopianism, and a critical parody of the Tabula of 
Cebes and Alcibiades’ promise of conversion as it appears in the homonymous 
Platonic dialogue.  
 As demonstrated throughout this argument, it seems to me that the 
unitarian account of Lucian offers particularly compelling and pertinent 
readings of the Hermotimus, which developmentalist readings do not. Indeed, I 
am very much in agreement with Möllendorff’s proposal that the ending of the 
dialogue is open and believe it much more plausible that Lycinus’ proposal to 
live like everyone else is ironic. If this is taken to be the case, then we should 
reject Nesselrath’s perception of the Hermotimus as a manifestation of Lucian’s 
sincere and serious rejection of dogmatic philosophy, and avoid reading it as a 
confessional text which contributes to a developmentalist account of Lucian’s 
work. Despite this assertion, there does still exist a caveat against the unitarian 
account.   
Lycinus is an authorial voice, and his ironic proposal conveys more than 
a simple message. The seriousness of the game of the Hermotimus derives from 
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the fact that, as the life of the ἰδιώται is not presented as an alternative in its 
own right, it is therefore difficult to prove that in this text Lucian sides with the 
common life, or even, for that matter, with the poor. Indeed, the occasional 
positive depictions of ordinary people are only perceived as such in relation to 
representations of philosophers who are presented as overambitious and 
hypocritical. Therefore, rather than offering the reader a glimpse of the 
autobiographical, the story of the old man in Hermotimus 24 and the 
characterisation of Lycinus are anything but sincere. In fact, I would argue, such 
characters are a continuation of a line of argumentation and demonstrate a 
critical attitude that Hermotimus himself should have adopted before making 
the decision to join the Stoics. But we should not take Lycinus’ anti-utopian 
message lightheartedly, as it may yet open another avenue to an interpretation 
of Lucian that is located in his own historical context, and which goes beyond 
the unitarian and the developmentalist accounts of his work. To open up such a 
perspective, I will conclude this thesis with an analysis of the aischrologic 
aspect of the Hermtotimus and explore other ways in which the text might have 
been recieved by its readers. 
 
1. Friendship and Reputation 
 
The best way to study the aischrologic aspect of the Hermotimus is to look for it 
within the dialogue itself. The Hermotimus can be divided into four sections: a 
prologue (1-12), a main apotreptic section (13-70), a protreptic section (71-85), 
and an epilogue. Taken as whole, they depict Hermotimus’ conversion to the 
laymen’s life (85-86).  
 The apotreptic section can be further divided into five subsections. The 
first of these presents the challenge of finding an appropriate criterion with 
which to choose the right philosophy and assure the reader that Stoic 
philosophy is that very philosophy (13-21). This is followed by a corroboration 
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that even if a criterion could be found it would be impossible to know whether 
by following any one sect one could achieve true happiness. One solution might 
lie in testing, through experience, each path to happiness although this is 
revealed to be an impossible task (21-50). In the first interlude Hermotimus’ 
mood changes from vexation to anger and the relationship between Lycinus 
and truth is explained (50-53); Hermotimus also fails to give a sufficient method 
with which to test the philosophies, in order to prove whether it is possible to 
know the whole from the parts (54-62). In the following interlude, Hermotimus 
admits that he is completely defeated (63) and the concluding section proves 
the impossibility of finding any such criterion at all (64-68). This is followed by 
a corollary (68-70), which contains the similar impossibility of knowing whether 
any philosophy has found truth, as well as the argument of regress to infinity. 
Regarding the metaphoric level of discourse, from §21 to paragraph §70, the 
argument starts from the goal of the quest of philosophy and ends by bringing 
Hermotimus well and truly down to earth. 
 During the conversation Hermotimus goes through a series of emotional 
changes: from self-conviction to indecision, from equanimity to anger, and from 
exasperation to sadness. Lycinus, on the other hand, remains emotionally the 
same throughout. Only from Hermotimus’ perspective does his attitude 
change; at first, he seems to present himself as a well-disposed friend who is 
keen to join the Stoics, but he then turns and becomes a mocker, an exposer of 
lies, and finally a convincing adviser and ultimately a better kind of friend. In 
fact, it seems by looking at the role of laughter in relation to Hermotimus’ 
emotional changes, is an obvious place to start an investigation into the 
aischrologic potential of the Hermotimus.  
 Lycinus and Hermotimus have been acquainted with one another other 
for 20 years, or at least since the latter began studying Stoicism,1 but in the 
course of their conversation Lycinus’ laughter threatens to shame the reputation 
                                                          
1 Luc. Herm. 2 
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of Hermotimus, his teacher, and philosophy altogether. In the first part of the 
dialogue Hermotimus believes he is the more privileged of the two and sees in 
Lycinus a potential acolyte or ἑταίρος.2 Hermotimus is at this point convinced 
that at the pinnacle of virtue, where his teacher resides, philosophers are 
εὐδαίμονες and that this is the ultimate goal in life. Philosophers, on the other 
hand, laugh scornfully (καταγελῶντες) at those who think that riches, glory 
and earthly pleasures have any value.3 But then, seemingly by overcoming his 
hesitation (μηδὲν ὀκνήσαντα εἰπεῖν τἀληθές) and through the revelation of 
the vicious behaviour of Hermotimus’ teacher, Lycinus moves the conversation 
in a direction that may put the friendship under strain.4 On this occasion, 
however, the revelation of the inward life of philosophers will in fact imply that 
Hermotimus and Lycinus will engage in more than just a casual conversation as 
friends (φίλοι ὄντες).5  
 Indeed, the strength of this friendship will be tested throughout the 
dialogue with the fire of laughter, and will crucially depend on how well 
Hermotimus can defend the philosophical life.6 Lycinus for example, 
encourages the discussion by calling his interlocutor either ἑταῖρε, θαυμάσιε or 
ὦγαθέ each time that Hermotimus fails to prove an argument or needs some 
encouragement not to abandon it.7 Friendship is summoned various times.8 But 
                                                          
2 Luc. Herm. 7, σοφίαν καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ τὸ καλὸν αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πάντα 
ἐπίστασθαι βεβαίως πεπεισμένον ᾗ ἕκαστα ἔχει. τὸ καλὸν is perhaps equivalent in Latin for 
honestas, cf. Brunt (2013), 226-227 and different from τιμημάτων Luc. Herm. 24, and τιμήσονται 
and προτιμᾶσθαι, Luc. Herm 72. 
3 ἐπὶ τὸ ἄκρον εὐδαιμονοῦσι πλούτου καὶ δόξης καὶ ἡδονῶν ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ μεμνημένοι ἔτι, 
καταγελῶντες δὲ τῶν οἰομένων ταῦτα εἶναι Luc. Herm. 7. 
4 Cf. Luc. Herm. 8: Ὅρα, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ὡς ἔγωγε καὶ πάνυ ὀκνῶ... ἀλλὰ μὴ ὄκνει, ὦ γενναῖε; 
5 Luc. Herm.13. 
6 Luc. Herm. 15, Luc. Herm. 19  ἀλλ’ ὅρα μὴ καὶ ταῦτα, ὦ Ἑρμότιμε, παίζεις πρός με 
πειρώμενος εἰ ἐξαπατώμενος συνίημι; Luc. Herm. 20. Cf. also the use of ὦ χρηστέ in Luc. 
Herm. 21 and ὦγαθέ Luc. Herm. 21 and ὦ καλἐ Ἐρμότιμε Luc. Herm. 28. 
7 Cf. Luc. Herm.  50, 64, 66 respectively. For θαυμάσιε see also Luc. Herm. 64. 
8 ἀνδρὶ φίλῳ, and φίλῳ ἀνδρί; note that the resurrected philosophers call Lycinus Ὦ 
βέλτιστε Λυκῖνε. Luc. Herm. 30. οὐχὶ δὲ ἀναγελάσαντας ἂν εἰπεῖν πρὸς ἐμέ. Luc. Herm. 33. 
That ἀναγελάω can also imply a power relationship can be exemplified with Luc. Tox. 26: 
ἀνεγέλασε. If Hestia in Luc. Herm. 35 is the goddess of the hearth, then why would 
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finally getting angry (οὐ μετρίως ἀνιᾷς), Hermotimus is forced to admit that it 
is impossible to know if the Stoic school is the true philosophy and he blames 
Lycinus for his constantly bullying (ὑβριστὴς ἀεὶ σύ), for hating philosophy 
(μισεῖς) and for scoffing at philosophers (ἐς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας 
ἀποσκώπτεις). Lycinus argues that he is only telling the truth, which is not as 
pleasant or attractive as listening to falsehood, because truth is honest and 
speaks freely, and for this reason people are offended by her (διὰ τοῦτο 
ἄχθονται αὐτῇ). But despite Lycinus’ good will (ὑπ᾽ εὐνοίας), Hermotimus is 
offended and believes conversely that he friend speaks in this out of bad will 
(δύσνουν ἐμέ).9 Lycinus is making out of the choice of the best life a 
παγγέλοιον matter.10 What started in jest is now in Hermotimus’ eyes the 
words of a buffoon.11 
 So it is that 20 years of friendship are now at stake. Hermotimus’ attempt 
to transform Lycinus the mocker into the butt of the joke fails. Lycinus might 
seem irreverent,12 but he is acutely aware that if he so wished, Hermotimus 
could dismiss him as a lunatic, and leave him alone with his foolish chat (ἔα 
ληρεῖν). Hermotimus retorts that he cannot because Lycinus is forcing his hand 
and it is then that Lycinus argues that he himself has been dragged too by the 
argument, which is more forceful than he is.13 The impossibility of finding a 
criterion capable of discovering whether any one of the many philosophies has 
ever found the truth moves Hermotimus to tears.14 This emotional breakdown 
might be seen to threaten Hermotimus and Lycinus’ friendship in much the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Hermotimus invoke her? Costa (2005), 265, for instance, does not give any further explanation. 
Montagu (2001), 25, might be right in claiming that the name of Hestia stands for in the name of 
friendship in this context. This is how Harmon (1921), 329, understands the swearing in Luc. 
Philop. 5. His translation of Luc. Symp. 32, however, follows Plat. Crat. 401C6-8, where Socrates 
says that the name of Hestia is derived from ἐστί. 
9 Luc. Herm. 51. 
10 Luc. Herm. 54. 
11 Ταυτὶ μέν, ὦ Λυκῖνε, βωμολοχικὰ καὶ οὐ κατά σε, Luc. Herm. 58. 
12 βλασφημεῖν, Luc. Herm. 62.  
13 Luc. Herm. 63. 
14 Luc. Herm. 69, λυπερόν τι καί δύσελπι. 
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same way as the previous outburst of rage, for which Lycinus again consoles 
his companion. Hermotimus’ anger is like that of a man whose irritation comes 
from the realization that his dreams of great wealth, digging up treasure, or 
discovering mountains of gold; of ruling, or flying or becoming a giant like the 
Colossus are in fact impossible.15 As a friend Hermotimus should not feel that 
way towards Lycinus16 and yet the problem has been all along that even laymen 
laugh at philosophers’ pretentions and nonsense.17 Lycinus continues to console 
Hermotimus. All that he says, he argues, is said out of friendship (ὦ φιλότης) 
and because all philosophers are vulnerable to the undermining case that he has 
made.18 He is pains to say that he holds no real hostility towards the Stoics.  
The friendship between Hermotimus and Lycinus tells us much about 
the risks of offence in the Hermotimus. Whilst Lycinus’ relationship with 
Hermotimus remains the same, Hermotimus’ view of the friendship changes 
considerably. In the entire dialogue Hermotimus only once addresses Lycinus 
using the vocatives ὦ ἑταῖρε and ὦ γενναῖε, and this happens when he 
perceives in him a potential acolyte or when he is afraid of telling the truth. 
Conversely, Lycinus constantly uses a friendlier tone, but allows himself to 
offend Hermotimus a bit in the way friends do when they tell the truth. He is 
aware of his control of the conversation. Who is mocking who in this dialogue 
is the gauge of right and wrong, and it is this that drives Hermotimus from 
conviction to indecision and from equanimity, anger and exasperation, to 
sadness. But juggling with Hermotimus’ hopes of becoming happy through 
philosophy, threatens to shame that which is most important to him and to all 
philosophers: their reputation.  
                                                          
15 See the expression, ὦ ἑταῖρε in Luc. Herm 71. 
16 Luc. Herm 72 Ἀλλὰ σύ, ὦ φιλότης, μὴ πάθῃς αὐτὸ πρὸς ἐμέ. 
17 See the use of γελῶμεν, τί ταῦτα ληρεῖ, καταγελάσας αὐτῆς, λῆρον in the student’s story, 
Luc. Herm. 81.  
18 Luc. Herm. 85 μή με νομίσῃς κατὰ τῆς Στοᾶς παρεσκευασμένον ἥ ἔχθραν τινὰ ἐξαίρετον 
πρὸς Στωϊκοὺς ἐπανῃρημένον εἰρηκέναι. 
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 Lycinus’ laughter threatens the respected position that philosophers 
occupy in society. Hermotimus’ teacher deserves respect (αἰδοῦς) because of his 
old age and his philosophical wisdom.19 Philosophers are also revered (σεμνοί) 
and honoured (τιμήσονται) by the majority (ὑπὲρ τοὺς πολλοὺς);20 and from 
this reputation they receive payment, and sow the seeds of unattainable desires 
in their pupils.  Exposure of the lack of coherence between the deeds and words 
of the philosopher puts at risk both his reputation and his salary. In theory, 
money should not concern a Stoic philosopher.21 But in truth, those 
philosophers who  
 
realize too late that they have been deceived, and after this they 
have become old, because of their reputation hesitate to turn 
back (ὀκνοῦσιν ἀναστρέφειν αἰδούμενοι) if at their age they 
must confess that they did not realize that they were acting so 
childishly. As a result, they persist through shame (ὑπ’ 
αἰσχύνης), praise what they have, and encourage as many as 
they can in the same course, so that they will not be the only 
ones deceived, but can have a consolation from the fact that the 
same has happened to many others.22   
 
It is both fear of losing their reputation and the wealth that they acquire that is 
the real reason philosophers do not change their ways, even after they discover 
that philosophy is unattainable.23  
 The worst that can happen to one with a good reputation is to be laughed 
at by laymen. Though laymen also send their sons to study philosophy hoping 
that philosophy will improve them and yet quickly realize that it is all bluff. 
However, philosophers have arguments for this too. When a layman complains 
                                                          
19 αἰδοῦς ἄξιος καὶ γέρων ἤδη ἐς τὸ ὕστατον. Luc. Herm. 9. 
20 Luc. Herm. 75. 
21 Luc. Herm. 10; see ἠγανάκτει Luc. Herm. 81. 
22 Luc. Herm. 75. 
23 Luc. Herm. 80, 81. 
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that the philosopher has made the student even more shameless than before,24 
the teacher of philosophy answers in return that had it not been for philosophy 
and the respect for her (ἡ φιλοσοφία καὶ ἡ πρὸς ταύτην αἰδώς), which brings 
the student moderation and shame if he seems unworthy of the robe and the 
name, he would have behaved even worse. Therefore, the philosopher also 
believes that he deserves payment despite there being no improvement in the 
student.25 The philosopher’s biggest problem is to lose his patrons and for that 
reason he must keep his reputation clean. 
 In making Hermotimus overcome his shame, Lycinus manages to 
persuade him to abandon philosophy. Lycinus argues that there are few 
distinguished people that one can call a philosopher, but those that are, are 
paradoxically the ones brave enough to quit the philosophical quest.26 So 
Hermotimus should not be ashamed, for if he is sensible, he will change 
direction and it will all be for the bette even if he is now getting on iun years.27 
Unlike his teacher, Hermotimus did not actively tell lies,28 neither did he 
become a philosopher to earn money, but was cheated by his teacher to whom 
he paid a lot of money in the hopes of achieving some unachievable virtuous 
state. The only thing left to Hermotimus is to save what is left of his good 
reputation and learn how to expose those philosophers who cheated him.29 
 Reputation, laughter and shame are the most basic markers that give 
form to the main level of discourse or a plot of the Hermotimus. Clearly the 
Hermotimus is a caricature of a friendship as much as it is a caricature of 
philosophers and laymen. But the need for one true philosopher and one true 
sect, a belief which is itself an agreed assumption between Hermotimus and 
                                                          
24 τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐς ὀργὴν καὶ θυμὸν καὶ ἀναισχυντίαν καὶ ἐς τόλμαν καὶ ψεῦδος μακρῷ τινι 
ἄμεινον εἶχε πέρυσιν ἥ νῦν. Luc. Herm. 81. 
25 Luc. Herm. 82. 
26 Luc. Herm. 75. 
27 Luc. Herm. 85, καὶ οὐκ αἰσχυνῇ, ἤνπερ εὖ φρονῇς, εἰ γέρων ἄνθρωπος μεταμαθήσῃ καὶ 
μεταχωρήσεις πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον. 
28 Luc. Herm. 77. 
29 Luc. Herm. 86. 
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Lycinus, reveals the dogmatic and hairetic environment within which this 
conversation takes place.30 Lucian was a satirist ‘both fascinated and repelled by 
the activities of holy men,’31 but would his caricature of philosophers offend a 
Stoic or other philosophers?  
 Given the little we know about the concerns and horizons of expectation 
of the Hermotimus’ second-century readers, was the dialogue seen as a 
destabilizing aischrologic or was it a challenge to think about how the educated 
should execute philosophical paideia? We might, for argument’s sake, start by 
suggesting two possible readers of the text; the first a convinced, practising 
Stoic and the second a convinced, practising Sceptic. This hypothetical situation 
provides an interesting insight in the context of the quarrel between Favorinus 
of Arles and Epictetus.  
 
2. The Quarrel between Favorinus of Arles and Epictetus 
 
Philosophical ambition among the educated elite could lead to bitter 
competition. An anecdote preserved in Galen about a quarrel between the pupil 
of Plutarch, Favorinus of Arles, who was an Academic philosopher with 
Peripatetic leanings,32 and Marcus Aurelius’ favourite Stoic, Epictetus, might 
serve as an example of how philosophical sectarianism could be a divisive force 
among well established pepaideumenoi.  
 Galen, the favourite doctor of the Empire, was critical of Favorinus for 
having argued in his Plutarch or On the Academic Disposition (περὶ τῆς 
Ἀκαδημαικῆς διαθεσέως) that the best education consists of teaching a student 
how to argue on both sides (εἰς ἑκάτερα ἐπιχείρησιν) in order to induce 
                                                          
30 Luc. Herm. 77. 
31 Anderson (1994), 3. 
32 Plutarch presents Favorinus as an admirer of Aristotle (Quaest. Conv. 734F). But Lucian 
presents him as an Academic (Eun-7). See Glucker (1978) 280-293. 
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suspension of judgement. Discussing the ἐποχή that the old Academics called 
ἀοριστίαν, Galen observes that  
 
not just Favorinus, but also the Academics of the new 
generation (οἱ νεώτεροι) emphasised so much the suspension 
of judgement that sometimes they could not agree that the sun 
is an object of understanding (καταληπτόν) as much as it is of 
comprehension (γνῶσιν), that they could not transmit it (i.e. 
the notion of ἐποχή) to their students (τοῖς μαθηταῖς 
ἐπιτρέπειν) without having taught them first the criterion of 
knowledge (ἐπιστημονικὸν κριτήριον). 
 
Even though Favorinus was a Sceptic, it seems that in this dialogue he concedes 
the possibility of there being something like firm knowledge (τὸ βεβαίως 
γνωστόν). We know that Favorinus wrote later a dialogue on a similar subject 
called Against Epictetus, in which he depicts Epictetus conversing with 
Plutarch’s slave Onesimus. In all probability Epictetus’ attacks against the 
Academics were one of the reasons Favorinus points at the Stoic’s previous 
social status. Epictetus can indeed be seen to display a dogmatic attitude as an 
orthodox Stoic, attacking the scepticism of the Academy, Pyrrhonians and 
Epicureans. His issues with the Sceptics are chiefly in the field of epistemology. 
He criticizes their relativism,33 and mocks their proofs of ἀκαταληψία by 
summoning the conundrum of the impossibility of distinguishing between 
dreaming and being awake.34 Epictetus also contests the idleness of the 
σοφίσματα of the Pyrrhonians and Academics who argue that there are no true 
φαντασίαι or real impressions. Finally, Epictetus says he has no leisure time 
(οὐκ ἄγω σχολήν) for the discussions of the Academics and Pyrrhonists and 
that he is not capable of arguing in favour of their club (τῇ συνηθείᾳ).35 These 
passages of Epictetus against the Stoics prompted Glucker to think that the 
                                                          
33 Epict. Diss. II. 20. 
34 Epict. Diss. I. 5. 6. 
35 Epict. Diss. I. 27. 
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reason for reminding Epictetus and his contemporaries of his condition as a 
former slave was that the Academics attacked in the Discourses were Plutarch 
and his circle.36 Galen adds that in his Alcibiades, Favorinus praised the 
Academics for their skill in arguing on both sides, and he also allowed his 
students to choose whatever side was truer (ἐπιτρέποντας δὲ τοῖς μαθηταῖς 
αἱρεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀληθεστέρους). Furthermore, he said that it seemed probable 
(πιθανόν) that nothing could be apprehensible (φαίνεσθαι μηδὲν εἶναι 
καταληπτόν). It therefore seems to Galen that in the Plutarch and in the 
Alcibiades Favorinus shows two different and contradictory views about the 
apprehensible. 
This quarrel between Favorinus and Epictetus, as documented by Galen, 
certainly reminds us of Lucian’s parody of the Stoics and Sceptics. In this sense, 
we might find attractive the idea that Lucian borrowed the modes of Agrippa 
from Favorinus of Arles in his writing of the Hermotimus, but it is also 
important to concede that there is no solid evidence to confirm this hypothesis. 
What this anecdote does offer is an opportunity to play with the idea of a 
convinced Stoic and a convinced Sceptic, like that of Epictetus and Favorinus, 
reading the Hermotimus. 
 
3. A Stoic Reader of the Hermotimus 
 
As for Stoic readers of the second century AD, it is possible that they would 
have grasped from the very start of the dialogue that Hermotimus was 
following the wrong kind of Stoicism. In addition, Hermotimus’ affected 
βάδισμα might have betrayed him early on as a clichéd philosopher.37 In 
addition, the philosopher’s gait was a popular subject for comedians of the 
period. Alexis, for example, mocks a Platonic walk consisting of walking back 
                                                          
36 Glucker (1978), 294. 
37 On the Romans on Greek walking see O’Sullivan (2011), 89-96. 
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and forth to solve philosophical aporías.38 In Plautine comedy the philosopher’s 
walk became a distinctively Greek trait.39 The enemies of Scipio Africanus 
laughed at him while he was in Sicily during the Second Punic War for 
devoting too much attention to his books,40 and for walking like an unmanly 
Greek philosopher in times of pressure. This was an attitude that Germanicus 
would also emulate centuries whilst making a trip to Egypt.41 For Lucian too, 
the ἱμάτιον is not only a philosophical garb, but also a distinctively Greek 
dress.42 Therefore it is possible to argue that from the very start of the 
Hermotimus, Lucian wanted any reader, and in particular the Stoic reader, to be 
able to recognize Hermotimus as a clichéd Stoic.  
The first part of the prologue of the Hermotimus might also have worked 
as a way to hook a Stoic reader by presenting to him Sceptic arguments. 
However, immediately after this section even the least attentive Stoic would 
have noted that Hermotimus was following the wrong teacher. The Stoics were 
well aware of the strangeness of their own gait. According to Seneca, the 
philosopher need not worry about how he looked when he walked,43 although 
he might well know how ridiculous he looked whilst doing so.44 Furthemore, 
Epictetus attacked those who used the appearance of asceticism to pretend to be 
philosophers,45 and who dressed like Stoics but were not,46 but merely use the 
philosophical rhetoric as an appearance.47 The Stoic philosopher need not to 
wear the τρίβων, nor to go out without a tunic (ἀχίτων) underneath, nor grow 
his hair, nor deviate from the behaviour of the majority of people (τὸ κοινὸν 
                                                          
38 Alex. Fr. 151 PCG. 
39 Plaut. Curc. 288-291 with Csapo (1989), 150-4. 
40 Liv. 29. 19. 11. 
41 Tac. Ann. 2.59. 
42  Luc. De Merc. 34, 25. 
43 Sen. Tranq. 2. 1. 
44 Sen. Ep. 15. 7. 
45 Epict. Diss. 3. 2. 16. 
46 Epict. Diss. 4.8. 15 and 3. 22. 9,50, 80. 
47 Epict. Diss. 3.2 6; 2.19. 8-10. 
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τῶν πολλῶν).48 But, being unprepared for the question of what his criterion is 
in choosing to join the Stoics Hermotimus claims to have followed his teacher 
for his respectable appearance alone. Epictetus warns the aspirant to 
philosophy against charlatans to whom the label ‚philosopher‛ is commonly 
attached.49 Indeed, in Stoicism a philosopher should not be judged on his garb 
or his logoi, but on his actions.50 Clearly Hermotimus’ teacher is in this sense, 
from the very start of the dialogue, a false Stoic,51 who fails to follow his 
askesis,52 which consists of moderation, respectability and a simple life. 
Hermotimus’ teacher uses his garb to charge money, and therefore he, 
Hermotimus, and his fellow pupils behave contrary to Marcus Aurelius’ 
recommendation to not  impress others with a reputation for asceticism.53  
When engaging with Lycinus’s talk, Hermotimus might have been 
violating the Stoic advice to stay away from former friends and relatives,54 and 
from laymen who could give wrong advice,55 and distract the Stoics from the 
right path.56 On the other hand, Hermotimus fails to be a Stoic with a solid logos. 
The Stoic must become an expert in dialectis and logic,57 -dialectic being the 
science of eloquence and logical argumentation.58 This is, however, something 
that Hermotimus evidently lacks. Though, given what has already been 
mentioned, from the very start of the dialogue, a Stoic reader of the Hermotimus 
might have seen that Lycinus, an inverted Socrates, was sincerely helping his 
friend by giving him an argument that could work to detect false teachers. 
                                                          
48 Mus. Ruf. Diss. 16. 106 
49 Epict. Diss. 3. 22. 2, 10-11, 15, 50, 80. 
50 Epict. Ench. 52. 1. 
51 Luc. Herm. 1-12. 
52 Epict Diss 3. 12; 2. 9.13; Mus. Ruf. 6. 56. 
53 Marcus Aurelius. I. 7. Cf. Luc. Herm. 83. 
54 Epict. Diss. 4. 2. 1. 
55 Disc. 3.16.3, 16. Konstan (1997) 113-114. 
56 Sen. Vit Beat. 1. 
57 D. L. 7. 83. 
58 Alex. Aphr. In Top. I, 8-14. 
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Ironically this is an argument of the Sceptics, and therefore in its application 
Lucian seemingly uses it in a way that is advantageous for their opponents.  
But besides this ironic use of Sceptic arguments, a Stoic too could have 
seen Lycinus’ ironic proposal to live like everyone else as an argument 
favouring the Stoic idea that it is impossible to be a Sceptic. According to 
Epictetus, even those Academics who deny that there are propositions that are 
true and evident need these same propositions to make their assertions. 
Scepticism leads Academics to the self-contradiction as they demand of others 
those beliefs which are advantageous to them, when they themselves assert that 
one should never trust a man.59 Furthermore, as aforementioned, not all Stoics 
were keen on radical dogmatism,60 and in all probabilty a Stoic with Cynic traits 
like that of Epictetus would have agreed with the proposition that virtue lies in 
deeds and not in words. For these reasons, perhaps a Stoic would not have 
found the ἀποτρεπτικὸς λόγος of the Hermotimus to be working against him. 
Indeed, perhaps any philosopher would have welcomed, on some points, 
Lucian’s attack against hope.61  
 
4. A Sceptic reader of the Hermotimus  
 
Of all Lucian’s texts, the Hermotimus is perhaps the one most influenced by 
Scepticism, for it makes use of the modes of Agrippa.  Yet despite this, Lucian 
seems not to have had great respect for Favorinus as either an empowered 
intellectual or a nobleman.62 On the other hand, Lycinus’ unsettling alternative, 
to live the life that is common to all, might also have been read by a Sceptic as a 
parody of the Sceptic take on morality. In the Outlines of Pyrrhonism Book 3, 
where Sextus Empiricus tries to demonstrate that there is no expertise in living, 
                                                          
59 S.E. P. 1. 20. 4-5. 
60 Sen. Epist. 80. 1.  
61 Cf. Max. Tyr. Or. 1.5. 
62 Luc. Demon. 12-13; Eun. 7. 
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we see both Sceptics and laymen joining sides against the dogmatic 
philosophers. The whole purpose of this coalition is to provide an alternative to 
dogmatism, which teaches individuals how to suspend judgment and reach 
tranquillity. Lycinus’ proposal is, after all, close to the Sceptical life-advice 
which calls for a fall back on nature, necessitated by feelings, and the handing 
down of laws, customs and teachings of certain kinds of expertise.63 When 
discussing whether the individual who suspends judgement about the nature of 
the good is in all respects happy, Sextus implies that ἀταραξία is sufficient for 
εὐδαιμονία. According to the Sceptics, all unhappiness is due to disturbance, 
and to the pursuit of things that seem to be good and the avoidance of those 
things that seem to be bad. Stoics and all dogmatic philosophers believe there 
are things that are bad and that are good, and therefore according to the 
Sceptics they are bound to be disturbed and unhappy. The Sceptic, on the 
contrary, suspends judgment about the nature of good and bad, and thereby 
achieves tranquillity. This association between happiness and tranquillity seems 
to go back to Pyrrho and Timon of Phlius, and to continue until Sextus.64  
Lycinus’ proposal to find a criterion and virtue lying in deeds, as 
Hankinson suggests, echoes the practical philosophy of Arcesilaus.65 Taking for 
granted that one must inquire into the business of living, and that one needs a 
criterion with which to choose safely the best kind of life, Arcesilaus suggests 
that he who suspends judgement about everything is moderate in his actions, as 
ge chooses what is ‘reasonable’ (eulogon). According to this criterion the 
individual will advance straight (katorthosei), because eudaimonia comes through 
wisdom (phronesis), and wisdom consists in right actions (katorthomata). An 
action is right when it is performed reasonably; therefore anyone who attends 
to the reasonable will act correctly and will therefore be happy.  
                                                          
63 S.E. P. 1.23. 
64 S.E. M. 9. I. 
65 S.E. M 158. See Hankinson (1995), 79. 
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However, the ending of the Hermotimus leaves the reader concerned that 
Hermotimus will now be in pursuit of things that seem to be good to him (i.e. 
living like everyone else), and that he will avoid those things that seem to be bad 
(i.e. philosophers). But Hermotimus is unaware of the incidence of bad 
behaviour in ordinary life. A true Sceptic would have suspended his judgement 
on the matter of the life of laymen or the philosophical life as it is presented in 
the Hermotimus. Perhaps Lucian, by using the metaphor of the road, and leaving 
the text of the Hermotimus open-ended, is addressing the dubious status of 
Pyrrhonism and later Scepticism as a hairesis or philosophical choice.66  For 
Diogenes Laertius, but also for Sextus, it is important to explain the terms under 
which Scepticism can be considered a hairesis. This becomes clear when Sextus 
Empiricus’ uses the word ὁδός to address Aenesidemus’ claim that Scepticism 
is a path towards the philosophy of Heraclitus.67 Although a Sceptic like 
Favorinus might have been flattered in seeing his arguments used against a 
Stoic, it does however seem likely that the proposal of living like everyone else, 
as it appears in the Hermotimus, would have come across as ironic. If used thus, 
then it is also likely that Lucian was using Sceptic philosophy for non-Sceptic 
purposes. 
Like most of his contemporaries, in Lucian’s work we find a respectful 
opinion of Epictetus.68 If one wishes to believe that in the Hermotimus Lucian is 
not only borrowing from Favorinus the five modes of Agrippa, but also 
rejecting Stoicism and all philosophy, and that the author not only advocates for 
                                                          
66 Perhaps the distinction between the attainment of the goal and what leads to the goal could 
also be added to the list of Sceptic motifs in the Hermotimus. See Sextus’ P I, 231, where he 
makes a distinction between the New Academy and the Sceptics. See, however, Arist. EN. III. 
2.1111b26-29 and VI. 13.1145a5-6. The status of Pyrrhonism and later Scepticism as a hairesis 
remained ambiguous at the time of Lucian and thereafter. For a discussion of this Scepticism 
and the possibility of it as a hairesis see Polito (2007). 
67 See Polito (2004), and S. E. P I. 210: But Aenesidemus and his followers used to say that the Sceptical 
persuasion is a path to the philosophy of Heraclitus *<+207ἐπεὶ δὲ οἱ περὶ τὸν Αἰνησίδημον ἔλεγον 
ὁδὸν εἶναι τὴν σκεπτικὴν ἀγωγὴν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἡρακλείτειον φιλοσοφίαν (trans. Annas and 
Barnes 2000). 
68 Luc. Alex. 2; Dem. 2, 55; Adv. Indoct. 14. 
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the life of laymen but is also inclined to Scepticism, then one would have to 
explain how it is possible that he seems to speak of Favorinus negatively and of 
Epictetus positively.  
 
5. Final Observations 
 
It is possible that neither convinced Stoics nor convinced Sceptics would have 
found the outcome of the Hermotimus either particularly worrying or insulting. 
In the 1960s new literary historians, such as Glen Bowersock, had already 
noticed that there were too many problems in reducing all literature of the 
Second Sophistic to entertainment.69 What was seen as entertaining literature 
was in many ways a central aspect of the lives of powerful individuals who 
were also sophists and philosophers. Admitting the need for a solid culture, it 
was the elite of the Antonines that (re)-created the figure of the sophist, and 
formed a new kind of intellectual, which would fight against ψευδοπαιδεία.70 
Even if his stance is a mixture that does not indulge in sectarianism, Lucian has 
‘visible preferences among the schools’,71 in spite of his clear inclination 
towards Epicureanism and some forms of Cynicism.72 It is even probable that he 
might have found some commo ground agreement on some few points with 
Christians.73 This means that Lucian’s literature can not have been entirely 
uncompromised, as the oldest evidence that we have seems to suggest, and that 
his take on philosophy had to respond at least to the internal politics of the 
economy of paideia. Rostovtzeff saw the importance of what seems to be 
Lucian’s criticism of the gulf that separated the rich from the poor, but he also 
warned of the fact that Lucian praises poverty only over those who are striving 
                                                          
69 Bowersock 1969, for Lucian p. 115 
70 Bompaire (1958), 118- 119; Norden (1898) 1. 374. For ψευδοπαιδεία see Boulanger (1923) 438. 
71 Jones (1986), 26. 
72 Jones (1986), 32. 
73 Jones (1986), 45. 
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to become richer. In his investigation of the relevance that civil unrest in the 
second century, Rostovzeff suggested that philosophers, and in particular 
Cynics, were not only tolerated during the reign of the Antonines, but migh 
even supported Lucian and other writers who used their literature to uphold 
the status quo.74 After all, perhaps the moral message of the Hermotimus, that of 
avoiding hope, would have better matched its classical, popular and paideutic 
notion75 than its philosophical counterpart. Similarly, the message of avoiding 
excessive ambition can be found in school texts of the period, in which practical 
virtue is advised often along the lines of self-control.76 We might therefore 
suspect that the Hermotimus’ apotreptic aspect was not only perceived as 
inoffensive by more sectarian readers, but that it might also have been seen as 
combining ideologies (Stoicism and Scepticism) commonly seen as 
incompatible. The problem with which we are left and which is far beyond the 
scope of this thesi  is how can we start to understand Lucian’s fictionalized 
autobiography as a pepaideumenos and his attack against philosophical ambition 
and the greed for power and money.  
 Perhaps one way forward might be to think of Lucian’s literature 
engaging with two currencies that found themselves in contradiction: honour 
and wealth. In all probability, Lucian’s readers would have belonged to the 
governing élite. The Hermotimus like the vast majority of works preserved from 
Lucian’s time was destined to the minority of Greek literate individuals in the 
Roman Empire.77 But it was not always expected of the elite that they should 
know how to read and write quickly, since they had slaves that could read to 
                                                          
74 Baldwin (1963), 75-76 follows Rostovtzeff (1957), 120, on the theme of civil unrest, but does 
not pay a lot of attention to  what he says about the widespreadtolerance towards philosophers 
and in particular towards Cynics: ‘The activity of Dio and Plutarch, the speeches of Aelius 
Aristides, even the diatribes of Lucian, all show that the leading classes in the Greek-speaking 
portions of the Empire gradually acquiesced in the existing state of things, that they abandoned 
their dreams of liberty and worked for the consolidation of Roman power in the East.’  
75 Armstrong (1998), 30-48. Solon’s Fr. 38 including the tetrameters to Phocus is not discussed by 
Armstrong. For Hes. WD 96 better see West’s (1978), 171. See Polito (2004), 
76 See Morgan (1998), 125-126 for riches; 127 for self-control, and 132-133 for virtue. 
77 On literacy in the Greek and Roman worlds see Harris (1989). 
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them instead.78 This meant that both aristocrats, but also sometimes slaves, 
needed to have possessed a lower level of the enkyklos paideia, or common 
education, which consisted of grammar, literature, rhetoric and dialectic among 
other things.79 However, the Hermotimus is a dialogue, and the genre of the 
dialogue maintained a special reputation as higher literature among other lesser 
literary genres. It has been argued that Lucianic dialogues could have been 
performed,80 but perhaps it is more likely that they were read in more intimate 
occasions such as symposia or other private readings. The dividing features of a 
sophist and a philosopher were not always clear, and sometimes sophists could 
give speeches in the form of dialogues. But even though sophists and 
philosophers wrote dialogues, this remained the most distinctive genre of 
philosophy,81 and its style was thought to deal with more serious matters about 
epistemology, ethics, and the order of the cosmos. In this sense, we can 
speculate that Lucian might have had in mind as his reader, an educated 
individual or at least a youngster who had started his mese paideia. In support of 
the latter, one might think back to the large group of young students who are 
listening earnestly to the old teacher of philosophy at the end of the 
Hermotimus,82 or indeed of the example of the student who is sent to study 
philosophy with the teacher by his uneducated and ordinary (ἄγροικος 
ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἰδιώτης) uncle.83 Camerotto has tried to show that even though 
it is better when readers can understand the parodied text, it is not necessary 
for them to know it for them to experience a μάθησις about paideia. However, 
the Hermotimus is a complex dialogue that contains quite an elaborate set of 
                                                          
78 Cf. Quint, Inst. 1. I. 28. See Harris (1989) 249. 
79 Morgan citing Philo 114 De Cong. 11-18, 74-6, 142, 148-50. 
80 Ureña Bracero, Andrieu 
81 Russell 1968; König 2009. See also Reardon 1971 p. 155-180 whose emphasis on the dialogue 
form leads him to place Lucian’s work in the context of the major literary movements of his 
time. For the history of dialogue as a literary genre see Hösle’s 2012 important book on the 
poetics and hermeneutics of the philosophical dialogue p. 71-121, specifically on Lucian, p. 44, 
94, 100,118 and Hirzel 1895 p. II. 277, 306, 312, 314. 
82 Luc. Herm. 80. 
83 Luc. Herm 81-82. 
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philosophical arguments and various direct and indirect references to Hesiod, 
Homer, Hippocrates, and other authors from antiquity. We might, therefore, 
speculate that it was written with the hope that it would have been read in 
private occasions by a more specialised audience. Owing to the general trend in 
book commerce and as the Hermotimus seems to emulate a philosophical text, it 
can be speculated that the more probable readers of the Hermotimus apart from 
being relatively well-trained pepaideumenoi, would have also been members of 
the ruling class. 
 Most of the power of the ruling class, which consisted of the various 
communities across the Roman Empire were directly linked through the 
delegation of power from the Emperor, on whom decision making was 
ultimately centralized, as well as the Roman Senate, laid in its honour. Military 
power, police and law enforcement were fundamental in keeping the structure 
of the Roman Empire intact. Ancient honour was the ‘public veredict’ of a 
man’s qualities and achievements in relation to his position in society.84  These 
qualities included high birth in an important place, wealth, legal status, glory in 
war, property and public displays of slaves and clients, clothing, and education. 
However, aristocrats of the Empire had to ensure that their offspring kept their 
family’s honour (τιμή or honos), which consisted of both economic and cultural 
capital. It was aristocratic honour that allowed the Emperor and its government 
to maintain authority, and to help it in its job the ruling class advertised their 
classical and imitable moral virtues through institutional propaganda which 
was found on coins, in cults and inscriptions, in art and architecture, and in 
education. In Greece, since the times of Homer, honour and the military glory 
attached to it were central to the identity of the aristocracy. It was expected of 
the nobility that they maintain their honour, and that they kept it from others 
who competed with them by achieving greater reputation in combat, by 
claiming higher birth, more wealth, or having stronger arguments. Even though 
                                                          
84 Lendon p. 36 
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the Homeric world and Lucian’s world were very different from one another, 
Latin writers and thinkers adapted the Athenian concept of honour, which to 
the Roman Empire remained an aristocratic moral value of vital importance.  
 Through the practice of euergetism the aristocracy showed its superiority 
by constructing aqueducts, baths, libraries, and stadiums, all of which were 
allegedly useful for the entire city. Very often aristocrats would also build 
theatres or would organize events such as literary symposia, in which all the 
literati could show-off their skills. During Lucian’s lifetime, drama, and comedy 
in particular, experienced a revival, but it was also through writing, and mostly 
declamation that the aristocrat was able to display his individual competence in 
Greek paideia. Indeed, such a display, is made particularly visible in 
Philostratus’ Lives of the Sophists.  
 In some ways philosophy purported values contrary to ‘ordinary’ 
education. Philosophers like Hermotimus, who claimed to understand better 
the nature of the cosmos, could laugh at those who sought a traditional 
understanding of τιμή. From Socrates onwards, the reputation of philosophers 
presented itself as problematic in its divergence from traditional reputation, 
which emanated from τιμή. Being a philosopher implied the choice of 
particular way of living (prohairesis), which led to freedom from the 
conventional pursuit of honour and the political life, and the opportunity to live 
a theoretical life in which moral excellence was seen as the most valuable 
element for a good and happy life. Philosophers claimed to conduct their lives 
and to carry out their social duties according to real virtue, and thereby 
considered other goals to be mistakenly perceived as virtuous and to be 
unimportant distractions. Since the Hellenistic period philosophy had focused 
on self-transformation, through the common analogy between the soul and the 
city, but it had kept to some extent its utopian and political agenda, which 
could on some occasions challenge basic established social forms. Philosophers 
did not earn their reputation from their linguistic skills, but from their alleged 
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superior knowledge of the soul, of goodness, and of the order of the cosmos. 
Dio went as far as to declare that philosophers despised everyone.85 Behind the 
philosopher’s asceticism was the aim of becoming holy. In return for their 
alleged contempt and rejection of public life, philosophers were honoured, 
indeed sometimes even having statues erected to them as in the interesting 
cases of Apuleius and Aelius Aristides.86 
 But although asceticism might always represent a problem for the order 
of the Roman Empire, and regardless of whether philosophy had sometimes 
also been problematic for the ruling classes,87 for the most part it was a system 
of thought and life stule that found itself on good terms with the values of the 
aristocracy. In Lucian’s time philosophia had become part of paideia and was a 
shared tradition between Greeks and Romans. Philosophy had experienced a 
revival in the Antonine Era after the philhellenic Emperor Hadrian, who was 
particularly influenced by his wife Plotina, and who allowed Epicureanism to 
flourish in Athens as well as all philosophy in general.88 Antoninus Pius, for 
example, fixed in an edict the maximum number of doctors and teachers who 
could qualify for tax immunity in a city of a given size, but added that since 
philosophers were rare, those philosophers that were already rich might give 
their money to improve the city. Those who did not do so, would be exposed as 
false philosophers.89 Being counted as a philosopher might mean that one could 
enjoy exemption from taxation.90 Marcus Aurelius established an institution 
known as the Imperial Chairs of Philosophy, which was created to support the 
cult of Athena in the Acropolis.91 This institution seems to have been the result 
of a quarrel between Herodes Atticus and the Athenians, and it offered an 
                                                          
85 Dio. 64. 13.1 
86 Gsell (1922) n. 2115. Cf. Apul. Flor. XVI. Philost. VS 582. 
87 Francis (1995), 2. 
88 See Oliver (1981) 
89 Digest. 6. 1.6.2-7. 
90 Millar (1977) 491-506.  
91 Oliver 1967 p. 329. See Millar (1977) 502; Hahn (1989) 119-27 for the Imperial Chairs. 
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option for those rich individual interested in culture, thereby contrasting 
sharply with the Areopagus that dealt specifically with political offices. 
Herodes Atticus seems to have been in charge of appointing a member for each 
one of the chairs of philosophy in order to to represent the Platonist, Epicurean, 
Stoic and Aristotelian schools.92 Each philosopher would earn 10,000 drachmas 
a year, the equivalent of 60,000 sesterces. If Juvenal is to be believed, 2000 
sesterces were paid to Quintilian per student each year, an amount four times 
greater than the average grammarian got and therefore an attractive sum 
indeed.93 However, we do not know much about the structure and organization 
of philosophical schools, or about how they managed to sustain themselves. 
Some of these schools might have emerged as θιάσοι and as such may have 
been institutions owned by the community. However, by Lucian’s time, and to 
judge from what we know of the Academy, euergetism seems to have been the 
way in which the schools managed to survive. The Academy seems to have 
been always supported by patrons, and only later became self-supporting. 
Marinus, for example, speaks of Theagenes, who was an eponymous archon of 
Athens, a patricius, and a member of the senate of Constantinople as an 
euergetes, and it seems that he supported the institution with money which was 
to be spent on teachers and doctors.94 In this competitive high-class 
environment, philosophers such as like Hermotimus might well have laughed 
at other philosophical sects believing them to be uneducated and misleading 
about the nature of virtue. In this way, philosophy presented itself as a very 
complex phenomenon in which a philosopher could live the ascetic life of a 
sage on the one hand, and on the other behave as an intellectual who enjoyed, 
perhaps too much, the economic benefits of philosophical τιμή. In any case, to 
                                                          
92 Birley (1966), 195. 
93 Birley (1966), 243. 
94 Marinus speaks of him as an euergetes (Procl. 29) and a benefactor of the academy, see Dillon 
(2005) 1-17. 
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the eyes of the common crowd, both kinds of philosophers had the power to 
challenge the reputation of most traditional aristocrats. 
 However, philosophers and aristocrats alike may have feared the 
monetization of the economy as such rewards could potentially damage the 
hierarchy established by honour. Even in this late period, some landowners 
might avoid using money by leaving to negotiatores the merchandizing of their 
products.95 However, due to urbanization and to the stimulus to monetization 
caused by the Roman army, increasingly more aristocrats were induced into the 
use of money,96 and this led to social mobility of people who would not 
necessarily be part of the aristocracy. Such social shifts are found expressed in 
the poems of Juvenal and Martial.97 To read the Hermotimus as a warning 
against philosophical ambition and the ambition for power and riches, allows 
for the possibility that this text to have been written by a hand that was trying 
to appeal to a relatively large numbers of readers that belonged to a reduced 
number of elite aristocrat pepaideumenoi and who feared changes brought by 
asceticism and monetization. Therefore, perhaps rather than trying to find in 
Lucian’s fictionalization of his own life evidence for spiritual developement, as 
argued by Francis,98 we should see Lucian’s inevitable attacks against asceticism 
as a defence against all that threatened Greek education in a general sense, and 
by extension, the aristocracies of the Roman empire. By adopting this particular 
reading, the intention of Lucian’s texts in which is difficult to assert whether his 
philosophers are savours or charlatans,99 or which seem to de-centralize and 
subvert the ‘author’ are made clearer. Through this particular reading, the 
relationship between Lucian’s Syrianess, hellenismos and latinitas as well as his 
paideutic identity emerges. 
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